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1 Contesting land and custom in Ghana:
Introduction
Kojo Amanor and Janine Ubink
Since the 1990s there has been a resurgence of interest in land tenure
reform in Africa, which is reflected in a growing academic and policy
oriented literature on the subject, and in the implementation of new
land tenure reform policies and programmes and new legislation. In
policy circles, recent concerns with land tenure are characterised by a
distinctive approach, which focusses on building and facilitating the
emergence of land markets, on promoting the rule of law and property
rights, and on integrating customary and formal land tenures and the
‘empowerment’ of customary institutions as part of a trend towards de-
centralised government administration. In contrast to the dominant
global approaches to land reform under modernisation during the
1960s, the major focus is now on institutional and administrative re-
form rather than equitable redistribution of land.
During the 1960s and 1970s land administration in Africa was influ-
enced by the paradigms of modernisation theory, which sought to re-
place a traditional ‘backward’ agricultural sector with modern farming
based on mechanisation and synthetic inputs. Agricultural modernisa-
tion focussed on promoting a cadre of elite or ‘progressive’ farmers,
whose adoption of new technologies would eventually trickle down to
the peasantry. Within this modernisation framework customary land
tenure was viewed as outdated. It did not provide individual farmers
with secure and fungible rights in land. It was argued that this inhib-
ited long-term investment in the productivity of land since users were
not sure they would retain ownership over a long period. It also pre-
vented the development of financial and risk markets, in which farm-
ers would be able to use their title to land as collateral for loans and
mortgages. Under the influence of modernisation theory, land tenure
reform was based on promoting land titling and the creation of state
cadastres through which farmers could register their land. However,
land registration and titling procedures were cumbersome and expen-
sive and only a tiny minority of rich farmers registered their land. The
cost of titling was beyond the means of the majority of smallholders
and most of them continued to hold their land under customary or in-
formal arrangements.
With the implementation of structural adjustment programmes and
neo-liberal policies in the 1980s, the major emphasis in development
policy turned towards opening African economies to the private sector
and foreign investment. However, the expansion of foreign investment
required an institutional framework which promoted a regulatory fra-
mework for transactions in land and which would enable policies pro-
moting free markets to translate into functioning and transparent
property and land markets. The requisites for this transformation in-
clude easy access to information about transactions, clearly demarcated
property rights, the enforcement of property transactions and contracts,
and the speedy registration of transactions and ownership changes.
Early approaches to land tenure administrative reform under structural
adjustment promoted by the World Bank and other donors thus also
focussed on promoting land titling and registration (Bruce et al. 1994;
Deininger and Binswanger 1999; Feder and Noronha 1987; Feeny
1988; Lipton 1993).
The continued focus on titling and registration was not uncontested.
Given that much land lay under customary ownership and that rights
in this sector were often contested, the translation of customary land
into formal tenure was not easily achieved without establishing proce-
dures for transparency in the recognition of rights in the customary
sector. The focus on extending titling was challenged by World Bank
sponsored research that looked at the relationship between security of
tenure, land markets, and investment in land or agricultural develop-
ment in various African countries (Bruce and Migot-Adholla 1994).
This research argued that there was no direct correlation between titles
to land and long-term investment in land, since investment was condi-
tional upon the existence of another set of infrastructures, such as
functioning land markets – on which the development of collateral and
ability of banks to foreclose on mortgages was dependent – as well as
credit and insurance markets. In place of full-titling programmes, the
authors recommended ‘community-based’ solutions that would decen-
tralise land administration to communities.
This approach also resonated with approaches to development policy
that had developed from the 1970s in Africa, which were critical of the
state and state-community relations. These often focussed on the
rationality of local level management strategies and institutional frame-
works, and on the adverse effects that state interventions often had on
the community level. The inclusion of articles by John Bruce in Reyna
and Downs (1988) Land and Society in Contemporary Africa, and in Bas-
set and Crummey (1993) Land in African Agrarian Systems, and the
seminal influence of these articles, marked the convergence of these
two approaches and the mainstreaming of community-based develop-
ment approaches into land policy.
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This position led to a polarisation of land reform approaches within
the World Bank, between those advocating individual land titling as a
way of promoting market development, and those supporting decentra-
lised community-based management in response to rolling back the
state (Deininger and Binswanger 1999). Eventually, there was an ac-
commodation between these approaches, which has resulted in the in-
corporation of a framework supporting the recognition of customary te-
nures within the evolutionary theory of property rights (Deininger
2003). Within this framework it is now accepted that community-based
or customary systems are dynamic and changing, and are evolving to-
wards individual property rights systems in response to economic
changes. Thus, by supporting these systems and the institutional pro-
cess of change within them, secure property rights will eventually
emerge in a movement from communal rights to extended family
rights, and then to the rights of individuals and atomistic nuclear fa-
milies. The atomistic family farm is seen as the highest evolutionary
form of property (Binswanger and Deininger 1993; Deininger 2003;
See Amanor 1999 for discussion on the relationship between the fa-
mily farm and agribusiness).
The dynamics and negotiability of customary relations
The recognition of the dynamism and adaptability of customary land
tenure systems originates within social science research. Berry has ar-
gued that African land tenure systems are adaptive arrangements
which are negotiated, fluid, open, and ambiguous (Berry 1993). Rather
than being fixed and conservative, customary relations are seen as
being perpetually negotiated by various actors who use their social net-
works to redefine and renegotiate customary relations (Berry 1993 and
2001). People invest in social status and networks of community and
kin and use their social status to make claims on resources including
access to land, demands on labour, and the support of clients. Thus,
mobility and fluidity are achieved through social skills in negotiating
rules and the definition of what constitutes the customary, which is
ever changing in relation to these social networks. The fluidity of the
relations mediate markets and the planned interventions of states,
which become another potential source of claims on resources. In con-
trast with policy approaches which seek to establish clearly defined
property rights, Berry argues that land rights within the customary sec-
tor have been ambiguous over long historical periods and that this has
not prevented people from investing in production and in social net-
works to establish their access and control over property.
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Lentz (2006c) has similarly argued that customary rights in land are
often deliberately ambiguous to allow room for further re-interpreta-
tion or renegotiation. Thus, they accommodate different perspectives
and different interests. Juul and Lund (2002) argue that negotiability
of rules and relations is one of the fundamental characteristics of Afri-
can societies. Property rights are institutions in which people’s access
to, use of, and control over land are regularised and readjusted in the
ongoing reconstruction and transformation of social relations. Social
identities are contested zones in which people’s claims are constantly
being disputed and renegotiated. They argue that far from being rooted
in ascriptive social relations, customary relations are constantly chan-
ging and reaffirmed. Rather than resulting from the static nature of
tradition, stable and robust customary relations result from the con-
stant reaffirmation of existing social relations. Thus, customary rela-
tions are only as enduring as their on-going re-enactment, negotiation
and renegotiation. Juul and Lund argue that this fluidity of the custom-
ary not only results from the nature of the customary but also from the
interaction between the customary and other institutions, particularly
the existence of legal and institutional pluralism and an unwillingness
to fix the rules and ensure constancy and compliance. This encourages
people to renegotiate identities and social relations to either confirm
existing arrangements or to change them. Thus the customary involves
a continuous negotiation within and without. It involves a trade off
with state institutions in which both sectors attempt to anticipate each
other and redefine themselves against the institutional configurations
and changes within the other. This results in a state of affairs in which
both sectors incorporate elements of the other and in which the formal
and informal continually adapt to each other and construct their identi-
ties in each other’s image. The customary is frequently as modern as
the formal sector, and the modern legal framework often bases itself
on developments within the informal customary sector.
Harmonising customary and state relations
The emphasis on the flexibility, negotiability and adaptability of cus-
tomary land tenure, and its social agency or embeddedness in social re-
lations has generated a new policy oriented research which focusses on
the institutional relationship between formal and informal land tenure
systems. This research sees the customary as largely being inclusive
and equitable against a state sector which is exclusive, inequitable, and
favours the interests of political elites. While the state sector formulates
rules and regulations about land, the majority of land users hold land
on customary tenure, in systems that lie beyond the reach of the state
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and beyond formal legal frameworks. This approach advocates the har-
monisation of formal and informal systems through greater recogni-
tion of community institutions for land management and through the
decentralisation of land administration to community organisations,
which enables rural people to negotiate and manage their own solu-
tions for securing access to land (Lavigne Delville 2000; Toulmin and
Quan 2000a). It is argued that increasing devolution of land adminis-
tration to local and customary-based institutions will result in a more
equitable management of land, which allows rural people to be in-
volved in the negotiation of rights to lands. Increasing recognition of
the customary will also result in its greater accountability and the
transparency of land markets at the local level, which will have to con-
form to criteria negotiated between local institutions and the state.
Social differentiation and power
Several researchers have questioned the conception of the negotiability
and equity of customary land tenure systems. They stress the fact that
negotiators or contestants in customary land matters seldom operate
on level playing fields (Amanor 1999; Cousins 2002; Daley and Hob-
ley 2005; Juul and Lund 2002; Lund 2000; Peters 2002; Shipton
2002; and Woodhouse 2003). Some have more negotiating power and
more defining and contesting powers than others, and not everything
is negotiable. As Lund (2008:2) puts it, ‘[t]he openness and contin-
gency of land issues in Africa make absolutely central the questions of
how and to whose benefit settlements are reached, who has the capa-
city to endorse or enforce them, and how and by whom they are chal-
lenged’. From a gender perspective Whitehead and Tsikata (2003) ar-
gue that customary systems often embody patriarchal values and
power, which seeks to exclude women from land. Women are not well
positioned within customary political institutional frameworks or with-
in local government frameworks to represent their own interests. Thus,
the harmonisation of the customary with the formal, and the turn to
the customary, often further marginalise women’s rights, and serve to
legitimate institutions that undermine women’s rights to land. They ar-
gue that in many respects, rather than decentralisation to community
based structures rooted in customary concerns, a state institutional
structure in which gender concerns can be brought to bear can offer
better prospects for women’s land rights to be addressed.
In a critique of the framework of evolutionary property rights and
communitarian perspective on land administration, Amanor (1999)
has argued that the qualities which are adduced as the flexibility and
negotiability of customary land often emerge from the interests of the
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political elites in rural and urban areas who are able to continually re-
define customary tenure to meet their interests and to dispossess rural
toilers of their access to land and natural resources. He argues that
since the colonial period governments have recognised and invented
the control of land by chiefs as a strategy for gaining control over land,
natural resources, and agricultural production at the expense of the
poor peasantry. While the customary continually changes in relation to
transformation in policy and the economy, the negotiations over the
customary (or investments in social networks able to carry out pro-
cesses of redefinition) are limited to those with wealth and power, and
elude the rural poor who increasingly find themselves excluded, dispos-
sessed, and marginalised by the customary. In a similar vein Pauline
Peters (2004) argues that there is mounting evidence of increasing so-
cial differentiation within Africa and expropriation of land by local and
non-local elites. Peters (2004:270) urges that:
More emphasis needs to be placed by researchers on who bene-
fits and who loses from instances of ‘negotiability’ in access to
land, an analysis that, in turn, needs to be situated in broader
political economic and social changes taking place over the past
century, particularly during the past thirty or so years. This re-
quires a theoretical move away from privileging contingency,
flexibility, and negotiability that, willy-nilly, ends by suggesting
an open field, to one that is able to identify those situations and
processes (including commodification, structural adjustment,
market liberalization and globalization) that limit or end nego-
tiation and flexibility for certain social groups or categories.
Several studies within Ghana show increasing social differentiation
within rural areas, increasing conflicts over land and rifts between
rural elites, chiefs and producers, which question notions about the ne-
gotiability of customary land. Tonah’s (2002 and 2006) research in
Northern and Middle Ghana analyses the rising land use conflicts re-
sulting from intense competition between indigenous farmers and mi-
grant Fulani pastoralists for the most fertile land. In these areas chiefs
prefer to give land to migrants, especially the pastoralists who are rich
in cattle and can afford to make substantial payments as settlement
fees. Allocating land to migrant pastoralists has become a ‘gateway to
prosperity’ for many chiefs. As a result, farmers do not see traditional
authorities as impartial dispute settlers, but believe them to take sides
with stockowners and pastoralists because they benefit directly from
their presence and activities in the area. In the Sefwi area of Western
Ghana Boni (2005; 2006) has shown that chiefs have consistently
changed and revised the conditions on which land has been given out
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to migrants, and how recently redefined customary norms apply retro-
spectively to previous contractual agreements. Thus, transactions which
were understood as the alienation of land have been re-interpreted as
the payment of tribute for land leases, and amounts paid as tribute
have been constantly inflated. Attempts to redefine customary tenure
have often been resisted by migrants, and chiefs have mobilised dis-
gruntled youth within the area to engage in violent confrontations with
migrants as a way to force them to accept the new impositions or to
dispossess them of the land. When land was first given out to mi-
grants, it had little scarcity value and was given on favourable terms,
since the migrants, unlike locals, had the capital to invest in cocoa
farming. The early migrants thus opened up the area for development
initiatives, with the state investing in areas which became important
cocoa growing centres. The opening up of these areas brought an in-
flux of new migrants and new demands for land, which raised the
value of land. As land values increased, chiefs found new ways to aug-
ment their revenues from older lands transacted on more favourable
terms to the farmers, particularly when the already allocated land be-
gan to exceed remaining unclaimed forests. In this context, the ever-
changeability of customary land does not create security for cocoa
farmers but creates increasing insecurity as chiefs are increasingly em-
powered over customary land. Similar experiences have been documen-
ted for Coˆte d’Ivoire (Chauveau 2005).
Ubink (2008a) has described how, in peri-urban areas around Kuma-
si with a growing demand for real estate, chiefs are attempting to rede-
fine customary tenure as a way of dispossessing farmers on the peri-
meters of towns, to give out the land to wealthy urban dwellers willing
to pay large amounts for residential land. Ubink documents differing
relations and outcomes in different settlements depending on the ‘en-
lightenment’ of the chief, which serves to highlight the lack of account-
ability of chiefly authority and the ability of chiefs to redefine custom-
ary relations to meet their interests. Ubink argues that the failure of
the state to hold chiefs accountable results in a complicity in failing to
establish accountability in customary land tenure.
Current land administration initiatives
National laws and government policies constitute a structure of oppor-
tunities for the negotiation of rights and redistribution of resources,
although the result is neither coherent policy implementation nor a
complete disregard of law and policy (Lund 2008:4). Several policy in-
itiatives have been launched in African countries during the 1990s to
create new institutional land management frameworks that give greater
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roles to customary institutions and authorities and create institutional
linkages between state and customary systems (Benjaminsen and Lund
2003; Toulmin et al. 2002; Toulmin and Quan 2000a).
Within Ghana the main vehicle for attaining land administration re-
form has been the Land Administration Project (LAP). The stated aim
of the LAP is to lay the foundation for an accountable, harmonious,
and transparent customary land administration system from the bot-
tom up which will then form the bedrock for an enhanced formal land
administration in Ghana. This is done with the intention of both en-
hancing the tenure security of smallholder farmers and facilitating
speedy transactions and registration of land to enable investors to pur-
chase land in Ghana with confidence. To achieve an effective registra-
tion of land in Ghana, administration is being decentralised to Cus-
tomary Land Secretariats (CLSs), which are associated with traditional
rulers. At present a number of pilot secretariats have been established
in different parts of the country. By placing the CLSs under the author-
ity of chiefs the LAP ignores the fact that chiefs often exercise custom-
ary privileges and use their powers to redefine land relations in their
interest and to dispossess the powerless. The LAP has chosen to work
within the existing power structures of chieftaincy rather than to at-
tempt to create a more democratic framework for land management.
This enables the traditional elites to further their interests in land.
There is evidence that chiefs are resisting attempts to introduce more
transparent and accountable procedures for recording their incomes
from land transactions and are using the CLSs to gain further control
over land (Ubink and Quan 2008).
LAP implementation began without the promotion of systematic dia-
logue in Ghana about the form and content of land reform, although a
series of ten regional land policy consultation fora and one national
forum took place in late 2007. The LAP has largely been implanted
through recommendations of foreign consultants and the national land
sector bureaucracy. It fails to take into account the considerable recent
research on customary land within Ghana and the critique of neo-liber-
al land policies. It is only following the adoption of the LAP that a ma-
jor research project has been funded in Ghana to examine land poli-
cies, the ISSER Land Tenure and Land Reform Project, which is produ-
cing a large number of case studies and generating a debate through a
number of workshops.1 Within rural areas the incorporation of the
CLS under the authority of traditional authorities has inhibited debate
about land, since farmers who can be dispossessed by chiefs may fear
being critical which might result in the wrath of chiefly power. In con-
trast to the communitarian perspective which presents the customary
as the site of open and equal negotiation, rural producers are often
wary to carry their land cases to traditional authorities, since they are
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seen as parties with particular interests in land who may use the oppor-
tunity to extract revenues from the litigants or dispossess them of the
land, and often prefer to appeal to state institutions, if the disputes can-
not be settled within extended family and village institutions (Crook et
al. 2007). Paradoxically, while the communitarian perspective aims to
create more negotiability in land and voice for the rural poor, its at-
tempt to harmonise the customary with the formal often closes down
the multiple institutional choices available within the situation of insti-
tutional and legal pluralism and forces rural land users to deal with
customary authorities who are not democratically elected or accounta-
ble. This carries the danger of further marginalising and disempower-
ing marginalised groups, including the rural poor and the poorer sec-
tions of women, youth, and toiling migrants.
The scope of this work
The various contributions to this book critically examine notions of
customary land tenure. They examine the relations between the cus-
tomary and statutory tenure and the institutional interactions between
the state and traditional authorities in land administration, addressing
issues of power, economic interests, transparency, accountability, con-
flicts and notions of social justice, equity, and negotiation. They exam-
ine both past and contemporary policy issues, and present a number of
case studies with implications for the integration of customary institu-
tions into the framework of state land administration. The first four pa-
pers by Berry, Amanor, Boni, and Tonah are concerned with the nature
of customary institutions, historical changes in the customary, and the
ways in which notions of the customary are manipulated by local elites
and the state and are subject to political reinterpretation, redefinition,
and invention. The next two papers by Crook and Ubink are concerned
with local perceptions of customary and state institutions involved in
land management, the ways in which the plurality of institutions are
negotiated and utilised, issues of accountability, and the role of the
state in enforcing accountability and transparency in customary set-
tings. The final chapter by Quan, Ubink, and Antwi examines pro-
blems of implementing contemporary land policy reform in the Land
Administration Project (LAP).
In the first contribution to this volume, Sara Berry analyses the sal-
ience of history in local struggles over property and power through a
comparative study of socio-economic and political change in the former
cocoa frontiers of southwestern Ghana and Coˆte d’Ivoire. In both coun-
tries, the process of forest clearance and tree crop cultivation was car-
ried out by migrant farmers. While the first migrants in both countries
CONTESTING LAND AND CUSTOM IN GHANA: INTRODUCTION 17
encountered little difficulty in getting access to land, the terms on
which they did so and their subsequent relations with host commu-
nities differed significantly. In Ghana immigrants obtained cultivation
rights from local chiefs, for which they paid substantial annual pay-
ments. In Coˆte d’Ivoire farmers obtained land from village elders or fa-
mily heads, and relations between hosts and migrants were discussed
in terms of the tutorat, a form of guardianship which perpetuates a pa-
tronage relationship between autochthones and strangers, serving as
an institution for transacting land with migrants and incorporating
them into the local community based on a moral economy of obliga-
tion and reciprocity, including presentation of gifts and mutual assis-
tance at times of funerals and other social events.
Within Ghana the state did not interfere in local tenure arrange-
ments between hosts and migrants, while in Coˆte d’Ivoire the state in-
tervened to ensure migrants gained access to land, while assuring the
host communities that their claims on the land remained intact. This
was done ambiguously, without abolishing or reforming customary te-
nure or customary laws and conventions. The Ivorian president Hou-
phouet-Boigny merely announced in 1963 that ‘land belongs to the one
who develops it’. On the ground, party cadres and local officials fol-
lowed his lead, reassuring local villagers of the moral force of the tutor-
at, while settling individual disputes in favour of the migrants who pro-
duced the greater part of the cocoa that fed the state’s coffers. The
claims of the migrants were dependent upon the patronage of the
state. This generated social conflicts and tensions based on notions of
entitlement, ancestry, origins, and interpretations of history, as well as
the renegotiation of the tutorat. Local communities maintained their
claims to land on the basis of custom while migrants made claims on
the basis of their relationship with the state. With increasing shortage
of land in Coˆte d’Ivoire, the intensification of rural struggles provided
fertile ground for political mobilisation with the return of multi-party
elections at the end of the 1980s. This coincided with ethno-regional
antagonisms over national power and political exclusion, which
brought ‘ethnic’ conflicts into electoral politics with disastrous effects.
This was further exacerbated by the crisis in the cocoa-growing areas
and neo-liberal insistence on the promotion of a single model of ‘open’
markets and multi-party elections, and by political opportunism on the
part of the main competing political factions. While many of these con-
flicts over ‘ancestral’ belonging and ‘traditional’ prerogatives also oc-
curred in Ghana, they were fought along more localised lines. By pla-
cing contemporary land issues in historical and comparative perspec-
tive, Berry underscores the connections between land, politics and
citizenship, and the directions in which they change under different
policy and political initiatives.
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In the second chapter Kojo Amanor also deals with processes of
transformation and contestation of customary law. He argues that the
characterisation of customary land relations is a product of the domi-
nant interests of political alliances rather than a historical fact. He
shows how the depiction of customary relations as based on communal
forms of tenure – in which the chief holds the land in trust for the
community – is a political invention. This invention was created in the
colonial period firstly to constrain the development of land markets,
which were viewed by the colonial authority as a threat to the peasant-
based export crop economy which they sought to promote, and sec-
ondly to empower chiefs on whom the system of rural administration
by Native Authorities depended. During the nineteenth century, there
was marked social differentiation within the Gold Coast, and consider-
able transactions in land took place. Under colonial rule the colonial
administration sought to protect customary land tenure systems from
the market by vesting lands in paramount chiefs and by preventing the
rise of a class of indigenous land speculators. Since indigenous com-
munity members had an inherent right to use land for free, chiefs who
wanted to gain revenue alienated land to outsiders. This resulted in the
rapid alienation of land to migrant farmers, hungry for land to invest
in cocoa farming and foreign concessionaires. This has often resulted
in land scarcity for local poor farmers, youth, and women, as unused
land is alienated to migrants and appropriated for sale. It often creates
insecure access to land for migrants, who find that as land becomes
more valuable, chiefs attempt to renegotiate the terms of ownership.
Amanor argues that present policy initiatives, which attempt to make
land distribution more equitable and transparent by strengthening cus-
tomary forms, are misplaced, since the customary forms are reinvented
traditions which express the interests of elite factions. He illustrates
this by showing a multiplicity of customary forms, which are margina-
lised and do not enter into policy frameworks. Contemporary notions
of customary tenure assume that notions of ownership or rights over
particular plots of land are based on entitlements to fixed plots of land,
mapped out by customary rulers and family heads. However, in many
farming systems based on shifting cultivation, rights to land arise out
of the changing dynamics of the rotation of land, which requires con-
stant movements over changing plots of land and negotiations between
neighbouring farmers. Farming plots expand and retract according to
the farmers’ access to labour, soil fertility, the concentration of farmers,
conflicts over resources, and other factors. Under these types of farm-
ing systems land plots are not easily mapped and digitised, since they
are constantly changing. However, within these areas, contemporary
notions of customary land ownership open up the alienation of land
and dispossession of shifting cultivators to a class of wealthy local and
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migrant tree planters. Amanor argues that notions of customary privi-
lege are often used by an alliance of local elites, aspiring investors, and
agents of the state to justify accumulation and the dispossession of the
poor and marginalised of their land.
Amanor’s contribution shows that the customary realm is not inde-
pendent of the state. On the contrary, the shaping and reconstruction of
custom by local elites often take place through a close alliance with the
state. Economic and administrative considerations have led the state to
side with the powerful elite, accepting claims of chiefly control over
smallholders’ claims for livelihood rights, and the demands of para-
mount chiefs over local chiefs, ignoring historical evidence pointing in
other directions. The state institutions justify their actions with the dis-
course of egalitarian communities and traditional leadership in the best
interest of the entire community and nation. In reality, however, chiefs
often use their power to expropriate and profit from community land.
Thus, state policy that strengthens chieftaincy and chiefly control over
land, and ignores contested definitions of the customary presented by
other interest groups, will tend to promote highly unequal development
in rural areas and ignite considerable social turmoil and upheaval.
Stefano Boni’s contribution continues with the topic of struggles
around chiefly prerogatives. The chapter is based on field study in the
Sefwi Wiawso and Juabeso-Bia districts of the Western Region. He de-
scribes disputes in four different realms: conflicts among chiefs, dis-
putes concerning the rights of immigrant farmers, age-related confron-
tations, and conflicts concerning the determination of appropriate com-
pensation for wives’ marital toil. In all these realms Boni shows that
the customary tenure system is ambiguous and constantly shifting,
and that this ambiguity and indeterminacy are being defended and pre-
served by the chiefs, the people with interpreting powers. This allows
for differentiation of norms according to people’s ethnicity, ancestry,
gender, and age. The customary elite who control the administration of
land consists of the same people who have interpreting powers. They
are therefore able to preserve and exploit the unequal conditions and
profit from new values in land. This becomes especially evident in the
cases concerning immigrants; when chiefs try to unilaterally change
the conditions of land ‘contracts’ with immigrants, disputes arising
from these redefinitions are mainly dealt with in the ‘courts’ of the very
same chiefs. This shows the near impossibility to circumvent chiefly ar-
bitration, as well as the lack of alternative and more impartial channels
for redress for the immigrant farmers.
The disputes within these four realms again clearly show the impact
of the state on customary land tenure – sometimes through certain di-
rect actions, but often also through decisions not to intervene in local
struggles. Boni argues that the state’s actions should be seen within
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the existent ‘land tenure orthodoxy’; a discourse of egalitarian commu-
nities, traditional leadership administering land on the basis of a clear
set of unchanging criteria of land allocation in the best interest of the
entire community, in which conflicts are considered as misunderstand-
ings of the interpretation of tradition. The dominant idiom and inter-
pretation of traditions are constantly questioned by the marginalised
groups, but they often do not find accessible platforms through which
they can address their grievances and complaints to state agencies.
Steve Tonah presents a case study of the village of Biu and its neigh-
bouring communities in the Kassena-Nankana District of northeastern
Ghana. Tonah traces the transformation of land tenure arrangements
in that area, in the context of, first, colonial rule and then the develop-
ment of a large-scale state-sponsored irrigation project from the 1970s.
Both periods witnessed continuing struggles between earth priests,
chiefs, and state agencies for control, allocation and management of
lands. Prior to colonial rule, settlements in the area were under the po-
litical and religious headship of earth priests (Tengnyono), the tradi-
tional leaders of the first-comer clans, who would also function as the
custodians and administrators of the land. Each clan within a settle-
ment was autonomous and governed by its own clan head, who would
consult the earth priest in cases of disputes and for general directions
on the administration of the clan. During the colonial period, the var-
ious clan heads were transformed into headman, and later chiefs,
whom the colonial government regarded as the political representatives
of the people. This sidelined the earth priests and altered the balance
of power. The various hitherto independent and autonomous chiefs
were later grouped into a hierarchy with the creation of village, divi-
sional, and paramount chiefs, which led to a great number of conflicts
among them. The declaration of all lands in Northern Ghana as ‘public
lands’, under the management and control of the Governor in 1927,
further curtailed the powers of the earth priests and chiefs, as their
powers with respect to land management were made subordinate to
that of the colonial government. However, the control of land by the
government was only effective in the major towns. In the rural areas,
land continued to be administered according to ‘customary law’. Since
1979, when the lands were de-vested and returned to the ownership
and control of the ‘traditional owners’, there has been an intense com-
petition between the earth priests and chiefs over who has allodial title
to the land.
In 1974 the government decided to construct an irrigation project in
the research area. Land used for the construction of the irrigation facil-
ity was expropriated by the government without consulting the land-
owners, and the payment of compensation to the landowners, through
the chiefs, was far from adequate. In all matters concerning land the
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government dealt exclusively with the chiefs, bypassing the earth
priests, which enabled the local chiefs to gradually legitimise their hold
on land in their traditional areas with the connivance and active sup-
port of the state. For instance, the Land Allocation Committee, respon-
sible for the allocation of zones and plots of land on the project, in-
cluded chiefs, not earth priests. In 1987, management was transferred
from Land Allocation Committees to Village Committees, which gener-
ally include earth priests. With the increasing participation of the com-
munities in the project, the earth priests seem to be regaining part of
the authority over land that they had lost to the state. This again in-
creases the contestations between chiefs and earth priests, as member-
ship of the Village Committee offers opportunities for economic gain
and for ensuring political support and patronage within the commu-
nity through the allocation of irrigation plots. Tonah’s paper highlights
the heavy interference of governments since the colonial period in local
power structures and customary land management in Northern Ghana
and the ways in which chiefs and earth priests have struggled to capita-
lise on new opportunities to gain control over land and access to
power.
Richard Crook examines the plurality of dispute settlement institu-
tions (DSIs) in Ghana and the DSIs to which customary landholders
turn if their land rights are threatened by the state, local government,
or the chief, or if they come into conflict with other parties. There is a
wide range of possible dispute settlement institutions to which they
can turn, ranging from state courts and administrative agencies
through superior chiefs’ customary courts to village level arbitrations
by village chiefs, family heads, elders, and community leaders. Given
the reality that most landholders in practice use mainly local and cus-
tomary forms of dispute resolution, and given the congestion and huge
backlogs in the state courts, state policy in Ghana now favours an em-
phasis on encouraging these local and customary DSIs. Crook exam-
ines the legitimacy, effectiveness, and inclusiveness of these customary
and informal local level systems of land dispute settlement based on
case studies in peri-urban Kumasi (Ashanti Region), Asunafo District
(Brong-Ahafo Region), and Nadowli South District (Upper West Re-
gion). He examines their viability as alternative dispute resolution
(ADR) institutions, and their ability to reduce the backlog of land cases
facing the state courts.
In his contribution, Crook clearly shows the influence of the colonial
government on the courts of superior chiefs. Ranger’s ‘invention of tra-
dition’ thus also applies to the functioning of customary courts (Ranger
1983). The bad reputation of these courts, often accused of corruption,
oppressive procedures, high fees, and lack of accountability for funds,
shows the ambiguity of this legacy. Crook furthermore shows how the
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ADR orthodoxy ignores differences in status and power (cf. Nader
2001), the paramount importance of which is also demonstrated in the
contributions of Amanor and Boni. He argues that superior chiefs’
courts do not in fact seem very suitable as ADR solutions, since those
with land disputes in peri-urban Kumasi and Asunafo District tended
to resort to local state courts in preference to superior chiefs’ courts,
especially if they were non-locals.
Janine Ubink examines claims and conflicts between chiefs and
smallholders over the ownership of land in peri-urban Kumasi. The
chiefs play a central and often negative role in the conversion of farm-
land to residential land, causing loss of land, jobs, and income for local
citizens. A discussion of local contestations over land rights in peri-
urban Kumasi reveals how chiefs abuse their position as guardians of
stool land and authorities in the field of customary law to claim
changes in the unwritten, ambiguous customary law. Resistance of lo-
cal citizens against the chiefs’ land conversions takes various forms,
but hardly goes through DSIs: chiefs’ courts are avoided since the
chiefs are themselves a main party in these disputes; family elders can-
not hear cases involving chiefs; and state courts are unsuited because
of their long delays in delivering judgements. In general, popular ac-
tions of resistance are often not very effective due to a combination of
eroded traditional checks and balances and the ‘policy of non-interfer-
ence’ of the current government. Ubink shows in her contribution that
the current government is not willing to place any checks and balances
on the customary realm and to a large extent leaves the interpretation
of local tenure arrangements to the local elite, for political and econom-
ic reasons, and as a result of close connections between state elite and
chiefs. Again, we see the government justifying its non-interference
with an appeal to local checks and balances.
In the second part of her paper, Ubink examines the relationship be-
tween the negative role of chiefs in land administration and people’s
views on the institution of chieftaincy and the other tasks and activities
of chiefs – including involvement in local development, sustaining law
and order, and the performance of traditional religious practices. Her
data reveal a clear correlation between chiefs’ style of land manage-
ment and overall popular assessments. These overall assessments of
chiefs, however, show no correlation with the assessments of the insti-
tution of chieftaincy, a fact that leads Ubink to conclude that people’s
opinion about chieftaincy hardly depends on the performance of cur-
rent village chiefs, or – to put it differently – the way a chief governs
barely reflects on the institution.
The last contribution to this book, a joint paper by Julian Quan, Ja-
nine Ubink, and Adarkwah Antwi focusses on the policy response to
these problems. It describes the Land Administration Project (LAP)
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Ghana, a long-term program with multi-donor support, started in
2003, that intends to reform land institutions and develop land policy
so as to provide greater certainty of land rights for ordinary land users
and enable greater discipline and efficiency in the land market. The re-
form seeks to divest government of responsibility for the management
of stool lands and to transfer this to Customary Land Secretariats
(CLSs). In initial project documents, these CLSs were characterised as
local secretariats with appropriate governance structures to assure insti-
tutionalised community-level participation and accountability in the
use of stool land and the revenue it generates. During the pilot imple-
mentation phase, however, government made the political choice that
CLSs should fall under the aegis of traditional authorities rather than
opting for more community based approaches to the management of
customary land.
Quan et al. discuss a number of difficulties encountered in the im-
plementation phase of the LAP that lie both in the customary realm
and in the state sphere. Considering the far from undisputed position
of the chiefs in Ghana and their continuous renegotiation of chiefly
prerogatives, the unwillingness of chiefs to enhance transparency and
accountability of the new CLSs – the first obstacle described by Quan
et al. – does not come as a surprise, as chiefs are profiting from these
attributes of customary land management. The implementation of LAP
is furthermore hampered by the resistance of staff of land sector agen-
cies who are supposed to implement the LAP in such a way that it will
decrease their own importance and revenue – both officially in the
forms of stipulated fees and unofficially in the form of bribes. The im-
plementation of donor-supported programs as an integral aspect of an
existing ministry’s business – mainstreaming – furthermore risks the
subjection of the project to motives of politicians and officials who aim
to utilise and allocate project resources in such a way as to legitimate
their authority, entrench bureaucratic self interest, resist institutional
change, and maximise votes, without necessarily having regard to ob-
jectives of equity and/or efficiency. A last obstacle in implementation
links up with earlier papers: the unwillingness of the government to
impose checks and balances on chiefs and to command their account-
ability. Quan et al. conclude that the approach taken in the first years
of LAP amounts to the further empowerment of chiefs through the re-
sourcing of CLSs without progressing appropriate checks and balances.
This brings significant risks that powerful customary leaders may uti-
lise CLSs to consolidate their political control over land, which will
have the perverse effect that people are disenfranchised rather than
empowered.
The various contributions to this book are characterised by two con-
cerns: a focus on processes of transformation and contestation of cus-
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tomary land tenure; and the relationship and interaction between cus-
tomary institutions and state institutions. They examine political di-
mensions of customary tenure and point to the complexity of social,
economic, and power relations involved in the harmonisation or articu-
lation of customary and state sectors. They argue that customary insti-
tutions have always involved power struggles to define the control of
land, as well as alliances and interactions between state and local-level
actors to legitimise and redefine the customary. The papers examine
the contestation over rights to land between competing traditional
authorities, between chiefs and cultivators, between chiefs, local
youths, women, and migrants, as well as the various ways in which
concepts of belonging, ancestry, history, and family relations are used
and reinterpreted to validate claims.
Tonah describes the considerable impact of the colonial and post-
colonial state on customary land management in Northern Ghana
through its policy of placing land in the north under the colonial
authority, while implementing a policy of rural administration based
on chieftaincy. This marginalised the control that earth priests exer-
cised over land and has led to struggles between earth priests and
chiefs to redefine and clarify customary ownership of land. The flow of
these local power struggles is influenced by the changing framework of
development policy and projects and the various political alliances built
by government to initiate development activities. Decisions by the state
not to intervene in customary tenure may also influence the nature of
customary tenure, allowing chiefs to redefine customary land in their
own interests as long as these do not contradict state policies. Both
kinds of state influence – direct local interventions as well as decisions
not to intervene in local struggles – can be found in the case described
by Boni. Amanor similarly argues that the existing definitions and
transformations of customary tenure result from an alliance between
state and traditional rulers that represents elite interests and justifies a
process of dispossession and land appropriation by elites in the ‘na-
tional interest’. This is echoed by what Ubink calls the ‘policy of non-
interference’ and Quan et al.’s description of the current government’s
approach to land tenure reform in the Land Administration Project.
The papers by Crook, Ubink and Quan et al. also focus on institu-
tional accountability and popular perceptions of accountability. While
Crook focusses on the legitimacy and accountability of dispute settle-
ment by chiefs, Ubink analyses a wide panoply of chiefly functions.
Both Crook and Ubink point to the need to place administration by tra-
ditional authorities within a broader framework of plural institutions
involved in administration and local government. This leads Ubink to
conclude that policymakers who wish to build on customary systems
should critically assess chiefly rule – and popular perceptions of it – in
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various fields, taking into account the performance of other actors in
these fields, including local government representatives. Based on such
assessments, governments should determine the desirability to recog-
nise, formalise, and enhance or curtail the various functions of the
chiefs. Quan et al.’s paper demonstrates, however, that this has not
been the approach taken in the implementation of the current Land
Administration Project, which has tended to empower traditional
authorities to evade downward accountability. Berry, on the other hand,
cautions that state interference in customary arrangements and at-
tempts to establish a national framework for regularising customary re-
lations can exacerbate local level tensions, drawing them into wider po-
litical conflicts which mobilise ethnic and xenophobic emotions to
achieve political ends. These types of conflicts can ultimately result in
civil war and considerable loss of life.
Note
1 Drafts of papers can be found on line at: http://www.isser.org/index.php?option=-
com_content&task=view&id=24&Itemid=11.
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2 Ancestral property: Land, politics and ‘the
deeds of the ancestors’ in Ghana and Coˆte d’Ivoire
Sara Berry
Introduction
For the last 25 years, western governments and international donor in-
stitutions have waged a concerted campaign to liberalise African politi-
cal economies – deregulating markets; privatising assets, enterprises,
and services; replacing authoritarian with elected governments; and ur-
ging African states to conduct their affairs in an open, ‘transparent’,
manner according to ‘the rule of law’. Presented as a forward-looking
agenda of economic, political, and institutional reform, neo-liberal in-
terventions promise peace and prosperity through closer integration
into the global economy. Ironically, given its resolutely modernising
thrust, implementation of the neo-liberal agenda has coincided with re-
newed emphasis on the past as a source of entitlement and legitimacy
in the present. From demands for reparations from descendants of op-
pressed peoples, to ‘indigenous peoples’ claims to territory and re-
sources, contemporary struggles over wealth and power are filled with
appeals to the past. Far from heralding ‘the end of history’ (Fukuyama
1992), recent neo-liberal efforts to remake Africa in America’s self-
image have gone hand-in-hand with vigorous debates over questions of
origin and precedent and the salience of these questions in ordering
the affairs of the present.
Struggles over land have figured prominently in neo-liberal policy
agendas and in West Africans’ experiences with them, in part because
land is both property – an economic resource valued as a means of pro-
duction and a store of wealth – and territory – governed space that
gives those who control it leverage over other people. In many West
African contexts, neo-liberal efforts to ‘clarify’ patterns of land owner-
ship and bring transparency to land transactions (through land regis-
tration, legislation, and administrative reorganisation) have added to al-
ready intense pressures on access to and control of land, intensifying
contestation not only over land per se, but also over questions of who is
eligible to make claims and who has the authority to decide. Such
struggles challenge neo-liberal assumptions about the separability of
market transactions from political processes. They also give rise to in-
tense debates over historical precedents, raising questions about widely
held assumptions that ‘customary’ rights and institutions provide a
stable or even knowable social base on which to build adjusted political
economies that are equitable as well as efficient.
The present paper addresses these questions through a comparative
case study of socio-economic and political change in the former cocoa
frontiers of southwestern Ghana and Coˆte d’Ivoire. After briefly de-
scribing the two rural localities and their respective national economic
and political contexts, the paper examines the changes in land and la-
bour relations that accompanied the process of frontier settlement and
agricultural expansion in each, discusses the role of the state in shap-
ing processes of economic growth and local governance in the cocoa
frontier regions, and describes the way struggles over land and labour
both invoked and informed debates over the relevance of the past for
questions of citizenship and belonging in the present. By placing con-
temporary land issues in perspective, historically and comparatively,
the paper underscores the connections between land, politics, and citi-
zenship, and outlines the directions in which these connections are
changing in the era of structural adjustment.1
Setting
Beginning in the late 1940s, the rich semi-humid forests of southwes-
tern Ghana and Coˆte d’Ivoire became target destinations for migrant
farmers and workers seeking access to land for growing cocoa, coffee,
and other marketable tree crops, as well as food crops for home con-
sumption and sale. Cocoa in particular served as a leading export com-
modity, fuelling the growth of national income, imports, and state rev-
enue during the early years of independence, and increasing both
economies’ vulnerability to global market fluctuations. Within the
cocoa-growing regions, the process of frontier expansion created lines
of social division and interdependence between migrants and hosts
that intensified from the 1970s onward, as virgin forest lands were
used up, farms aged, and world cocoa prices fell. In the aftermath of
frontier expansion, tensions over land and income within the forest
zone intersected with political struggles that often reverberated well be-
yond their immediate local contexts.
On the national level, the political and economic histories of post-
colonial Ghana and Coˆte d’Ivoire present a striking combination of par-
allels and contrasts. While the post-war boom in cocoa production
ended earlier in Ghana than in Coˆte d’Ivoire, both followed similar tra-
jectories of frontier expansion and closure in the southwestern forests,
and both experienced rising levels of social tension and conflict over
land, authority, and access, as opportunities for expansion shut down.2
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Given the primary importance of cocoa as a source of export earnings
and state revenue in both economies, one might expect that develop-
ments in the main cocoa-producing regions would have had similar re-
percussions at the national level, but this was not the case. Once the
euphoria of independence and cocoa prosperity wore off in the mid-
1960s, patterns of national economic growth, decline, and political (in)
stability moved in opposite directions. Beset by falling income and a
series of short-lived military and civilian governments after the over-
throw of President Nkrumah in 1966, Ghana’s economic and political
situation only began to stabilise in the mid-1980s. Economic recovery
was modest, at best, for the last fifteen years of the century, with many
Ghanaians struggling to make ends meet in the face of stagnant levels
of income and employment and persistent erosion of the value of the
currency. Politically, however, the country regained a measure of stabi-
lity under the leadership of J.J. Rawlings who, after a decade of military
rule in the 1980s, succeeded himself (as duly elected President of the
Fourth Republic) when civilian rule was restored in 1992. Eight years
later, in one of sub-Saharan Africa’s first peaceful changes of electoral
regime, the opposition party was voted into power. In contrast, Coˆte
d’Ivoire – which was hailed throughout the 1960s and 70s as an inter-
national icon of export-led economic growth and political stability – slid
into a deepening economic crisis in the 1980s, which undermined the
ruling party’s hold on power and paved the way for increasing conflict
following the death of President Houphouet-Boigny, after 33 years in
office, in 1993.
Read against the parallel histories of frontier expansion and closure
in the main export-crop producing regions of Ghana and Coˆte d’Ivoire,
these divergent trajectories of national transformation and turmoil
raise questions about the interrelations between state power and local
society in both countries, and the extent to which they challenge or
bear out key assumptions of the neo-liberal agenda. Framed from the
outset as a critique of the state, neo-liberal policy interventions have
worked diligently to curtail state regulation of economic activity, to
transfer assets and enterprises to private owners, and to privatise public
services and many functions of government. Confident that, once ‘lib-
erated,’ African political economies would emulate those of Europe and
North America, the architects of neo-liberalism moved in the 1990s to
add political to economic restructuring – replacing authoritarian re-
gimes with governments chosen through multi-party elections, decen-
tralising governing institutions and practices, and clarifying rights of
ownership and lines of authority in both public and private spheres.
Predicated on a hidden hand of frictionless regulatory capacity, some-
times referred to euphemistically as ‘the rule of law,’ neo-liberal re-
forms take for granted the feasibility of removing special interests from
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markets and governing institutions, and of resolving conflicts before
they get out of hand. The utopian and paradoxical qualities of these as-
sumptions are well known and do not need reiteration. Rather than an-
other critique of neo-liberal principles, this study views them through a
lens of recent West African history, asking how local struggles over
land and authority have shaped or collided with governing practices,
political competition, and resource use at the level of the state, and
how the multi-layered dynamics of resource mobilisation, regulation,
and conflict in West Africa have absorbed or deflected international ef-
forts to reorder them in the name of neo-liberal reform.
In a recent study, Catherine Boone compares the governing strate-
gies of post-colonial national regimes in three West African countries –
Senegal, Coˆte d’Ivoire and Ghana – in the 1960s and 70s (Boone
2003). Fiscally dependent on their ability to tax peasant agriculture,
Boone argues, all three governments calibrated their strategies for con-
solidating and exercising state power to the structural realities of rural
society. ‘[B]road political trajectories, state forms, and perhaps even the
viability of the center’ were shaped by the ‘dynamics of indigenous rur-
al societies,’ (Boone 2003:318) as well as the character of colonial rule
and the nationalist leadership3 Confronting strong politically mobilised
rural elites in the cocoa growing regions of Ghana, Nkrumah ‘usurped’
their power by building direct institutional links between the state and
the peasants. By contrast, Houphouet-Boigny left rural society in the
western forests as he found it – decentralised, relatively egalitarian and
politically weak. Under Houphouet, Boone argues, ‘authority was cen-
tralized, and state institutions remained ‘‘suspended above’’ rural so-
ciety’ (ibid:143).
Boone’s contrast – between an Ivorian state that consolidated its
power by keeping aloof from rural society, leaving decentralised and di-
vided communities to hold one another at bay, with a Ghanaian regime
that extended state power directly to the rural masses in order to
strengthen its own position by sidelining rural elites – views rural so-
ciety’s influence from the perspective of the state. Viewed from below,
I would argue, state policies appear both less single-minded and more
intrusive, especially in Coˆte d’Ivoire, than Boone’s analysis suggests.
Both regimes sought to gain political as well as economic leverage over
rural electorates as well as incomes – Nkrumah and the Convention
People’s Party (CPP) through extensive formal institution-building, and
Houphouet-Boigny and the Parti De´mocratique de Coˆte d’Ivoire (PDCI)
through equally extensive but largely informal influence over rural land
rights and local administrative practices. In both cases, state policies
helped to shape conditions under which farmers gained access to land
and labour. Neither government was entirely consistent in policy or
practice, however, nor were they effectively in control of the resources
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or the sympathies of rural inhabitants. In the following pages, I discuss
the repercussions of state strategy and local practice in both countries,
focussing in particular on the way negotiations and struggles over agri-
cultural land intersected with the politics of entitlement and belonging
both locally in the cocoa frontier zones, and nationally in struggles over
control of the state and its economy. The multi-layered dynamics of re-
source access, governance, and social control in these two cases illus-
trate the complex economic and political fields in which neo-liberal ‘re-
formers’ are seeking the ownership society.
Dynamics of frontier expansion
In both Ghana and Coˆte d’Ivoire, the process of forest clearance and
tree crop cultivation was carried out by thousands of migrant farmers,
who either acquired land on arrival or worked on others’ farms until
they had the means to start farms of their own. In Ghana, many of the
migrants came from older cocoa-growing areas in Asante and the East-
ern Region, where yields from aging trees were declining, and many
farms had been destroyed by swollen shoot disease. In some cases,
they or their forebears had already established more than one farm
during the earlier phase of cocoa expansion, leaving each farm in the
hands of a relative or a hired caretaker, and travelling between them to
supervise their work (Hill 1963:179ff). As world prices rose and war-
time shipping restrictions were lifted after 1945, farmers seized the op-
portunity to offset ‘the exhaustion of cocoa land in their homes of ori-
gin’ (Arhin 1986:14) by moving into untapped forest zones in the west
[Figure 2.1] (See also Adomako-Sarfoh 1974:134; Berry 2001:106,116;
Dunn and Robertson 1973:11; Konings 1986:62-64; ). There they were
joined by migrants from the savanna regions of Northern Ghana and
neighbouring countries, who worked as labourers on the farms of older
residents and ‘pioneers’ and, in a few cases, went on to establish farms
of their own (Arhin 1986:2; Hear 1998:ch. 5. See also Allman and Par-
ker 2005:91ff and passim).
In Coˆte d’Ivoire, cocoa and coffee growing developed much more
slowly in the early decades of colonial rule – hampered by state policies
of forced labour, heavy taxation, and discrimination against African
planters in favour of Europeans. In 1928, for example, cocoa exports
from Ghana reached 229,000 mt, compared to 16,000 mt from Coˆte
d’Ivoire (Crook 1991b:219). Following the abolition of forced labour in
1946, however, migrants flocked to the forests of west Central Coˆte
d’Ivoire, clearing plots of land and planting cocoa and coffee on rich
forest soil [Figure 2.2]. Many of the ‘pioneer’ farmers were Baule and
Dyula from savanna areas on the eastern and northern borders of the
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forest zone, including some who had worked on French or African-
owned plantations in the southeast before the war. Clearing and plant-
ing a few hectares at a time, they soon filled up their first plots of land
and moved on to establish additional farms further west. Their efforts
attracted a growing number of migrants from further north, including
many from Burkina Faso and Mali, who worked as labourers on the
growing expanse of tree crop farms. By the 1970s, migrants outnum-
bered host populations in many villages in the west Central Region,
with Burkinabes, Malians, and late arrivals from Northern Coˆte d’Ivoire
making up the bulk of the farm labour force.
Acquiring land
While the first migrants encountered little difficulty in getting access
to land in the sparsely populated southwestern forest zones, the terms
on which they did so, and their subsequent relations with host commu-
nities, differed significantly within Ghana and Coˆte d’Ivoire. In the de-
centralised communities of west central and southwestern Coˆte
d’Ivoire, migrants obtained land from village elders or family heads,
whose authority did not extend beyond their immediate circle of kin or
Figure 2.1 The cocoa frontier
Source: Amanor 1994
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Figure 2.2 Moving cocoa frontiers: Coˆte d’Ivoire, 1920-1993
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Table 2.1 Social demography of migrants in southwestern Coˆte d’Ivoire
Autochthones Immigrants
Allochthones4 Étrangers
Bodiba village
1953 100
1975 35 65
1998 22.4 45.9 31.7
Districts
Divo Dept, 1980 33 67
Southwest, 1988 7.5 35.7 34.4
Oume Dept, 1998 22 46 32
Sources: Bodiba-Chauveau and Léonard 1996:114, Chauveau and Bobo 2003:13-14; Divo-
Hecht 1985:37; Southwest Region-Chauveau and Léonard 1996:185; Oume Dept-Chauveau
and Bobo 2003:13.
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local community. Apart from a token gift – sometimes supplied by the
land giver – to ratify the initial agreement between migrant and host,
the former did not pay for the land in advance, nor did they agree to
rent it for a prearranged annual payment of cash or share of the crop.
Instead, it was generally understood that immigrants were free to plant
both permanent and annual crops, sell the resulting produce, and pass
their farms to their descendants. In exchange, migrant farmers were
expected to show their appreciation with annual gifts of farm produce;
contributions to marriage and funeral ceremonies in the host’s family;
and assistance, in times of need, in the form of loans or occasional la-
bour on the host’s farm. Relations between hosts and migrants were
discussed, in local parlance, in terms of guardianship (tutorat) rather
than tenancy. Following an outbreak of violence in Gagnoa in 1970,
after Bete villagers tried to stop Baule migrants from obtaining more
land, local officials promoted the ‘fiction’ that relations between hosts
and migrants were mutually supportive rather than openly commer-
cial.5 In addition to providing land, tuteurs were expected to protect
their immigrant clients in case of difficulty or dispute, and clients to
show their gratitude by assisting their tuteurs in times of need. In prac-
tice, according to one life-long student of the region, these arrange-
ments ‘verge on, or hide, largely commercial transfers of land – how-
ever, the commercial aspect does not erase the social relation stem-
ming from the ‘‘gratefulness’’ that the migrant (or his heirs) owes to
his tuteur (or the latter’s heirs)’ (Chauveau 2005:215).
The moral and emotional overtones of the tutorat both facilitated the
spread of cocoa cultivation and complicated relations between migrants
and hosts. As immigrant farmers prospered, many tuteurs came to de-
pend on their ‘assistance’ – relying on clients to lend them money or
help with farm work while, at the same time, reaffirming their claim
to social precedence by asserting their right to request and receive their
clients’ help. As land became scarce and cocoa prices fell, tuteurs tried
to renegotiate the terms of their original agreements, restricting clients’
rights and demanding higher payments (Chauveau 2005:226ff). Un-
derstandably, stranger farmers resisted these demands, arguing that
their farms were theirs to use, sell, or pass on to their heirs. The result-
ing tensions highlighted the paradoxical implications of the tutorat. Tu-
teurs demanded increased payments in cash both for new allocations of
farming rights, and in the form of loans and gifts from their existing
tenants. In turn, these payments tended to reaffirm both the tuteurs’
continued authority over the land, and ‘the migrants’ claims of having
been engaged in a purchase-sale transaction’ (Chauveau 2005:234).
In Ghana, immigrants who arrived in Ahafo or the Central or Wes-
tern Region in the 1940s and 50s obtained cultivation rights, directly
or indirectly, from local chiefs. In some cases, an immigrant might
34 SARA BERRY
conduct negotiations with the head of a local family rather than directly
with the chief, although chiefs expected to be informed of such ar-
rangements, in recognition of their ultimate authority over stool land.6
Whether strangers applied directly to the chief, or indirectly via the
head of a local family, they made an initial payment in exchange for per-
mission to farm and, once their cocoa trees began to bear, turned over a
portion of each year’s harvest, in cash or in kind, to the ‘owner(s)’ of the
land which, in most cases, meant the chiefs. These annual payments
were substantial: demands for a third or half of the crop were not un-
common, and the chiefs might additionally levy an annual tax (Boni
2006:176). In some cases, chiefs refused to specify annual rents or crop
shares in advance, ‘waiting until the cocoa farm came into fruition
when the landowner, after making a thorough inspection of the farm
and the yield-potential, released his terms like a bomb, which the farm-
er could (…) reject (…) only (…) at the risk of being dispossessed of the
land and the fruits of his labour’ (Arhin 1986:30). Farmers rarely
sought redress in the courts, Arhin adds, not only because many could
not afford the expense, but also ‘because he (the landowner), who was
also the chief, was bound to be the judge’ (idem. See also Arhin
1986:18; Berry 2001:15ff; Boni 2006:176; Dunn and Robertson
1973:53ff; Rathbone 1993:ch.13; Simensen 1975a).
Chiefs also used their political leverage to renegotiate agreements
with stranger farmers – raising rents, and reclaiming (or expanding
the scope of their control over) land by reducing the duration of con-
tracts or curtailing tenants’ rights of usage or land transfer. Some en-
gaged in outright fraud, selling the same plot of land more than once
or allocating land to strangers which had previously been acquired by
the state (such as forest reserve lands) or included in concessions to
timber companies (Arhin 1986:32; Boni 2006:178). Indeed, by conti-
nuing to re-enact their authority over land and the terms of land ac-
cess, recurring demands for increased tax payments, reductions in te-
nants’ rights or outright repossession of defaulters’ farms served to re-
inforce chiefs’ authority in general, as well as reaffirming their
ultimate, or ‘allodial,’ title to the land.7
The demands chiefs placed on ‘stranger’ farmers have been a subject
of recurring dispute since the early years of cocoa cultivation and colo-
nial rule.8 Repeated efforts by state officials to limit chiefs’ control over
cocoa income have rarely succeeded in effecting lasting reductions in
rates of chiefly appropriation. In 1962, the CPP regime passed a Rents
Stabilisation Act (109), limiting stools’ tax on stranger farmers to 5s/
acre, but the law was repealed after Nkrumah was overthrown in 1966,
and subsequent regimes have been disinclined to reinstate it. By law,
chiefs are required to deposit rental income from stool lands in a spe-
cial account managed by the state, which oversees the mandatory trans-
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fer of a portion of these moneys to local government, to be used for
public purposes. The laws are rarely enforced, however, and chiefs con-
tinue to exercise de facto control over the terms under which ‘strangers’
acquire and use rural land. Twenty-five years after Nkrumah’s downfall,
Boni found that chiefs still held the upper hand in Sefwi. He reports
that land transactions between chiefs and strangers are negotiated with
reference to written ‘memoranda of agreement,’ drawn up by the
chiefs, which specify tax rates, tenants’ rights of use and transfer, and
chiefs’ rights to oversee them. Revised from time to time as circum-
stances change, the memoranda represent a form of de facto local legis-
lation which has worked, since the 1940s, to reduce tenants’ rights,
while increasing rates of taxation, and expanding chiefly prerogatives
(Boni 2006:176-178).
In Coˆte d’Ivoire, the state also played an ambivalent role in regulating
land relations on the cocoa frontier. When Houphouet-Boigny and the
PDCI took control of the state in 1960, the agricultural export boom
was in full swing and the newly independent regime did not want to in-
terrupt it. Rather than invite organised opposition by formally abolish-
ing customary rights, President Houphouet-Boigny simply announced,
in 1963, that ‘land belongs to the one who develops it’ (‘la terre apparti-
ent a celui qui la met en valeur’). At the time, his pronouncement con-
travened Ivorian law, under which the ‘national domain’ was vested in
the state, and private contractual arrangements with respect to any part
of it were prohibited (Chauveau 2000:10). Thanks to Houphouet’s pres-
tige, and the power of his ‘patronage machine’, however, the President’s
word carried as much force as the law. On the ground, party cadres and
local officials followed his lead, reassuring local villagers of the moral
force of the tutorat, while settling individual disputes in favour of the
migrants who produced the greater part of the cocoa that fed the state’s
coffers. The effect was to create a space of ambiguity in which local vil-
lagers could claim that even though they had granted cultivation rights
Table 2.2 Average areas acquired by immigrants, west Central Region (ha)
Gbehiri village, Divo Department
1940-9 34.2
1950-9 20.1
1960-9 9.1
1970-9 2.9
Villages south of Gagnoa
Before 1970 23.8
1970 10.7
After 1970 8.8
Sources: Gbehiri village–Hecht 1985:35; Gagnoa Region–Ruf 1991:111.
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to strangers in perpetuity, the land belonged to them, while migrants
could invoke the President’s dictum to argue that they owned the land
on which they had established their farms.
Mobilising labour
In both Coˆte d’Ivoire and Ghana, migrants often hired themselves out
when they first arrived in the forest zone, but did so only until they
had saved enough money to acquire land and start their own farms
(Arhin 1986:16; Boni 2006:175; Chauveau and Richard 1977:491). La-
bour arrangements were predicated on upward mobility: aspiring to be-
come independent farmers, migrant labourers sought out potential em-
ployers who could help them negotiate access to land. Writing of west
central Coˆte d’Ivoire in the 1970s, Chauveau & Richard argued that the
growth of cocoa and coffee production turned on a contradiction: ‘to
get more labour, it is necessary to have land; land attracts a rural ‘‘pro-
letariat’’ at the same time that it allows them to ‘‘deproletarianise’’’
(Chauveau and Richard 1977:513, my translation). Predicated on mobi-
lity, relations between hosts and migrants worked to accelerate the pace
of forest clearance and the growth of agricultural output and exports.
Expectations of upward mobility also figured in family labour ar-
rangements. Young people who worked for their fathers or elder kins-
men were rarely paid for their services, but they too anticipated moving
on to start their own farms, with assistance from the relatives whom
they had helped in the past. Young men who had worked on their
fathers’ farms might ask for land when they were ready to marry and
start households of their own, or for money either to start businesses
or pay school or apprenticeship fees, the latter enabling them to move
out of farming and into salaried employment in the cities. Wives might
receive gifts of cash or cloth after the cocoa harvest, and husbands, in
recognition of their wives’ contributions to the family farm, sometimes
contributed trading capital or money to purchase equipment.9 In Gha-
na, a number of women acquired cocoa farms of their own, either
through inheritance or with money saved from trade. In Brong-Ahafo,
the number of women farmers increased in the 1920s and 30s then
declined again, as men reasserted control over family property and wo-
men diversified into trade and other non-agricultural occupations (Mi-
kell 1984 and 1985. Compare Allman and Tashjian 2000:74). In the
mid-1940s, Meyer Fortes reported that 18 per cent of the adult women
in Asokore (a village in eastern Asante) owned cocoa farms, compared
to only 15 per cent of the men (Fortes 1948:163). In another Asante vil-
lage, Okali found that 76 per cent of the adult men and 43 per cent of
adult women owned cocoa farms in the early 1970s – up from about
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36 per cent and 24 per cent, estimated from a survey carried out in
1933 (Okali 1983:49).
Partly because of the high degree of mobility in the frontier econo-
my, late arrivals in a given locality were often at a disadvantage in
terms of access to both land and labour. In areas where local farmers
had already ceded much of the available land to earlier arrivals, mi-
grants who came later received smaller allotments than their predeces-
sors, as illustrated in table 2.2.
Between 1981 and 1991, the price of forest land in the Nekeide dis-
trict, west central Coˆte d’Ivoire, rose 40 per cent, and rental rates on
fallow land tripled (Ruf 1995:39. See also Chauveau, 1995:114; Colin
2005; Le´onard and Ibo 1994). In the far southwest, Burkinabes and
other northerners who arrived late had to contribute labour on their tu-
teurs‘ farms, in addition to giving annual payments of money or pro-
duce (Chauveau 2005:221ff). In addition, farmers with larger holdings,
who could reallocate part of their land to aspiring workers, were also
able to employ labourers on more favourable terms and earned higher
rates of profit than those with smaller amounts of land (Chauveau and
Richard 1977:512-513; Hecht 1985:47). Differences between early and
late arrivals were at least partly offset, however, by the expansionary
process itself. Farmers who reached the limit of their allotments, or
who could not get as much land as they wanted in well-settled local-
ities, moved on to establish new farms in uncultivated forest areas
further south and/or west. As long as land was available, the expan-
sionary process continued, generating rising export earnings and rev-
enue for the state, and permanently altering the social demography of
the forest zone.
‘Cocoa cycles’: Ecology, mobility and markets
Based on forest clearance and continuing frontier expansion, the exten-
sive process of cocoa cultivation described above could not continue in-
definitely. As Francois Ruf has argued in a number of publications, co-
coa production tends to move in cycles. Output increases rapidly as for-
est land is cleared and planted, then evens out and eventually declines
as trees age and the supply of uncultivated land is exhausted. High
yields obtained from previously uncultivated forest land represent a
kind of forest rent which diminishes as the forest is cleared, trees age,
and accumulated nutrients are extracted from the soil. Old trees may
be uprooted and replaced, but the next generation of trees will require
increased inputs to restore soil fertility, control pests and plant disease,
and clear invasive species such as chromolaena odorata, popularly
known as Sekou Toure – ‘revolutionary’ and out of control (Ruf
1991:113). In both Coˆte d’Ivoire and Ghana, farmers preferred to aban-
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don old farms rather than rehabilitate them. As one explained, graphi-
cally, to Francois Ruf, ‘an old plantation is like an old wife who is dy-
ing. Medicines to keep her alive would cost too much. It’s better to
keep them for the young wife.’10
As long as uncut forest land remained, ‘shifting cycles’ of expansion
into the southwestern forests sustained the growth of total cocoa out-
put and exports, masking the process of forest depletion and declining
yields in the older frontier areas. By the late 1970s, however, the
growth of Ivorian exports, combined with fresh supplies from new cy-
cles of cocoa cultivation in southeast Asia, had begun to saturate the
global market. World prices fell after 1978, putting downward pressure
on Ivorian export earnings just as supplies of uncultivated forest land
began to run out. Coming on the heels of OPEC‘s second major oil
price increase in the late 1970s, the convergence of cocoa cycles and
closure of the southwestern frontier helped to push the Ivorian econo-
my into a prolonged crisis that has yet to be resolved (Crook 1990;
IMF et al. 2005; Ruf 1991, 1995).
In Ghana, the rate of frontier expansion began to slow in the late
1960s, a decade earlier than in Coˆte d’Ivoire. After twenty years of
more or less steady growth, cocoa output peaked in 1965, then fell stea-
dily, bottoming out in 1984 at 28 per cent of the level it had reached in
1965 (Oduro 2000:173). Already in debt from the overextended spend-
ing of Nkrumah’s later years in power, the economy floundered after
1966, under a succession of short-lived military and civilian regimes,
each apparently too caught up in internal rivalries and personal ambi-
tions to give serious attention to the economy. Entirely dependent on
imports for supplies of gasoline and other petroleum-based products,
Ghana suffered badly from the OPEC oil price increase in 1973, and
the next ten years were ‘nothing short of an unmitigated economic dis-
aster. Real GDP per capita, real export earnings, cocoa exports, import
volumes and domestic savings and investment all declined dramati-
cally…’ (Aryeetey et al. 2000:11). The worsening economic situation
culminated in a crisis in 1983/1984, when the ‘worst drought in living
memory’ (Tabatabai 1988:720) coincided with a refugee crisis caused
by Nigeria’s sudden decision to expel all undocumented aliens then liv-
ing within its borders. Ghanaians who had escaped economic decline
by emigrating to Nigeria’s oil-rich markets in the 1970s and early 80s
now found themselves summarily ejected, forced to leave their posses-
sions behind in the rush to meet the Nigerian government’s deadline
for departure. Over a million Ghanaians (9 per cent of Ghana’s popula-
tion at the time) flooded back into the country in a period of three to
four weeks, most to homes in the southern regions where they were
met by internal migrants fleeing hunger in the drought-stricken north
(Van Hear 1998 and others).11 In the ensuing crisis, imported goods
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disappeared from the domestic market and the output of food crops, al-
ready reduced by the exodus of migrants in the 1970s, was decimated
by the drought.12 ‘[M]aize, millet and sorghum were lost over much of
the country,’ and the ‘unprecedented fall in the level of the Volta river
and hence of the Volta Lake dam’ reduced the supply of electricity to 5
per cent of its normal level (Derrick 1984:286). Abandoning his earlier
commitment to socialist transformation, J.J Rawlings turned to the
IMF and World Bank for help.
Plural governance? State power and rural society in the era of
frontier expansion
By the early 1980s, the cocoa cycles of the post-war era had come to an
end, leaving densely populated rural communities to face land
shortages, forest depletion, and dwindling opportunities for income
and employment, not only in the rural areas but throughout the nation
and the regional economy beyond. Ghanaians returned from Nigeria
and Coˆte d’Ivoire to find their own economy in worse shape than they
had left it. In Coˆte d’Ivoire, the economic crisis sent thousands of ur-
ban youth – many of them children of cocoa farmers, whose parents
had paid for them to attend school and relocate to the cities – back to
the land, only to discover that their place had been taken by upwardly
mobile immigrants, and that their elders had no land left to give them.
In both countries, declines in income and employment, as well as deep
uncertainty about the future, converged with land scarcity and forest
depletion to generate intense competition and conflict over land, parti-
cularly in the former frontier areas of export crop expansion. In Coˆte
d’Ivoire, as we’ve seen, these tensions fed directly into emerging strug-
gles over national political restructuring and control of the state, contri-
buting to an escalation of political conflict that derailed state efforts to
restart the economy and paved the way for civil war. In Ghana, on the
other hand, the economy began a faltering recovery after the debacle of
1983/1984 and regained enough political stability in the 1980s to effect
a peaceful transition to civilian rule that remains in place today. Before
turning to a more detailed discussion of these events, I need to say a
bit more about the parts played by the Ghanaian and Ivorian states in
the earlier process of forest clearance and agricultural growth.
Like the layered and unsettled claims on land that accumulated in
the process of frontier expansion, relations between migrants and hosts
were affected by government strategies for consolidating state power,
as well as policies of economic and rural development. Both govern-
ments had a direct interest in promoting the growth of cocoa output
and income, from which they appropriated much of the revenue that
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sustained the ruling party as well as the state, and both worked with
and around rural authorities to extend their political control over rural
society. In Ghana, Nkrumah built an elaborate apparatus of state insti-
tutions designed to control as well as ‘transform’ the rural economy
(Boone 2003:142ff). Under the banner of rooting out the vestiges of co-
lonial oppression, the CPP regime punished chiefs who had supported
the Asante-based opposition party (NLM) in elections leading up to in-
dependence, stripping them of administrative and judicial authority,
confiscating their stool lands, and putting some of their most outspo-
ken opponents in prison.13 Rather than the single-minded campaign to
abolish chieftaincy which some contemporary observers perceived,
however, Nkrumah followed a more complicated strategy – courting
chiefs who supported him as well as punishing his opponents, and
playing rivals off against each other (Arhin 2001; Dunn and Robertson
1973:198-199, 204ff; Rathbone 2000).14 On the issue of land, the CPP
regime placed legal restrictions on chiefly rents and expanded the
state’s power to acquire stool land for public purposes (Kotey
2002:204-205), but stopped short of outright expropriation of the
chiefs.15 Weakened by internal rivalries, Nkrumah’s successors were
more inclined to court chiefly support than to curb their prerogatives.
The military regime that overthrew Nkrumah in 1966 released his
jailed opponents and restored their confiscated lands, and their succes-
sors varied in their reactions from tacit acceptance to open support of
chieftaincy as a time-honoured institution (Arhin 2001:46, ch. 4 pas-
sim).
In Coˆte d’Ivoire, Houphouet-Boigny and the PDCI sought to extend
and consolidate state power over rural society and income in varied,
sometimes contradictory, ways. Assured of ready access to export crop
income through the Caisse de Stabilisation,16 the state sought to maxi-
mise the rate of growth of cocoa and coffee production in the forest
zone. In addition to Houphouet‘s famous dictum that anyone who de-
veloped a piece of land owned it – customary (and statutory) prescrip-
tions notwithstanding – the Ivorian state enthusiastically promoted the
migration of aspiring farmers into the rich uncultivated forests of the
southwestern quadrant of the country. In addition to encouraging the
movement of Baule, Dioula, and others from savanna to forest zones
within Coˆte d’Ivoire, Houphouet‘s regime welcomed foreign investors
and immigrants alike. Envisioning Coˆte d’Ivoire as ‘a sub-regional eco-
nomic pole that attracted … labour, capital, and all kinds of expertise’ to
the Ivorian centre (Akinde`s 2004:8-9), Houphouet opened the borders
not only to French companies and highly placed bureaucrats, but also
to merchants, artisans, farmers, and unskilled labourers from neigh-
bouring countries in the region. With abundant supplies of untilled
land, and cities fed by the proceeds of the expanding agricultural econ-
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omy, Coˆte d’Ivoire’s expanding economy acted as a magnet for capital
and labour from across West Africa and beyond, far outdoing the ef-
forts of its erstwhile colonial rulers to draw labour from across the re-
gion into the colonial centres of Coˆte d’Ivoire.
At the time of independence, non-Ivorians dominated the civil ser-
vice and occupied whole neighbourhoods in Abidjan and other cities,
working in trade, artisanal and clerical jobs, as well as in manual la-
bour, and the pace of immigration accelerated in the following years.17
Throughout the 1960s and 70s, migrants poured into Coˆte d’Ivoire,
especially from landlocked neighbouring countries of the Sahel. Mostly
illiterate men and some women from rural areas in their home coun-
tries, Burkinabes, Malians, and others provided a steady stream of
cheap labour for the expanding agricultural economy of the western
forest zone. The number of Burkinabes, in particular, who were living
and working in Coˆte d’Ivoire rose from ca. 250,000 in the late 1950s,
to 726,000 in 1975, and 1,564,000 in 1988 (Blion and Bredeloup
1997:723).
The ruling regime reaped political as well as economic gains from
the swelling immigrant population. Seeking to place Coˆte d’Ivoire at
the forefront of enlightened African development, Houphouet-Boigny
propounded an ethos of ‘pan-Africanism in one country’ (quoted in
Dozon 2000:15), premised on a ‘logic of maximizing the sub-regional
labor force as a basis for a solid Ivorian economy…rather than [Nkru-
mah’s] idea of an Africa that would be strengthened by the unity of its
components….’ (Akinde`s 2004:8-9). In implementing Houphouet‘s
policy of ‘land to the developer,’ officials made no distinction between
Ivorians and foreigners: Burkinabe labourers who could save enough
to plant their own farms were treated on the same basis as migrant
farmers from inside the country. However, far from leaving rural resi-
dents to keep each other at bay, allowing the state to drain off most of
the cocoa surplus at the point of sale, Ivorian officials intervened regu-
larly in local affairs. Rather than being managed through an elaborate
apparatus of state-run courts and explicit legal rules, disputes over land
and labour relations were handled on an ad hoc basis by local officials
– the ubiquitous prefets and sous-prefets left behind by the colonial state
– under the watchful eye of PDCI cadres, who controlled appointments
and promotions throughout the civil service, and who used their influ-
ence to insure that local officials fostered export growth by deciding
these cases in the migrants’ favour. Ad hoc interventions were charac-
teristic of the President’s extra-legal style of governance. In addition to
his policy of land-to-the-developer, which effectively guaranteed rights
of private ownership in contravention of the law, Houphouet extended
de facto privileges of citizenship to all residents on Ivorian soil, regard-
less of nationality. Foreign immigrants were not only encouraged to
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work and invest in all sectors of the Ivorian economy – they were also
allowed to vote. Needless to say, they voted en masse for the President
and the ruling party that had welcomed them so warmly (Akinde`s
2004:16; Blion and Bredeloup 1997:728; Boone 2003).
As state policies and politics converged with emerging land shortages
in the former frontier regions, hosts and migrants sought to protect
their livelihoods and options for the future by invoking histories of past
rights and wrongs, re-imagined through the lens of current anxieties.
Citing their long-term presence in the region and history of marginali-
sation under colonial rule, villagers whose ancestors were present in
the forests when the migrant farmers arrived pictured themselves as
‘indigenous’ people, historically entitled to claim precedence in access
to and control over land. In both Ghana and Coˆte d’Ivoire, claims to ‘in-
digeneity’ invoked ethnic identities that owed as much to colonial ad-
ministrative and judicial practice as to older cultural practices and
boundaries. In each case, tensions between ‘indigenes’ and ‘strangers’
reflected the specific history of forest expansion and closure in the
country in question. Local residents of forest villages in western Coˆte
d’Ivoire felt exploited by the migrants – who not only outnumbered lo-
cal residents in many parts of the cocoa zone but controlled the greater
part of the land – and felt angry at the PDCI regime that had welcomed
the migrants so liberally. In Ghana, on the other hand, migrants felt
exploited by local authorities – chiefs who appropriated substantial
shares of their farm proceeds and threatened to dispossess tenants who
resisted their demands. In both cases, rival claims to land and income
were articulated in terms of historical precedent, giving participants a
potentially inexhaustible repertoire of antecedents, and giving rise to in-
tense debates over competing interpretations of the past.
Ancestral property: History and the politics of belonging
As migrants moved into the forests of southwestern Ghana and Coˆte
d’Ivoire, their acquisition of land and increasingly important role in co-
coa production inscribed differences between ‘locals’ and ‘strangers’
into the social and economic fabric of everyday life. In a recent essay,
entitled ‘Indigenous blood and foreign labour: the ancestralization of
land rights in Sefwi, Ghana,’ Stefano Boni charts the complex con-
structions of social identity and difference that developed in the process
of frontier expansion and converged into a pattern of increasing in-
equality and exclusion, as virgin forest land was exhausted, cocoa yields
declined, and economic conditions worsened from the 1970s onwards
(Boni 2006). As chiefs increased their demands for rent (or ‘taxes’)
and curtailed the land rights of strangers, questions rose over who
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could be considered a ‘stranger’ and how far the scope of chiefly
authority might extend. Framed in terms of ‘ancestry,’ these debates
turned on ‘the deeds and privileges of the ancestors’ as well as on lines
of uterine descent. ‘Ancestry’ is a historical construct rather than a gen-
eaological fact – ‘the social representation of descent, strategically rede-
fined within the limits of what is thought to be collectively credible’
(ibid:170). As supplies of allocable land diminished, chiefs in Sefwi
sought to reclassify local residents as taxable ‘strangers,’ challenging
people’s claims to belonging by invoking histories of settlement and
migration that traced their ancestors’ origins to other places. Protesting
a chief’s demand that he surrender a third of his crop, one farmer as-
serted his ‘birthright and privilege as a pure Sefwi born,’ denouncing
the chief’s claim as ‘a drastic innovation of custom never practiced in
the history of Sefwi Wiaso state’ (quoted in Boni 2006:173). Another
refused the chiefs’ demand for a share of his grandfather’s estate, de-
claring that his grandparents had settled in Sefwi over a hundred years
ago, and asking how he ‘who was born in [Sefwi] (…) resided [there] for
over 85 years (…), and left behind 15 children in the same district could
be termed as a stranger?’ (ibid:174).18
The ancestralisation of land rights that Boni describes in Sefwi has
been repeated, with variations, in communities across Ghana since co-
lonial times. Framed around narratives of settlement and migration,
‘the deeds of the ancestors’ link claims to land, authority, and origin in
a discourse of belonging that speaks to issues of political entitlement
as well as to property claims. People who claim membership in a local
community call themselves ‘citizens’ – as distinct from ‘strangers’ –
suggesting that local belonging conveys rights of participation and enti-
tlement analogous, if not equivalent, to those of citizenship in the na-
tion. Unlike national citizenship, which is defined, at least jurally, in
the Constitution, criteria for distinguishing citizens of one community
from those of another are matters of local understanding, subject to no
formal legal code and open to multiple interpretations. In my own
fieldwork in Asante, I found not only that claims to land and local citi-
zenship were based on historical narratives, but that these narratives
were invariably framed as histories of migration, which usually in-
cluded a list of places where their ancestors had stayed, and the length
of their sojourn in each, en route from a point of origin to the narra-
tor’s present location. In other words, ‘citizens’ of a given community
usually claim that their ancestors came there from someplace else.
Thus, while I agree with Boni that ‘ancestralisation’ has entailed a
‘hardening of boundaries of belonging’ (Boni 2006:183) akin to those
of ‘ethnicity’ and ‘tribe,’ and that these boundaries gained much of
their contemporary resonance under the aegis of colonial rule, I think
it is also useful to distinguish between local ‘citizenship’ as it is under-
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stood and practiced in post-colonial Ghana, and constructions of ‘ethni-
city’ in other contexts. Coˆte d’Ivoire is a case in point.
In Coˆte d’Ivoire, popular understandings of who had gained and lost
in the process of frontier expansion drew on perceptions of social iden-
tity and difference that owed as much to state practices during and
after colonial rule, as to local histories of social engagement and con-
flict. Interpreting ‘the results of their own actions as demonstrating a
differing potential for ‘‘civilisation’’ among ethnic groups,’ colonial
authorities in Coˆte d’Ivoire geared strategies of development to an ima-
gined ‘racial psychology,’ encouraging ‘peoples of the south-east to de-
velop their ‘‘wealth-producing aptitudes by growing export crops,’’
‘‘hardworking northerners’’ [to supply] foodstuffs and labor,’ and rele-
gating Baule and peoples of the southwest to manual labour (Chauveau
and Le´onard 1996:179). Within the bottom tier, ethnographers and co-
lonial officials grouped small, decentralised communities into ethnic
categories noted more for their descriptive and administrative conveni-
ence than their relation to social realities. ‘Bete’ ethnicity was one such
category. Used as a collective designation for peoples of the western for-
ests, the ‘Bete’ were relegated to the bottom of an imagined ethnic hier-
archy, destined in the minds of their colonial rulers for manual labour
and submission to the authority of more developed cultures and civili-
sations (Chauveau and Dozon 1987: 238, 249, 260-261; Dozon 1985).
Following independence, colonial ethnic hierarchies were reworked
rather than repudiated in the social imaginaries of Ivorians seeking to
understand and rationalise their claims to power and to representation
in the post-colonial order. In an illuminating study, Ivorian scholar
Francis Akinde`s suggests that Houphouet’s celebrated strategies of eco-
nomic openness and export-led development also worked to reproduce
the ethnic imaginaries of colonial rule. President Houphouet-Boigny’s
celebrated liberality towards immigrants was not inspired, he argues,
by any idealistic notion that all West Africans were created equal. Part
nationalism, part personality cult, the President’s ideology of ‘hou-
phouetisme’ ranked Ivorians in an ethnic hierarchy, with Akan (or,
more specifically, Houphouet’s own Baule subgroup) figured as ‘natur-
al rulers’ destined to preside over a middle tier of ‘Dioulas’ (another
catchall term referring not only to Mande-speaking Muslims known for
their skill as merchants and entrepreneurs, but also to Senufo and
other people from the northern regions), with acephalous ‘Bete,’
Bakwe, and other Kru-language peoples of the western forest zone at
the bottom.19 In effect, Houphouet’s ‘liberal’ vision of residential citi-
zenship as a product of pan-regional participation in the Ivorian na-
tional project went hand-in-hand with a myth of ethnically differen-
tiated capacities to contribute to that project, which paralleled and to
some extent reproduced the ethnographic imaginaries of colonial rule.
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Colonial officials in Ghana also referred to Africans as ‘tribes’ but
governed through localised polities based on imagined boundaries of
‘native authority’ and jurisdiction. In the 1950s, the NLM’s failure to
gain popular support outside of Asante allowed Nkrumah and the CPP
to portray the party as a throwback to ‘tribal’ politics that had no place
in a modern state, and to insist that Ghana become independent as a
unitary state, rather than a federation of semi-autonomous regions, as
demanded by the NLM. Despite the authoritarian excesses of Nkru-
mah’s later years in power, by taking federalism off the table as a viable
constitutional option, his regime may have spared Ghana the kind of
violent ethno-regional power struggles that pulled Nigeria into civil war
in the late 1960s, and exploded in Coˆte d’Ivoire at the end of the cen-
tury. Unlike Coˆte d’Ivoire, where intensifying struggles over land and
economic opportunity coincided, in the 1980s and 90s, with ethno-
regional antagonisms over national power and political exclusion, in
Ghana struggles over land, and over at least some forms of power, have
been fought along more localised lines of ‘ancestral’ belonging and ‘tra-
ditional’ prerogative.
In short, by the 1980s, tensions over land and livelihood on Ghana’s
and Coˆte d’Ivoire‘s declining agricultural frontiers had hardened into
‘ethnic’ antagonisms that both reflected and reproduced differential
patterns of wealth and influence in the nation as a whole. In Ghana,
however, ‘ethnic’ differences were constructed along multiple lines,
many of them corresponding to chiefly jurisdictions created, in part,
under colonial rule. In Coˆte d’Ivoire, by contrast, ethnic tensions in the
forest zone mapped onto both the population and the ‘national domain’
in large ethno-regional blocs that, along with the return to multi-party
elections at the end of the decade, provided fertile ground for political
mobilisation. As rising levels of debt forced states across the region to
renegotiate outstanding obligations and seek additional loans from the
IMF, the World Bank, and major donor governments, on-going strug-
gles over power, resources, and belonging intersected with neo-liberal
agendas of policy and political reform in ways that complicated rather
than clarified contested claims to economic and political entitlement
and belonging.
Political and economic change in the neo-liberal era
After thirty years of steady growth fed by rising agricultural exports
and inflows of foreign capital, by 1980 the Ivorian economy had begun
to falter. With ready access to foreign credit, the government weathered
the oil price crises of the 1970s by running up a large external debt
(Crook 1990:649). Eager to maintain its credit rating by keeping up
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with its debt service obligations, the state was ill-prepared to cope with
the drop in world cocoa prices that began in the late 1970s, just as the
supply of uncultivated forest land began to run out. Hoping to avoid a
recession and sustain state revenues, Coˆte d’Ivoire was one of the first
West African countries to apply for a Structural Adjustment Loan. Cuts
in state spending mandated under IMF ‘conditionality’ led to declines
in income and employment, especially in the urban areas (Sogodogo
1997:143).
A dozen years and four Structural Adjustment Programs later, the
Ivorian economy was in worse shape than it had been in 1980 (Dio-
mande 1997:121). Cocoa production continued to rise, levelling off near
800,000 tons per annum in the early 1980s, but falling world prices
reduced export earnings, cutting into state revenue, forcing layoffs and
reductions in government spending, and threatening the stability of
the ruling regime. Struggling to reverse the downward slide in state
revenue, the Caisse de Stabilisation cut the producer price of cocoa
from FCAF 200/kg in 1988 to FCAF 50/kg three years later, helping
to spread economic decline from the cities to the countryside. In some
villages, average farm revenue fell by as much as 60-80 per cent (Ruf
1991:115; 1995:5). Devaluation of the CFA franc, mandated by the IMF
and the World Bank in 1994, added to the misery, putting further
downward pressure on purchasing power and standards of living. By
2000, 12 per cent of the population was living in extreme poverty (as
measured by the World Bank’s standard of less than $1 per day) and
half subsisted on $2 or less (Akinde`s 2004:23-24). Despite the cut-
backs, government spending continued to rise (Sogodogo 1997:143),
and the country’s dependence on cocoa increased.20
Unlike Coˆte d’Ivoire, where structural adjustment coincided with
and accelerated falling income and employment, in Ghana the first
Structural Adjustment Loan brought a measure of relief after the col-
lapse of imports and basic food supplies in 1983/1984. With the help
of good weather and a rise in the world price of cocoa in 1985/1986-
1986/1987, staple food crops and other basic commodities reappeared
in the markets, and income stabilised, especially in the rural areas. Re-
covery was modest, however. Under structural adjustment, price con-
trols were removed, state employees were laid off, and the modest
gains in rural income were offset by sharp declines in average real
earnings in the urban areas (World Bank 1986:19). World cocoa prices
fell continuously from 1987 through 1992, undercutting the effects of
cocoa rehabilitation projects financed with structural adjustment loans.
Gold mining showed the biggest gains from market deregulation, leav-
ing the country dependent on a few resource-based exports (gold, co-
coa, and timber) for access to foreign exchange. Persistent trade deficits
weakened the cedi, limiting gains in real income for the majority of
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the people. A decade after structural adjustment was introduced, half
the population was living in poverty.
Memories of the crisis remained fresh, however, and Rawlings gained
popularity, despite unease with the continuation of military rule, in part
by investing money from structural adjustment loans in road repair and
rural electrification. When civilian rule was restored in 1992, his party
gained control of the National Assembly, and Rawlings was elected Pre-
sident with strong support from the rural areas. During the rest of the
decade, political openness gained momentum. Press censorship was
lifted, local government reorganised, with elected District Assemblies in
charge of service provision in their respective jurisdictions, and an in-
creasingly vocal population engaged in vigorous debate over the perfor-
mance of state officials and politicians. Driven in part by increasing evi-
dence of corruption in the ruling regime, voters rejected the President’s
hand-picked successor in elections at the end of 2000, bringing the
leading opposition party to power in one of sub-Saharan Africa’s first
peaceful electoral changes of regime in the post-colonial era.
In Coˆte d’Ivoire, political stability unravelled in the 1990s despite –
or because of – the introduction of multi-party elections in 1990.
Although Houphouet-Boigny and the PDCI held on to power in 1990,
and again in 1995 under Houphouet’s successor, Henri Bedie, the con-
tinued deterioration of the economy generated widespread discontent,
much of it directed at the ruling party and its leaders. When Prime
Minister Alassane Ouattara broke with the regime after 1995 to emerge
as a leading contender for national power, popular frustration crystal-
lised along ethno-regional lines. Drawing his main support from the
northern regions, Ouattara became a symbolic target for southerners’
fears of permanent displacement at the hands of foreign immigrants
and migrant northerners long favoured under PDCI rule (Dembe´le´
2003:36). These anxieties were especially acute in the former cocoa
frontier areas of the southwest, where ‘autochthonous’ communities
felt themselves doubly disadvantaged, not only by immigrant ‘Burki-
nabes,’ but also by members of the President’s own Baule ethnic group
and ‘Dioulas’ from the savanna regions, who had led the first wave of
‘cocoa pioneers’ into the southwestern forests in the 1950s and 60s
(Chauveau and Le´onard 1996, and many others).
Bedie’s efforts to recoup his party’s fortunes did nothing to calm po-
litical tempers. Reacting to popular criticism, he repudiated his prede-
cessors’ liberal treatment of immigrants, replacing ‘houphouetisme’ with
an ethno-nationalist rhetoric of ‘ivoirite,’ effectively transforming the
basis of citizenship from residence (‘droit du sol’) to descent (‘droit du
sang’) (Dozon 2000:17). Having barred Ouattara from the presidential
elections in 1995 because he did not meet legal residence require-
ments,21 Bedie then moved to disqualify him permanently on the
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grounds that his grandfather had been born outside the country and
that Ouattara was therefore not really ‘ivoirien’.22
Bedie’s manoeuvres served to heighten ethno-regional tension
throughout the country. Suspicions about Ouattara’s national origin
spread to northerners in general: those who could not prove that their
parents were born in Coˆte d’Ivoire found themselves relegated to ‘legal
second class citizenship’ (ibid:18). Fearful and angry, northerners ral-
lied behind Ouattara and the RDR, raising the likelihood of an RDR
victory in the next round of elections scheduled for 2000, and feeding
xenophobia in the south (Dembe´le´ 2003:38).
If Bedie anticipated that southerners would unite behind the PDCI
to stop the threat of a northern takeover, however, he failed to reckon
with the PDCI’s own unpopularity, especially in the southwest. Rather
than vote for the party that, in their view, had sent northern migrants
and foreigners to take over their land, Bete and other southwestern-
based peoples threw their support to one of their own, a professor
named Laurent Gbagbo, known for his socialist sympathies, who al-
ready commanded a significant following among university students
and urban youth. By the late 1990s, the next electoral contest appeared
to be shaping up as a three-way struggle between the RDR, the PDCI
and Gbagbo’s FPI, none of which appeared able to muster much sup-
port outside of the leader’s home region (Crook 1997:238-239 and pas-
sim). When the National Assembly finally enacted a new rural code in
1998, replacing the ‘legal anarchy’ of land tenure arrangements under
Houphouet-Boigny with a statutory system of private ownership in ful-
filment of a long-standing demand from the IMF and the World Bank,
the effects were explosive.23 Limiting rights of land ownership to ‘ivoir-
iens,’ the law played directly into the hostilities between autochtones
and etrangers in the southwest, reinforcing ethno-regional party loyal-
ties and driving another nail into the coffin of political stability, not
only in the former frontier areas, but throughout the country as a
whole.
Concluding thoughts: Land conflict, politics and citizenship in the
time of structural adjustment
The conflicts over land and economic opportunity that developed in the
wake of frontier expansion in the cocoa-growing regions of southwes-
tern Ghana and Coˆte d’Ivoire, reflected the histories of migration and
settlement that had brought thousands of migrant farmers and la-
bourers into the forests in the 1950s and after, fuelling a process of
agricultural expansion based on extensive cultivation and the non-re-
newable riches of newly cleared forest soil.24 In Ghana, conflicts over
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land turned on issues of chiefly prerogative and ‘ancestral’ claims to
property and belonging that assigned rights to land according to peo-
ple’s status as ‘citizens’ or ‘strangers’. Determining a person’s ancestry
is an exercise in historical interpretation, in which people draw on
‘geneaological memory,’ historical narratives of ancestral deeds, and
both formal and informal sources of documentation to assert and chal-
lenge one another’s claims to community membership, traditional
authority, and associated rights over land. Far from rigid or stable, his-
torical precedents and their implications for authority and entitlement
in the present have been debated and reworked as people confront new
opportunities and pressures. Reaffirmed, in various ways, under both
colonial and post-colonial rule, chiefs’ authority over land has drawn
on and reinforced their leverage in debates over ancestry, ensuring
them a level of influence in contemporary economic and political af-
fairs that goes well beyond their constitutional prerogatives, which are
limited to jurisdiction over ‘chieftaincy affairs’ (see chapter 22 of the
Constitution of the Republic of Ghana, 1992).
As Arhin, Boni, and many others have argued, Ghanaian chiefs have
used their leverage to garner disproportionate returns from cocoa farm-
ing and other land-based enterprises, particularly at the expense of pro-
ducers who are (or who have come to be) considered ‘strangers’ in
areas under chiefly jurisdiction. Local ‘citizens’ have been similarly dis-
placed in peri-urban areas (Berry 2001:123-124; Ubink 2008a). Chief-
taincy has served, accordingly, as a magnet for social contestation.
Some of the most violent conflicts in recent Ghanaian history have
erupted in disputes over chiefly succession, jurisdiction and/or related
claims to land. Chiefs also wield considerable influence, not only with-
in their respective jurisdictions, but at the highest levels of the state,
drawing politicians, judges, bureaucrats and others into efforts to influ-
ence and capitalise on chieftaincy politics, as well as resolving disputes.
Unlike Coˆte d’Ivoire, however, where conflicts over land and belonging
played directly into state politics, connections between chieftaincy, state
and local governance in Ghana are multi-faceted, operating in overlap-
ping but parallel spaces of political engagement and contestation.
Chiefs wield power, but they don’t stand for election25 – a situation that
many have condemned, with reason, as placing them beyond meaning-
ful public accountability, but one that also leaves room for explosive
conflicts over land and authority to occur in recent years without bring-
ing down the government.
In Coˆte d’Ivoire, on the other hand, where conflicts over land and
entitlement also converged with debates over ancestry and origin, espe-
cially in the frontier areas of expanding cocoa production, rural ten-
sions converged with national political contests in the 1990s, contribut-
ing to an escalation of xenophobic rhetoric that brought ‘ethnic’ hatreds
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into electoral politics with disastrous consequences. Political opportu-
nism certainly contributed to this process, as Ivorian scholars have
been some of the first to point out. ‘Contrary to situations in which
hotbeds of nationalism emerge and the state is forced to take measures
to offset its effects,’ writes Akinde`s, ‘in Coˆte d’Ivoire, …the state itself
is responsible for the retribalisation’ of political discourse and participa-
tion (Akinde`s 2004:26). At the same time, one might argue that the
force of popular response to the ugly rhetoric of ‘ivoirite’ owed as much
to the convergence of state politics with the crisis in the cocoa-growing
areas and the neo-liberal insistence that all economic and political ‘re-
forms’ in Africa conform to a single model of ‘open’ markets and mul-
ti-party elections, as is owed to the power of opportunistic politicians to
manipulate the popular mind. Most of these processes were also at
work in Ghana, but they came together differently, allowing neo-liberal
advocates to claim that country as something of a ‘success’ – as long as
they focus attention on the right areas of economic and political en-
gagement.
Notes
1 The present essay is part of a larger study that seeks to explore the salience of ‘his-
tory’ in local struggles over property and power in different parts of Ghana and some
of its francophone neighbours. Using case studies from my own and others’ re-
search, I compare local histories of resource access, use, and control in Ghana and
neighbouring francophone countries – asking how understandings of the past figure
in contemporary economic and political affairs, and how local histories of economic
and political change have shaped West Africans’ experiences with neo-liberalism. In
doing so, I am interested both in how global hegemony of neo-liberalism has influ-
enced people’s lives in West Africa, but also in how the neo-liberal project itself has
been reworked through encounters with West African political economies.
2 Reaching a peak in the mid-1960s, cocoa production in Ghana declined for the next
twenty years, and remained well below previous levels for the rest of the twentieth
century. In Coˆte d’Ivoire, cocoa output continued to expand into the early 1980s, gen-
erating increases in export earnings despite steep declines in world market prices.
3 Much of her argument rests, empirically, on demonstrating that each regime em-
ployed different strategies in different regions of their country, depending on the
structure of rural society and the strength or weakness of rural elites.
4 The term ‘allochthones’ refers to Ivorian nationals who do not come from the local
area and are therefore not considered to be autochtones.
5 Estimates of people killed in these riots run from several hundred to as many as
4,000 (Boone 2003:207, 220; Stryker 1970:134).
6 The stool is the symbol of chiefly office in Akan-speaking areas in Ghana and south-
eastern Coˆte d’Ivoire. When the British established colonial rule in Asante, they in-
corporated ‘loyal’ chiefs into the colonial administration, endorsing chiefs’ authority
over their ‘subjects’ as well as the lands attached to their stools. Invoking their tradi-
tional right to a share of anything of value (game, timber, nuggets of gold) found on
stool land, chiefs argued that a farmer who ‘found’ value by growing cocoa outside
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the jurisdiction of his/her own stool, should give part of the proceeds to the stool
whose land s/he cultivated. These claims were accepted by colonial officials as legiti-
mate under ‘native customary law’ and incorporated into colonial policy on land. For
further information and examples, see Berry 2001.
7 A similar point is made by Lund 2002:32 and passim.
8 Boni 2006; Arhin 1986; compare Nugent 2002 and Mensah 1996 on Volta Region.
Similar disputes had been common in the early decades of the twentieth century, in
the older cocoa growing areas of Asante and Eastern Regions (Berry 2001:42-43;
Rathbone 1993:ch. 13; Simensen 1975a:201ff).
9 Such contributions were by no means automatic, however. For studies of conjugal la-
bour and household economies in cocoa growing areas, see, inter alia, Allman and
Tashjian 2000; Clark 1999; Mikell 1985; Okali 1983.
10 ‘(…) une vielle plantation est comme une vielle femme qui meurt. Les medicaments
couteraient trop pour la maintenir en vie. Il vaut mieux garder les medicaments pour
la jeune femme’ (Ruf 1991:107).
11 For more on transnational migration in the region, and the 1983 refugee crisis in
Ghana, see text following footnote below.
12 One study estimated that reductions in Ghana’s agricultural labour force resulting
from emigration to Nigeria, contributed significantly to declining food output from
1975 on (Tabatabai 1988:720ff).
13 On the history of the NLM, see Allman 1993. Nkrumah‘s relationships with Gha-
naian chiefs are discussed in Arhin 1993 and 2001, Boone 2003, and Rathbone
2000. See also Dunn and Robertson 1973.
14 Never fully abrogated during the First Republic despite the state’s energetic appro-
priation of substantial tracts of both urban and forest land ‘in the public interest,’ the
principle that ‘stool and skin lands shall vest in their respective stools’ has been reaf-
firmed in every subsequent constitution, and interpreted more broadly by successive
regimes. For a useful discussion of the legal and practical implications of the differ-
ence between land appropriated ‘for public purposes’ and ‘in the public interest,’ see
Kotey 2002. The widening of the effective scope of chiefly authority through subtle
changes in the wording of later constitutions is discussed in Arhin 2001. On the
spread of the Akan chieftaincy model to other regions of Ghana, and its implications
for the distribution of power and practices of governance in recent years, see Arhin
2001:ch. 5.
15 Stools’ authority over land, described in legal parlance as allodial (ultimate) title, has
been reaffirmed in each of Ghana’s last three constitutions. Under colonial laws, the
state could acquire land needed ‘for public purposes,’ powers that were reaffirmed
and elaborated in the State Lands Act (125) and the Administration of Lands Act (123)
of 1962. Act 125 transfers allodial title to the state. Under Act 123, ‘the administration
and management of ‘‘stool land’’ is vested in the state in trust for the stool,’ to be
used in the public interest (Kotey 2002:205). State use of such lands has been a sub-
ject of much controversy in recent years (Kasanga and Kotey 2001; Kotey 2002).
16 Like the Cocoa Marketing Board in Ghana, the Caisse de Stabilisation held a mono-
poly over sales of cocoa and coffee to foreign buyers, and used its control to appropri-
ate the major part of export crop revenues for the ruling party and the state. For de-
tails and analysis, see Crook 1990:650.
17 Houphouet and the PDCI worked closely with French officials and investors, main-
taining an open door to foreign investment as well as immigrant labour, working
with its francophone neighbours to maintain a common currency pegged to the
French franc, negotiating protected quotas for Ivorian exports to France, and appoint-
ing French officials to some of the most senior positions in the Ivorian administra-
tion. The open door was not limited to senior government positions, but applied at
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all levels of the Ivorian economy. In 1976, ‘foreign Africans accounted for 57% of all
jobs in the urban ‘‘informal and artisan’’ sector, …42% in the…"unskilled modern
sector’’’ and ‘a staggering 72.7% of all paid jobs’ in the primary sector in 1971 (Blion
and Bredeloup 1997; Crook 1991b:225).
18 The practice of paying an estate tax to the stool derives from pre-colonial Asante, and
was a subject of intense debate during the colonial era. See, e.g. Arhin 1974; Berry
2001:24, 40.
19 Akinde`s 2004:12-16; Losch 2000; and others; Memel-Fote´ 1997, 1999.
20 Cocoa income rose from 25 per cent of total export earnings in 1990 to 50 per cent
in 2000 (IMF, World Economic Outlook data base, http://www.imf.org/external/ns/
cs.aspx?id=28).
21 A former senior official of the IMF, Ouattara had lived abroad for many years, return-
ing to Coˆte d’Ivoire in the early 1990s, at the behest of his employers, to deal with
the worsening economic and financial situation.
22 In responding to these claims, Ouattara himself has given different accounts of his
family’s history (Akinde`s 2004:36-39).
23 Passed at the end of December 1998, Loi no. 98-750 sur le Domaine foncier rural
has been credited with helping bring about Coˆte d’Ivoire‘s first military coup in
1999, and the escalation of violent political struggle in the early years of the new mil-
lennium. In addition to restricting ownership to Ivorian nationals, the law mandates
a process for recognising and registering individuals’ ‘customary’ rights of ownership
which is so complex and cumbersome that very few rural dwellers are likely to be
able to complete it. All land which has not been so registered within ten years (by
the end of 2008) will revert to the national domain, effectively nullifying the legalisa-
tion of customary rights as private property (Chauveau 2002).
24 Francois Ruf’s term ‘forest rent,’ coined to describe the gains from cocoa and other
crops grown on newly cleared forest soil, has been taken up by others (Austin 2005;
Chauveau and Le´onard 1996; Ruf 1995).
25 Chiefs are not chosen to succeed to stools on the basis of open popular elections nor,
under the current Constitution, are they allowed to stand for election to public of-
fices. They may hold positions in the civil service, if their qualifications meet those
required of other public employees.
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3 The changing face of customary land tenure
Kojo Amanor
In recent years there has been growing interest in promoting custom-
ary institutions and arrangements in land tenure administrative reform
within Africa. This forms part of a policy approach concerned with pro-
moting democratic participation in governance by decentralising ad-
ministration from national state agencies to community-based institu-
tions. In Ghana, this strengthening of community-based institutions
revolves around chieftaincy, and in recent years chieftaincy is re-emer-
ging as an institution of governance, with increasing responsibility for
local development, to the extent that donors and the World Bank have
been funding foundations established by chiefs. Chiefs are represented
by national and regional houses of chiefs, and their customary rights
and rights to revenues and royalties are recognised in the Constitution.
In the land sector, reform programmes are underway to strengthen
chiefly administration of land and establish Customary Land Secretar-
iats under their aegis in all the regions.
In policy circles, it is often assumed that the customary represents
traditional or indigenous institutions that preceded modernisation, and
which are widely accepted within rural areas. The customary is often
defined in terms of an idyllic Arcadian past, which was characterised
by communal and egalitarian values, based on group solidarity and
rooted in spiritual and moral values. This results in the association of
customary tenure with equitable access to land. Kasanga reflects this
perspective, when he writes:
Ghanaian customary tenurial systems are therefore a source of
social security and continuity. The full enjoyment of the fruits of
one’s labour and efforts are guaranteed, and in regard to land,
no man is ‘big’ or ‘small’ in his own village or town (Kasanga
1996:89).
In this communitarian approach, the morality of customary systems is
seen to be disrupted by the state, which has usurped management over
land and placed it in the hands of a bureaucracy. This state bureaucracy
is accused of appropriating land for state enterprises and for the
wealthy clients of government, and of engaging in corrupt practices.
Communitarians argue that strengthening the management of land by
customary authorities will result in a more equitable and transparent
system of land management.
A second more sophisticated variant of communitarian land reform
focusses on the nature of articulation between customary and statutory
tenure. It argues that the present problems in land administration
emerge from the poor harmonisation between the two spheres. Most
people gain access to land under the customary system, but there are
few institutional arrangements, that enable customary arrangements to
be formally recognised within the state system of land administration.
This lack of recognition of customary or informal arrangements results
in land relations being largely unregulated and subject to a large num-
ber of abuses by both chiefs and bureaucrats, since there are few ave-
nues through which people can gain access to justice and retribution.
This enables customary authorities to engage in the multiple selling of
land plots, since their transactions are largely unrecorded within the
state system, and allows bureaucrats to demand excessive payments for
those seeking to register their lands, since there is no transparent doc-
umentation of existing landholdings. Thus, it is argued that by
strengthening the position of customary land authorities and building
their capacities to manage land and document transactions, customary
transactions will be increasingly documented and made transparent.
This will prevent corruption in both customary and bureaucratic sec-
tors (Antwi and Adams 2003; Toulmin and Quan 2000b).
This approach assumes that the major problem lies in the nature of
transactions and the documentation of these transactions. The claims
of chiefs to own and to be able to transact land are not seen as proble-
matic. However, this may result in the dispossession of land users by
chiefs before land reaches the market. For instance, Ubink (2006)
shows that in peri-urban areas of Kumasi, chiefs use their claims as
custodians of tradition and owners of the allodial title to land to appro-
priate the lands of farmers and sell them to purchasers of real estate,
since they can make considerable profit from this.
In contrast to the assumptions in policy circles that customary land
relations are widely accepted and recognised in rural communities, this
chapter draws upon a number of historical and contemporary cases to
show that customary land relations have always been contested. These
case studies also show that the customary is not autonomous and inde-
pendent of the state. It does not arise out of the solidarity of local inter-
ests in opposition to the state. On the contrary, customary relations are
frequently constructed around an alliance between local power elites
and the state, which comes to redefine what constitutes custom in a si-
tuation of change. Thus, the definition and redefinition of the custom-
ary frequently occurs in periods of rapid social and economic change
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and is associated with an adaptation to changing conditions rather than
resistance to change. This chapter examines the role of the chiefs in
the transformation of land tenure and their relationship with the na-
tional state. It also draws attention to the multiple constructions that
exist in customary land practices, and the ways in which different
groups, including marginal groups, frequently develop their own rival
and often ‘subversive’ versions of the customary, which frequently chal-
lenge the dominant discourse of local elites but which are not accepted
into the official canonical and elite versions of customary tenure.
The construction of customary land relations
Within the state sector, customary land relations in Ghana are based
on a formulation that differentiates allodial and user (usufructuary)
rights. Allodial rights are vested in chiefs who through their political
hegemony are granted ultimate control over the land. This concept is
ultimately derived from some notion of communal land tenure in
which the land is vested in chiefs to manage on behalf of the commu-
nity, or in which, as founders of the polity and the political order, chiefs
acquired rights to the political allegiance of subjects on their land. This
is essentially a political definition of land rights, which empowers
chiefs as the trustees of communities to control land. Their ‘subjects’
(the peasantry) only hold user rights in land, which confer on them
rights to use the land to make a livelihood, but not rights to sell land.
Only the products emerging from the use of land and from their la-
bour belong to the subjects of the chief, such as the farm plot, but the
actual land belongs to the chief. This framework ultimately denies the
peasantry secure rights in land by enabling them to be ‘extinguished
by the action of a paramount power which assumes possession of the
entire control of the land’ (Lord Haldane in Sobluza II v. Miller and
others 1926 A.C., 518 at 525, quoted in Chanock 1991:671). As Chanock
(1991) points out, customary rights do not reside in the peasantry but
derive from a political authority.
The origins of customary and state control over land
The origins of the formulation of customary tenure date back to the
early colonial period, to the failed attempts of the British colonial ad-
ministration to control land and vest it in the colonial state, and to the
ultimate creation of a system of Indirect Rule based on Native Authori-
ties and chiefly rule. During the 1880s, the Gold Coast became the
scene of a gold rush. Fearing that Asante would sign a trade treaty with
France, Britain rushed to conquer the hinterland of the Gold Coast and
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to occupy Kumasi in 1893-1894. In 1895, following the occupation of
Kumasi, the status of the Gold Coast was transformed from a protecto-
rate to a colony. This declaration overturned the Bond of 1844 in which
a free trade colony in the southern Gold Coast had been negotiated be-
tween African and European sovereigns of equal power. The Gold
Coast was transformed into an imperial colony without consultation
with the chiefs or people of the Gold Coast and without military defeat.
This resulted in considerable concern among the people of the Gold
Coast, which manifested itself in the organisation of opposition in the
Aborigines Rights Protection Society (ARPS), an alliance of chiefs and
business and intellectual elites on the Gold Coast. This transformation
of the status of the Gold Coast had great significance for the land ques-
tion. Fox Bourne (1901:41), a noted philanthropist of this period, com-
mented on the British campaign against Asante:
One of the main motives of the expedition of 1895, not admitted
till after its conclusion was, of course, command of the minerals
in which the interior of the Gold Coast is supposed to abound.
Before the troops had returned from Kumasi, in fact, several
speculators had begun arrangements with local chiefs and
others, with the objective of obtaining valuable concessions at
low prices.
In the 1890s more than 400 mining companies were established on
the Gold Coast and vast tracts of land were given out as concessions
(Howard 1978; Kimble 1963). The largest concession in this period
was an area of 100 sq miles, which became the site for Ashanti Gold-
fields. Land was often acquired by Gold Coast property speculators
who then sold it on to gold mining companies. In this period land
transactions with foreign concessionaires were not the monopoly pre-
serve of chiefs. The rapid pace of land sales were of concern to the co-
lonial government, particularly since it had little control over the pro-
cess. In 1894 the colonial government of the Gold Coast attempted to
enact a Crown Lands Ordinance which would place ‘waste land, forest
land and minerals’ under the British Crown and enable the colonial
government to gain control over the granting of concessions. However,
this was met with considerable opposition from the Gold Coast elite
and the ARPS. The ARPS argued that the Crown Lands Ordinance was
unconstitutional since the Gold Coast had not been established by con-
quest, but by a treaty. They sent a deputation to London to appeal to
the Privy Council. This resulted in the early development of a literature
on customary land relations, written by the Gold Coast intelligentsia.
The most important of these works included Fanti Customary Law by
John Mensah Sarbah, which appeared in 1897, and two works by
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Casely Hayford, The Truth about the West African Land Question which
appeared in 1898 and Gold Coast Native Institutions: With Thoughts
upon a Healthy Imperial Policy on the Gold Coast, which appeared in
1903. These works attempted to explain and codify local practices and
address policy concerns arising from the British imperial presence.
They suggested that customary practice was vital and that it should
form the basis on which colonial rule built a modern African state.
However, these writings largely represented propertied interests, and
the growth of a stratum of concession lawyers and property speculators
who had made considerable wealth from transacting land. The Gold
Coast elite was legitimately concerned that the Crown Lands Ordinance
and the vesting of land in the British crown would prevent them from
engaging in land transactions and undermine their commercial inter-
ests. However, they couched their positions in terms of the customary
rights of Africans to land and the violation of customary land by colo-
nial interventions, rather than in addressing the concerns of modernis-
ing land relations and creating reforms to promote economic growth
(Howard 1978).
The Crown Lands Ordinance was also opposed by British mercantile
interests in West Africa, organised through the Liverpool, Manchester,
and London Chambers of Commerce. They opposed increasing state
intervention and argued that this would hinder private investment in
West Africa. With increasing popular agitation against the Crown
Lands Ordinance, the legislation was rescinded on technical grounds
and replaced by the Lands Bill of 1897. The Lands Bill declared all
waste land within the colony to be Crown Land. This formulation was
again opposed by the ARPS, which following Mensah Sarbah (1897) ar-
gued that all land on the Gold Coast had an owner, and that the de-
claration of Crown Lands was a violation of the rights of the people of
the Gold Coast. The Forest Bill of 1910 was also met by popular oppo-
sition within the Gold Coast. The clauses to place all unused forest
land under government for management for posterity were regarded as
an attempt to re-introduce the Lands Bill through the back door (Kim-
ble 1963).
During this period colonial policy circles for West Africa were po-
larised by debates between those who supported constructivist imperi-
alism and a more laissez-faire policy based on liberalism. Constructivist
imperialism, as advocated by Chamberlain, advocated direct interven-
tion of the colonial government in promoting industrial investment in
Africa to transform the economy. The liberals, on the other hand,
whose position was vociferously advocated by E.D. Morel, supported
the development of West Africa as a region of peasant agriculture pro-
duction, producing agricultural resources for European markets with
minimal interventions from the state (Cowen and Shenton 1994; Phil-
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lips 1989). Those advocating constructivist imperialism supported con-
trol of the land by the colonial state, while the liberals supported a
more indirect arrangement involving alliances with the tribal nations
of West Africa. The liberal position gained the ascendancy, and colonial
administration was established through a policy of Indirect Rule, in
which colonial rule was effected through an alliance with traditional ru-
lers organised into Native Authorities, overseen by District Commis-
sioners. From this period, the management of land came under the
authority of chiefs, and the British colonial administration supported
the privileges of chiefs and their control over land and natural re-
sources. Chiefs were recognised as the only social group who could
transact land. A theory of African communal tenure was developed, in
which land was vested in chiefs to manage on behalf of the commu-
nities. This effectively constrained the development of free land mar-
kets and speculation in land, since land could now only be transacted
by chiefs with concessionaires.
This theory of African communal tenure was largely worked out in
southern Nigeria, through the precedence set in the case of Amadu Ti-
jani, which was brought before the Privy Council in London in 1928.
During the nineteenth century, land sales were prevalent in the Lagos
Colony, with many migrants including the Saro, recently returned Bra-
zilian freed slaves, purchasing significant tracts of land. In the nine-
teenth century, land in Lagos lay under the control of the Idejo chiefs,
who had the power to allocate unoccupied land under their jurisdiction
to family heads and migrants (Cowen and Shenton 1994). The Idejo
shared temporal and spiritual power with the Akarigberes (the royal
chiefs), the Ogalades (spiritual chiefs), the Agagbons (war chiefs) and
the Oba, the political head of Lagos society. Cowen and Shenton
(1994:232) stress that this complex of power:
(...) never had the time to become ‘traditional’. Rather, it was an
accretion of the political culture of those who had made Lagos
their home, further modified in an accelerating fashion from
the beginning of the nineteenth century onwards as a result of
economic growth and the dramatic increase in immigration into
the Lagos area, which followed the economic expansion of
Lagos.
By virtue of their control over land, the power and economic wealth of
the Idejo chiefs had grown during the nineteenth century. By 1910,
over half of Lagos land had been sold to migrants. In 1913, the govern-
ment of Southern Nigeria expropriated 250 acres under the Public
Lands Ordinance of 1903. The Idejo chief of this land, the Oluwa, Ama-
du Tijani applied for compensation, claiming that the land constituted
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a portion of his personal estate. The claim was rejected by the Supreme
Court of the colony on the basis that it had no validity in customary
law. The Oluwa appealed to the Privy Council in London. In their ap-
peal to the Privy Council, the council for the Oluwa changed the origi-
nal petition, arguing that the land in question constituted the land of
the community, of which the Oluwa was the elected head and trustee.
Compensation was demanded upon the basis of trusteeship over cus-
tomary land. The case revolved around what constituted authentic Yor-
uba customary law, and this was established through readings of mis-
sionary and government official reports. The final decision found that
individual ownership was foreign to native ideas, and that land was
vested in communities or families, but not individuals. While commu-
nity members held rights to use the land, the land was vested in the
chief as its trustee. The Privy Council rejected the nineteenth century
history of Lagos as an aberration. Quoting from Chief Justice Rayner’s
Report on Land Tenure in West Africa, Lord Haldane declared: ‘There is
a pure native custom along the whole length of the coast, and wherever
we find, as in Lagos, individual owners, this is again due to the intro-
duction of English ideas’ (quoted in Cowen and Shenton 1994:242).
The Oluwa won his claim to compensation, but only by acceding to
British colonial notions of what constituted communal or customary te-
nure. The ruling on this case now set a precedent for the whole British
Empire on what constituted communal land tenure. Cowen and Shen-
ton (1994) argue that this conception of communal land tenure was
rooted in European philosophical notions rather than in an empirical
analysis of land relations in African societies.
In the Gold Coast, this theory of communal land tenure was used to
constrain and control land sales. Land was vested in the hands of para-
mount chiefs who possessed allodial rights over land, and who were
the only social group able to sell land. Through control over paramount
chiefs, the colonial government was able to control land. The construct
of customary land that developed in the 1920s sits uneasily with his-
tory. It did not reflect the social relations and transactions in lands that
had existed in the nineteenth century. In Asante, for instance, wealthy
lords and chiefs could sell and pledge settlements under their control,
including both land and inhabitants. Wilks (1975) writes that in the
nineteenth century the Mamponhene sold the three villages of Safo,
Nantan, and Asoromaso, in the vicinity of Ntonso to the Asantehene
Opoku Ware for 100 peredwan (225 ounces) of gold. Wilks (1975:107-
108) comments:
Although sales prices have not been systematically recorded and
analysed the market in towns and villages was clearly a lively
one. One Asokorehene (...) sold to Kumase the town of Asokore
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and all of its villages (...). When Nunu Akyeremadehene of Ku-
mase, incurred a debt of 30 peredwans, he decided to put his
land and people up for sale; the Asantehene Osei Kwadwo pur-
chased them, and granted them to the new Hiawu Stool.
Early land sales on the Gold Coast
In the southeast of the Gold Coast, land sales had developed during
the early nineteenth century, as Krobo and Akwapem farmers ex-
panded their territories beyond their boundaries into land under the
Akyem. These lands were not purchased from paramount chiefs, but
often from town chiefs. Originally, the Krobo entered into oil palm pro-
duction by seizing lands from their neighbours. As they began to devel-
op a prosperous economy, they sued for peace with their neighbours,
offering to pay them compensation for lands they had seized and
money for any other lands they were willing to sell (Amanor 1994). In
the period between 1830 and 1850 land sales began to develop in this
area. The main vendors of land were the chiefs of Akyem Abuakwa,
and the main purchasers of land were the Krobo and the Akuapem.
Among the Krobo, the military companies that were involved in seizing
land were transformed into land purchasing companies, and the var-
ious sections of Krobo methodically purchased land from their neigh-
bours, gradually extending their territory through the purchase of con-
tiguous blocks of land. The Krobo political structure of sectional chiefs
(wetsongwatsemei) and generals (asafotsemei) of the various sections and
subsections negotiated the purchase of land from Akyem town chiefs
on behalf of their subjects (Amanor 1994).
The early land sales were transacted with a particular ceremony
known as the guaha, which represented a contract. The ceremony be-
gan with the potential buyers presenting the sellers with drink, which
in the early days was rum. The buyers notified the sellers of their inter-
est in purchasing land. The sellers identified suitable land, and the two
parties to the contract negotiated the price. After the conclusion of the
contract, the sellers then performed a libation in which they reiterated
that the land had been sold outright to the buyers. The sellers then
called on the ancestral spirits of the land to vacate the land and settle
elsewhere. The ceremony was concluded with the buyers and sellers
each putting forward a child who squatted on the ground facing each
other. A leaf from a plant known as Kesenekesene, or from a palm tree,
was given to the children. The children pulled the leaf tight until it tore
and each party retained the portion of the leaf as evidence of the trans-
action. In the case of a dispute, the witnesses to the transaction would
come forward and the two halves of the leaf would be pieced together
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to see if they fit. Children were used since they were likely to live long-
er as witnesses to the transaction than elders (Opoku 1963).
From the mid-nineteenth to early twentieth century large areas of
Akyem territory were alienated to migrants. In the case of the Krobo,
much of this territory was incorporated into the Manya and Yilo Krobo
states. From the late nineteenth to early twentieth century, many of the
land sales were drawn up in written documents. An instance of this is
the sale of the land of Odometa by the town chiefs of Begoro in Akyem
Abuakwa to the Krobo:
Know all men by these present that in consideration of the sum
one hundred and seventy four pounds and three sheep paid to
us and our Chief Gyamarah of Begoro we agreed and approved
and sold Odumetta land to Konor E. Mate Kole of Odumase
Eastern Krobo (…).
Therefore at a meeting at Sontreso plantation on 25th October
1907 it was unanimously agreed by ourselves being the Chief
and elders of Begoro, to confirm that the abovementioned land
is henceforth for ever to be recognised as the property of Kono
Mate Kole and his sons and heirs.
And we further promised to help, defend, and assist the said Ko-
nor Mate Kole, his sons and heirs against any attempt to dispute
their rights to or to disturb them in occupation, and use the said
land which is their bona fide property.
We therefore in the Year of Our Lord 1907 and on the 28th day
of October at Sontriso plantation do make this paper in the pre-
sence of the witnesses whose signatures and marks are here at-
tached given in good faith to the said Konor Emmanuel Mate
Kole of Eastern Krobo a substantial title to the abovementioned
land.2
Early land sales, before the advent of Indirect Rule, took place within
an institutional context that recognised the rights of town chiefs to sell
land and the perpetual alienation of the land in these transactions.
The hegemony of the paramount chief in land matters
Under the Native Authority system, land was placed under the jurisdic-
tion of the paramount chief. Land relations were determined by what
was considered customary practice and by the proclamations of bye-
laws by paramount chiefs defining these relations. These Native
Authority bye-laws were vetted by the colonial authority.3 However,
through much of the nineteenth century the states of the Gold Coast
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were characterised by social turmoil, rapid transformation, a series of
long interminable wars between polities, and internal conflicts. This
hardly provided the stable foundations for reaching a consensual deter-
mination of what constituted customary land arrangements. The defi-
nitions of customary land relations were essentially inventions of tradi-
tion. This was no more the case than in Akyem Abuakwa, which was
in many respects the model Native Authority. The paramount chief
(Okyenhene) Ofori Atta I, an educated Christian with a clerical back-
ground, enthusiastically embraced the Native Authority system and be-
came a major architect in the formulation of the Native Administration
Ordinance of 1928. Ofori Atta sought to modernise Akyem Abuakwa
and centralise control over its vast wealth in natural resources. Rath-
bone (1993:56) writes that Afori Atta:
(...) sought to create a command economy in which the centre
would control not only taxation but also resource allocation. He
tried to control land sales and entrepreneurial activity. In this
too he made enemies; and because of this the potential support
of the colonial state was an important element in his arsenal.
To establish new economic controls the Okyenhene sought to redefine
land relations. In the Akim Abuakwa Handbook, J.B. Danquah (the
nephew and aide to Ofori Atta) wrote:
Land in Akim Abuakwa belongs to no particular person. All the
stool lands in the state are held as communal property by the
stools in trust and to the use of the people of Akim Abuakwa.
Any member of the Akim Abuakwa tribe can cultivate any forest
land in the State without the necessity of having the same sold
or leased to him. Proprietary rights in land only begin from the
time of occupation, and such occupied area is held by the occu-
pier as and because he is a member of the Akim Abuakwa tribe
and a subject of the Paramount Stool. A member of the stool so
holding a piece of land can use it for raising any kind of eco-
nomic activity, for building a residential house, or a mercantile
factory. He pays neither rent nor tribute. Only he cannot alienate
the communal interest in the land to any person who is not a
member of the tribe. The ultimate right of disposal is reserved
for and by the state stool in the interest of the public or for the
general welfare of the State (Danquah 1928a:43).
This depiction of customary land rights in Akyem was far from what
had occurred in Akyem in the not-too-distant past. During the nine-
teenth century the control of land did not lie under the Paramount
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Stool, but with the various town stools. The Akyem Abuakwa state had
arisen out of the collapse of the Akwamu Empire in the eighteenth
century, in the context of a long civil war, in which various groups that
came to constitute the Akyem Abuakwa moved into the area and even-
tually established political control in 1730. While the Abuakwa dynasty
claimed overlordship of this area, it had never been able to consolidate
its rule, since it was soon defeated by Asante in 1745. Much of the his-
tory of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century in Abuakwa is
made up of wars of resistance to Asante overlordship, and conflicts be-
tween different factions and towns allying with and against the Asante.
Abuakwa control of the former Akwamu territories was achieved by an
alliance with some of the town chiefs of Akwamu towns, who contin-
ued to maintain considerable autonomy. Much of the southern area of
Abuakwa was never successfully brought under Abuakwa jurisdiction
(Wilks 1958). During the nineteenth and in the early twentieth century,
land was largely transacted by town chiefs and a considerable area of
Akyem land was alienated by these town chiefs to migrant cocoa farm-
ers, before the creation of a system of Native Administration. Without
access to the control of significant areas of land, the paramount author-
ity in Abuakwa attempted to redefine land relations to enable it to ex-
tract rents from migrant cocoa farmers and to control concessions.
With the development of Indirect Rule, Ofori Atta used his new powers
to displace the rights of town chiefs to alienate land to immigrants. He
declared transactions in land a violation of Akyem custom and at-
tempted to gain access to parts of the proceeds of land rents and royal-
ties (Rathbone 1993). He was instrumental in alienating considerable
tracts of land and signing mining concessions. In this, he was backed
by the colonial authority, which supported the idea that the Akyem
Paramount Stool was entitled ‘by native custom’ to one-third of all
rents and profits of alienated land. He extracted considerable revenues
from migrant cocoa farmers within his domain. Since Ofori Atta was
frequently consulted by the colonial authority in drafting native admin-
istration legislation he was able to ‘use the law skilfully within the In-
direct Rule structure (...) to ordain what was and was not ‘‘customary’’
law’ (Rathbone 1993:62)
The attempts by the Okyenhene to refashion customary rights stirred
up considerable opposition in Akyem Abuakwa. Other social interest
groups began to contest this particular interpretation of the customary
and to articulate their own interests within the framework of custom-
ary rights, pointing out how those in authority violated customary
norms, and presenting their actions and opposition as based on the
real precedent of custom. The town chiefs in Akyem began to insist
upon their customary rights to transact land. When diamonds were
found in the Akwatia and Asamankese area, the chiefs of these towns
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insisted on their historical rights to claim control over these resources
and to negotiate the concessions. When this failed, they then insisted
on their historical rights to secession from the Abuakwa state, leading
to a protracted court case (Addo-Fening 1997; Rathbone 1993).
Similarly, the selling of land and attempts to impose forced labour,
fines and fees, and other exactions on commoners led to a resurgence
of popular organisation. The commoners began to revive the asafo com-
panies and transform them into political organisations. Historically,
the asafo were paramilitary organisations, which mobilised commoners
for military service in wartime and social infrastructure development
in peacetime. They also played important roles in representing the in-
terests of commoners and in destooling (dethroning) unpopular chiefs.
This role was consolidated and built upon in the colonial period. In co-
lonial Akyem and neighbouring Kwahu, commoners reshaped the asafo
to defend their interests and to develop checks on the newfound
powers of chiefs under Indirect Rule, through mass demonstrations
(Simensen 1975b). Commenting on the asafo movement in Kwahu,
Asiamah (2000: 73) writes:
Notably, the Asafo severely criticized the astronomical court
fines imposed upon the commoners accused of breaking the
chiefs’ oath, laws and taboos. Other more serious charges were
bribery and misappropriation of stool land revenues. For in-
stance, money that accrued from land sales, tolls, special levies,
timber concessions, mineral concessions, cocoa revenues, and
others, were freely squandered, as if they were the personal in-
comes of the chiefs while the commoner who toiled to bring in
the revenue did not benefit from his labour.
In Akyem Abuakwa, commoner perceptions of wide scale abuses of
privilege by chiefs under Indirect Rule led to a movement to destool
unpopular chiefs. Between 1904 and 1944 thirty-five chiefs were de-
stooled in Abuakwa. During the 1930s, the Okyenhene became the fo-
cus of attempts at destoolment from both the asafo and town chiefs. In
1932 the Okyenhene was saved from destoolment by the intervention of
a colonial force sent to defend him. In neighbouring Kwahu, two para-
mount chiefs were destooled in 1915 and 1927 (Asiamah 2000).
By the 1950s, the asafo movement had become integrated into the
anti-colonial struggle, and a major support base for the radical wing of
the Convention People’s Party, as a wave of destoolments developed.
Amamoo (1958:99) comments:
(...) many people were beginning by the end of 1950 to associate
the chiefs with British rule. The situation was worsened by the
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rather too close friendship between some of the chiefs and the
British officers, by a statement from Nkrumah to the effect that
reactionary and other chiefs who refused to move with the peo-
ple would be destooled, and by the spasmodic waves of ‘destool-
ment’ of chiefs which swept the country between the period
1949 to 1952. The chiefs, therefore, felt their position was at
stake; and their institutions in danger of being abolished.
By the late 1940s, the Native Administration system lay in tatters. It
was now clear that the system of chieftaincy did not reflect the social
heterogeneity of many of the areas over which they presided and had
alienated much of the population. As Macmillan (1946:90-91) com-
mented:
The Akim country, in particular has not only scattered aliens as
individual owners but whole village communities of ‘alien’ occu-
pants. In many market towns, of which Suhum is an often
quoted type, the aliens are definitely in the majority (...). and yet
the only local tribunals are those of the home tribe, with appeal
to the local tribal Paramount. The worst feature of all this is that
anything up to 20 per cent of the population of such towns are
Northern Territories labourers (....). But the labourers must look
for redress of grievances in the first instances to a tribal court,
which is certainly not their own, and may very often be com-
posed if not of their actual employers then of their employers’
friends and relatives (...). In some of the cocoa country, and cer-
tainly in the towns, one-tribe courts are therefore an anachron-
ism. It is a fair inference that successful government in the Gold
Coast demands a revision by the Colonial Office of its exclusive
devotion to a doctrine of Indirect Rule based on tribal institu-
tion. The confusion, finally, as it concerns both land-ownership
and those questions of tribal jurisdiction, is constantly spreading
to any area newly brought under cocoa, especially in the Wes-
tern Province, but also in Ashanti and Togoland.
During 1948, riots and looting spread through the major urban centres
in the Gold Coast. A Commission of Enquiry was set up under Aitken
Watson to examine the underlying causes of the disturbances. Many of
the commoners or young men consulted by the Commission com-
plained of the system of Native Administration, the autocratic imposi-
tions made by chiefs and elders on the population at large, and the lack
of any democratic representation of the commoners. These representa-
tions called for the establishment of a system of local democracy and
the reduction of the role of the chief to an ornamental figure. The re-
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commendations of the Watson Commission were taken up by the
Coussey Committee, which was charged with making practical recom-
mendations for constitutional reform based on the findings of the Wat-
son Commission, and the creation of a system of democratically elected
local government. However, the Coussey Committee was sympathetic
to the institution of chieftaincy and made some provision for chiefs to
be represented in local government and to preside over its functioning.
While democratic election of local authorities marked the transition
years to independence, chiefs had rights to appoint one-third of local
representatives and continued to enjoy rights of control over land.
Since independence, one-third of local government representatives con-
tinue to be appointed by configurations of government, chiefs, and alli-
ances between chiefs and central government. This has effectively
blocked downward accountability and popular reform in local govern-
ment (Aryee 1992; Crook and Manor 1998).
Since independence, no deep-seated reform of land tenure has been
carried out. While chiefly revenues now officially come under govern-
ment scrutiny and administration, there has been no attempt to reform
the rights of cultivators and provide them with security of tenure. The
allodial rights of chiefs have often been upheld and used by govern-
ment, which frequently works through the chiefs to expropriate peas-
ant cultivators. Governments continue to maintain the claims of chiefs
on allodial rights in land, since it often serves the interests of the politi-
cal elite. These claims enable rural farmers to be easily expropriated in
the national interest or in the interest of development. Compensation
for the land is only paid to the chief as the owner, while farmers only
receive compensation for the crop on the land. Thus the chiefs gain di-
rect economic benefit from the expropriation of their subjects. How-
ever, the provision of land titling options within land management in-
stitutions protects the investments of commercial investors in land,
since those with title can claim compensation for land. Through the
existence of complicated and expensive titling procedures, an exclusive
system of land titling is maintained which prevents peasant farmers
from protecting their rights in land and thus maintains their vulner-
ability to expropriation, while creating different rights for the rich and
privileged.
Family land, accumulation, and frontiers
Since the late nineteenth century, cocoa developed as a frontier crop in
which large groups of migrant farmers accumulated capital, investing
capital in the purchase of new land in forest areas and the conversion
of land into cocoa plantations (Hill 1963). The cocoa farmers depended
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upon family labour and migrant hired labour for production. They at-
tracted members of their extended family lineages to work with them.
In return for helping them establish their cocoa plantations the rela-
tives were provided with gifts of land and the inheritance of cocoa plan-
tations they had helped to create. Profits acquired in cocoa were rapidly
reinvested in new land and plantations. This led to the rapid develop-
ment of the cocoa frontier throughout the forest region of Ghana.
From its beginning in the Eastern Region in the nineteenth century,
the cocoa frontier rapidly expanded into Ashanti, the Central Region,
Brong Ahafo, and the Western Region. The opening up of the frontier
resulted in a diverse ethnic population within the forest region in Gha-
na, as farmers from all previous frontiers migrated to the new frontier.
Today the frontier has exhausted itself: there are no new frontier areas
in Ghana in which new lands can be opened up and new purchases of
empty forestland made.
Figure 3.1 The cocoa frontier
Source: Amanor 1994
The cocoa frontier has led to the rapid alienation of land and has often
created shortages of land for the youth and subsequent generations.
This affects both the autochthonous population in the new frontier
areas and the migrants. With the development of land sales to cocoa
farmers, chiefs began to define their alienable stool lands (that is the
areas which they could transact with non-locals) as the areas within
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their domain, which were not occupied by the existing or autochtho-
nous farming population. They began selling these lands to migrants
to gain revenues from them. Since the local farming population had
rights as citizens to farm freely, chiefs could only gain revenues by sell-
ing land to migrants or finding other ways of expropriating land from
locals. Chiefs were also under pressure to carry out rapid alienation of
the land, since the expansion of local farmers into cocoa production
would result in a decline in the area of land chiefs could sell or transact
with migrants. The development of cocoa, thus, created new interests
in land for chiefs that had not existed before. This essentially led to a
redefinition of stool lands as lands that could be transacted by the stool
under conditions of expanded commodity production, export agricul-
ture, and integration into world commodity markets.
Family relations and commodification: Migrants, youth, elders and chiefs
Until the 1920s, the dominant form of transaction between chiefs and
migrants was the direct sale and alienation of land for cash. However,
land purchasers often paid in instalments, and maximised accumula-
tion of land for plantation development by making multiple payments
of instalments on different plots of land, and by delaying the final pay-
ments of instalments (Hill 1963). By the 1920s, there was a large in-
flux of labour into the cocoa belt, largely from Northern Ghana and
neighbouring Sahelian countries. These migrants came from regions
that had been integrated into the colonial economy as labour reserves,
where imposition of taxation forced men to migrate to the colonial en-
claves to gain money with which tax obligations could be met. The co-
coa belt in the Gold Coast was one of the most popular and favoured
destinations for migrant labourers. This influx enabled migrant farm-
ers to hire labour and expand farm operations. It also enabled chiefs to
develop new arrangements in which they released land to labourers or
tenants rather than sell land outright to purchasers.
Sharecropping arrangements began to predominate from the 1920s
(Austin 1987; Hill 1956). Chiefs would release mature forestland to mi-
grant farmers (with some capital) who were responsible for converting
it into cocoa plantation. In some arrangements the cocoa plantation
was then divided between the chiefly stool and the sharecrop tenant,
and the portion worked by the tenant was recognised as their own
land. In other arrangements, the tenant gained a share of the yield, or
paid a rent (often a third of the yield) to the chief. The terms of these
sharecrop arrangements varied in different areas and different periods.
Through sharecrop arrangements chiefly stools were able to acquire
considerable cocoa plantations without directly investing in labour.
After the cocoa plantation was created, it could be hired out to a mi-
70 KOJO AMANOR
grant caretaker who gained a third of the proceeds or harvest from the
plantation, or an annual labourer who was paid a fixed sum after the
cocoa was harvested and sold. The terms of arrangements on these
lands have often changed, with chiefs introducing new arrangements
as land became scarce and applying these arrangements retrospectively
to other farmers, or creating new exactions, tributes, and rents on mi-
grant farmers (Boni 2005). This often led to insecurity of tenure for
migrant farmers.
With the attempts of paramount chiefs to claim a monopoly on the
sale of land from the 1920s, sharecrop arrangements became popular.
They often served as forms of disguised sales of land, through which
farmers and town chiefs could transact land without being challenged
by paramount chiefs or members of their lineages claiming the sale to
be a violation of custom. In the cocoa belt sharecrop transactions be-
came more frequent than land sales from the 1920s onwards.
The sale of land by chiefs to migrant cocoa farmers has resulted in
land shortage for local youth, particularly in the Eastern and Western
Regions. This has frequently led to resentment of migrants by local
youth (Amanor 2001; Boni 2005). In many areas, the dominant rural
populations are overwhelmingly migrants. In some situations, chiefs
have been able to manipulate the local youth’s resentment of migrant
farmers to make increasing exactions from migrants. When the mi-
grants resist these actions, chiefs mobilise local youth to take actions
against them, often making claims that the migrants have abused the
hospitality that was extended to them and have encroached into lands
that they were not allocated. Boni (2005) recounts how the Sefwi Dis-
trict Council decided to register ‘stranger farmers’ in the early 1950s,
with the aim of organising a more efficient system of land revenue col-
lection in which the migrant tenants had to renegotiate land agree-
ments. The migrants refused to comply and the chiefs sent in local
youth to dispossess strangers of their farms. As violence spread, the
government was forced to intervene.
The influx of migrant sharecrops and annual labourers often under-
mined the position of local youth among the rural poor. Farmers could
play off family youth against sharecrop tenants, making more demands
on youth labour and hiring sharecrop labour to replace family youth
when youth were not compliant. This has led to an anti-youth dis-
course that rural youth are lazy and footloose and unwilling to help
their parents on their farms. By the 1970s, youth participation in fa-
mily cocoa production became increasingly insecure. As land became
scarcer youth contributions of labour were devalued by elders. Okali
(1983) records many grievances among youth, who worked with their
fathers or matrilineal uncle’s, only to find that on the death of their pa-
tron the plantations they had helped to establish were usurped by the
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brothers of their fathers. One son, who had managed his father’s cocoa
plantations, only to find himself displaced by his father’s matrilineal
heir, bitterly declared: ‘If you follow your father you are a fool’ (Okali
1983:107). Wary of working for their fathers only to be displaced by ma-
trilineal kin, many sons abandoned their father’s cocoa farms when
they saw other relatives treated more favourably than them. However,
the same fate also befell nephews, who worked on their uncle’s planta-
tions only to find themselves displaced from inheriting the land by ju-
nior brothers of their maternal uncle. Fathers’ attempts to pass on land
to heirs were often challenged by other lineage members, as lineage
land became increasingly scarce with the decline of new frontier land.
Increasing scarcity of land has hindered the transmission of land
across generations, as well as the use of gifts of land within the family
to build up family labour networks. While in the past farmers would al-
locate land to nephews and sons, the allocation of land is increasingly
challenged. While this allocation is challenged on the basis of custom-
ary matrilineal norms, it often results in the breakdown of family rela-
tions and their replacement by commodified market relations. Increas-
ing areas of family land are allocated as sharecrop arrangements to
non-kin rather than being inherited by kin members.
Without secure access to family land, many youth have chosen to
withdraw from the family farm, seek alternative livelihoods, or work as
labourers or sharecrop tenants elsewhere. During the 1970s, long dis-
tance migrant labour from the Sahelian countries relocated to the Coˆte
d’Ivoire, where the cocoa frontier was still in an expansionary state and
land could be acquired on favourable terms. Youth in the Ghanaian for-
est zone have increasingly been transformed into labourers or share-
croppers, responding to the demand for labour but shortage of family
land for redistribution to the new generation. In matrilineal areas,
many fathers who work closely with their sons attempt to gain matrili-
neal land for their children (who do not have inheritance rights) on a
sharecrop basis. While the access of the children to land involves pay-
ment for land in the form of a sharecrop rent, this creates more secure
access which will not be challenged by the family. In areas where land
is highly scarce and has acquired a high value, sharecropping has be-
come the dominant form of transaction, and most young people, such
as in the Kwaebibirem area of Akyem, gain land through sharecrop-
ping rather than through inheritance (Amanor and Diderutuah 2001).
Oil palm plantations are recognised as highly profitable but expensive
to establish. Rather than release land to family youth, farmers prefer to
enter into sharecrop arrangements with those who have sufficient capi-
tal to develop oil palm plantations. Customary prestations for the allo-
cation of land have been inflated to levels which prevent poor youth
from getting access to land. This assures that those cultivating land are
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going to cultivate profitable cash crops to recover the costs of their in-
vestment in land (Amanor and Diderutuah 2001). Farming has become
increasingly commodified. Land and labour are transacted on markets
rather than offered or received on the basis of family solidarity.
Women and the commodification of land
The expansion of cocoa and the increasing commodification of land
undermine women’s rights to land. Prior to the development of cocoa,
food crop production was an important activity for women, and men
were responsible for clearing forests for their wives to cultivate. With
the development of cocoa as a means of accumulation by the wealthy,
and the rapid accumulation of land and plantations by wealthy male
cocoa farmers, the security of women farmers was undermined. The
customary framework of land, articulated in the colonial period, eroded
women’s rights to land and reinvented women farmers as the wives of
male cocoa farmers, who migrated to the new frontier to help them
establish cocoa farms. Frequently, women were not remunerated for
their activities. One of the women farmers interviewed at Asafo and
Maase by Hill during the 1950s commented ‘in the olden times we
used to help our husbands to get big, big farms; and when they died
we got nothing’ (Hill 1959:2). The women interviewed by Hill insisted
that they worked together as women with daughters and granddaugh-
ters, and that women’s land passed from mother to daughter. As Hill
(1959:3) reports:
Apart from the assistance given by school children in their holi-
days, some women are assisted by their elder sons, though they
tended to play this down in an interview. It was mentioned that
a particular helpful son might be given a farm by his mother
during her lifetime. Usually, of course, a women’s daughter suc-
ceeds to her property and it is considered more appropriate that
they should provide for her brother’s needs from her mother’s
farm than that the farm should actually pass to him.
During the 1970s, as land became increasingly scarce, many women
who had worked on their husband’s cocoa farms increasingly found
themselves dispossessed of the cocoa farms by their husband’s matrili-
neage. Okali (1983) found that women were making demands that the
farm services they performed be reciprocated in immediate rights in
land for themselves and their children. If these demands were not met,
they were prepared to divorce their husbands.
With growing insecurity in access to land through marriage, many
women are also insisting on their rights to matrilineal land in their
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own right. In research carried out in the Akyem settlements of Apina-
man and Dwenease during 1999-2000 (Amanor 2001), many women
insisted that they were the true purveyors of the matrilineal tradition,
and that men violated this by passing on land to their own children.
Under matrilineal inheritance, land is transmitted by men to their sis-
ter’s children rather than their own children (although in the past, in-
stitutions have existed which allowed fathers to make gifts of property
to their own children and to other people who have served them). A
woman at Apinaman stated:
Women usually pass on lands to their daughters and grand-
daughters. That is the tradition here because men do not belong
to the abusua [matrilineage]. If you give land to the son, it goes
out of the abusua; but if it goes to the women, it will stay home.
If you give land to the boys and they happen to give birth the
land will go to the wife’s children. A father can always give out
his land as a gift to his children. In that case, it becomes the
property of his children and they can sell it out or develop it for
their own use.
Some women also controversially challenged the right of men to matri-
lineal family land. One young woman confided:
We are three sisters and a brother. Our mother’s brother (wofa)
is dead, and he has left a large tract of land for us, which is lying
fallow. We are planning to meet here to share the land among
us. We are planning that we will not give our brother any part of
the land because it will allow him to develop part of it and leave
it to his children. So he has to find his own land elsewhere,
since he is not going to marry from our family. We can develop
what is there, little by little, for our children.
Young women at Apinaman aggressively asserted their rights to matri-
lineal land over their brothers. This becomes increasingly necessary, as
intergenerational conflicts exist between men. This serves to prevent
sons, who become increasingly estranged from their fathers and
mother’s brothers, from approaching their mother for land, thus
further eroding land available to women. This assertion of a matrifocal
ideology serves to cast doubts on the legitimacy of men’s customary
rights to control matrilineal property and their transparency in manag-
ing matrilineal property. It promotes female solidarity within the line-
age, and consolidates women’s defence of their property rights in land
and its erosion by male control of property and the increasing commo-
dification of agricultural production. Many women farm in matrifocal
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units consisting of three generations of women (grandmother, mother,
and daughter). Divorce is high and many women look to these matrifo-
cal units rather than to the conjugal family for security. Paradoxically,
this matrifocal identity threatens the rights of married women to re-
ceive land from their husbands. Nevertheless, it is symptomatic of the
pressures of commodification of agriculture on family relations, and
the tensions that ensue within the family as customary forms of reci-
procity break down.
The commodification of land and the rights of cultivators
In policy circles, customary land rights are frequently associated with
the allodial rights of chiefs to land, or the rights of chiefs to sell land.
However, these are very modern notions, which could only occur in the
context of the development of land markets and migrant farmers will-
ing to purchase land. Without the development of frontier markets for
land for export crop production, the issue of allodial rights and clearly
defined customary rights does not arise. The definition of the allodial
only acquires economic significance in the context of the alienation of
land. Where everyone has only a use right to land, allodial rights do
not carry any significant economic connotation. Allodial rights only ac-
quire significance where there is an influx of migrants without rights
of use and where land is transacted with these categories of people. Al-
lodial interests thus only arise at the juncture where land is being com-
modified. This was clearly recognised by Field (1948:7) when she com-
mented:
The new income from mines and land sales means that the
land, originally valueless to the oman [state] and quite indepen-
dent of it, has become linked to the oman. The oman does not
control or own it, but has acquired a very acute interest (in the
non-legal sense) in it.
Since chiefs cannot sell land to insiders the assertion of allodial inter-
ests only arises in the situation of demands on land by outsiders and
investors, in the context of the commodification of land. This can be
clearly understood if we examine conceptions of customary land in
areas where the commodification of land is not highly developed.
In the northern transition zone of Brong Ahafo, population densities
are low, frequently below twenty people per square kilometre. Land can
be acquired by migrant farmers for nominal annual fees. These fees
are not linked to the area cultivated; they merely establish permission
to cultivate and recognition of the landlord. Citizens have rights to
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farm anywhere in the land of their settlement where other people are
not actively farming or managing fallow. Farmers claim land according
to their labour power. They usually farm together along a line moving
forward, until the land they have left behind is well regenerated, when
they may chose to return to farm and begin a cycle of rotational bush
fallowing or shifting cultivation. When farmers meet other farmers
clearing from the opposite direction, they are forced to return to the
lands at their back, reorient their direction of clearing, or move to a
new area. Rights to land are established through the investment of la-
bour in clearing vegetation. In this situation, farmers’ lands are con-
stantly changing in relation to farming strategies and available labour.
Rights to land are clearly recognised within the communities and de-
termined by customary norms and conventions. However, these no-
tions of land rights to the tiller do not fit easily into modern notions of
ownership of specific areas, which can be mapped, digitised, placed in
databases, and transacted in land markets and ‘one stop shops’.
Figure 3.2 Land management under rotational bush fallowing
The security of landholdings within this system only breaks down
when chiefs begin to transact the land and allocate it to external inves-
tors. Unable to extract revenues from local cultivators, chiefs look to
the development of new high value crops and welcome external inves-
tors to develop the land, or when such investors move into their local-
ities concepts of land begin to change. In the transition zone of Brong
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Ahafo, chiefs are currently allocating large areas of land to investors in
teak, cashew, and exotic mango. Eventually, these new investments will
create land shortage for the food crop farmers and disrupt their fallow
management strategies. Policymakers usually define the customary as
occurring at this juncture, when chiefs begin to allocate land to exter-
nal investors, and plots begin to be demarcated, rather than at the junc-
ture where user rights in land prevails. The concept of the customary
is used to empower chiefs to sell the land to the external investors and
to create the necessary reforms to facilitate this transaction. The cus-
tomary has thus from the early colonial period come to define the pri-
vilege of chiefs and their rights to alienate land to external investors as
part of a process of commodification.
This is very apparent in the changes in land use in the grasslands of
the southern Krobo areas situated in the Accra plains. Export mangoes
are becoming a new crop, and external investors are now keen to ac-
quire land in this area. This is transforming land values in a formerly
highly marginal agricultural environment. An article in Ghana Regional
News of 18 September 2005, states:
The Eastern Regional Minister, Mr. Yaw Barimah, has suggested
to the chiefs of Manya Krobo Traditional Area to take a second
look at their land tenure system with a view to releasing land for
commercial mango farming. He explained that mangoes grow
well in the area and their cultivation could form the raw materi-
al base for the development of agro-industry to provide employ-
ment for the youth of the area.
This speech of the Regional Minister reveals many of the problems
and concerns with current initiatives to strengthen customary tenure,
defined as chiefly control over land. The empowerment of chiefs by the
state to control land serves to enable chiefs to transform or re-invent
tenure systems to serve the interests of elites. The chiefs are being
asked to create reforms that will enable lands to be released to com-
mercial mango farmers, presumably at the expense of the local popula-
tion. The main role envisaged for youth is as providers of labour for
agribusiness, which presumes their expropriation from the land and
their inability to engage in independent livelihoods. In this context the
phrase ‘taking a second look’ amplifies the process through which cus-
tomary land tenure systems are recreated in the present. They are
about commoditising land and creating the conditions under which
land becomes transferred to investors with clear and undisputed own-
ership rights attached to them. While these land rights may have been
appropriated from others, they cannot be challenged, since they are
authenticated by customary authorities with power to define and rede-
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fine land rights. The customary (as represented by chiefs) thus serves
to authenticate the commoditisation and appropriation of land and to
transfer user rights into alienable rights.
Conclusion
In the present economic climate land and natural resources are in-
creasingly being transacted in global markets and opened to investors.
However, as new frontier areas decline, land resources are also becom-
ing increasingly scarce and the source of competition. Future processes
of accumulation and new investment are likely to take place through
processes of dispossession of land users. The strengthening of chiefly
control over land creates conditions for the expropriation of the peasan-
try. It enables chiefs to claim control over land and to redefine land re-
lations. It absolves the state from blame for expropriating the rural
poor. However, in reality, the state empowers chiefs to control land and
enables them to define processes of appropriation, by insisting on
mythical definitions of customary rights that serve to disempower indi-
vidual cultivators of land, while promoting the customary as an egali-
tarian system which stands for the interests of the community. Without
tacit support and recognition from the state and support for their ver-
sion of customary tenure, chiefs would have little power to enforce
their versions of customary tenure.
Although chiefs claim to be the customary custodians of land and of
communities, in reality many chiefs form part of the modern elite.
Many of them are businessmen in their own right. Modern and cus-
tomary elites straddle each other. They intermarry; and they are mem-
bers of the same political parties, religious associations and other elite
associations. Businessmen use their wealth to gain chiefly titles and
wealthy sections of chiefly families are able to wrest succession from
poorer lines of the chiefly families (Arhin 2001). Chieftaincy is an in-
stitution that is closely associated with processes of accumulation and
the redefinition of tradition to support accumulation. While strength-
ening of chieftaincy may promote processes of decentralised adminis-
tration this often promotes highly unequal development.
The notion of customary land tenure has always been contested in
Ghana. There are diverse concepts of the customary used by various
groups to defend their rights against violation. This includes the rights
of citizens to claim land through its transformation through their la-
bour; the rights of women to create female property; the rights of youth
to a livelihood; the rights of youth to hold elders accountable through
demonstrations and threats of mob violence; the codes of conduct
worked out by shifting cultivators as they move across the land. There
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are diverse interest groups in rural society and contested definitions of
the customary and the ways in which social relations should be ordered
and reformed. However, these interests are poorly represented in policy
circles which, hark back to the era of Indirect Rule, associate customary
rights with the rights of chiefs to define and redefine control over land
and the power to allocate land on the market. In the policy world the
notion of the customary functions as a rhetorical device in the context
of social upheaval to justify attempts to impose control on fluid and
changing situations by those with power, and to redefine dominant in-
terests.
While chiefly rights and representations are being strengthened in
the contemporary period in policy circles, the rural areas are charac-
terised by considerable social turmoil and upheaval. The decline of
new frontier areas, the inroads of agribusiness in the rural areas, and
the commodification of agriculture and land is increasingly transform-
ing existing social relations within the family in agricultural produc-
tion. Family farming relations are increasingly replaced by individua-
lised agriculture in which land and labour becomes increasingly com-
modified and subject to market relations. Youth are no longer
guaranteed access to family land. These upheavals make it important
to investigate the actual living conditions of people and the changing
social relations of production, rather than to engage in abstract and
dogmatic assertions and definition of the customary based on ideas de-
riving from colonial administrative frameworks. It is important to
document changing social and production relations in agriculture and
to address the implications of the increasing commodification of agri-
culture for peasant cultivators, for the rural poor, labourers, women,
and youth. It is also important to open a debate in society about the
ways in which people want their land relations to be structured, rather
than leaving it to government and chiefs to jointly redefine and recre-
ate new customary land tenure systems that meet the requirements of
liberalised markets.
Notes
1 Lord Haldane presided over the Privy Council in London and in this role played an
important role in defining customary land rights in the British Empire.
2 Ghana National Archives, ADM 11/457 case no 23 of 1913, Sale of Odometa.
3 This did not apply to the Northern Territories, which were mainly incorporated into
the colonial administration as a labour reserve, and where land came directly under
government control.
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4 Traditional ambiguities and authoritarian
interpretations in Sefwi land disputes
Stefano Boni
In the course of the twentieth century, academic literature, chiefly dis-
courses, national legislation, government intervention, and court proce-
dures have largely converged on a set of principles that is thought to
provide the essential features of Akan land tenure. First, Akan land
tenure is seen as grounded in tradition, which implies that a clear set
of criteria of title allocation have persisted unchanged over centuries.
Second, chiefs are said to hold land titles on behalf of the community,
thus providing a general benefit and guaranteeing an equitable distri-
bution (Addo-Fening 1987). Third, conflicts are considered the result of
misunderstandings on the interpretation of tradition; courts and arbi-
tration panels solve these quarrels and restore peace. These three prin-
ciples have formed the axioms of the land tenure orthodoxy, which the
prevalent and official discourse considers to be the correct distribution
and management of titles. However, though the land tenure orthodoxy
claims to be a faithful description, it does not, as we shall see, describe
how land tenure dynamics are actually played out. The representation
of land tenure contained in these three statements mystifies, in the
sense that these land tenure assumptions systematically inhibit an un-
derstanding of facts and explanatory links. Rather, the production of a
simplified and false land tenure representation – while not providing
the tools to understand how land tenure is played out in villages – acts
as a powerful normative and prescriptive statement, asserting how land
tenure should be understood and managed, according to the wishes of
those who put forward this particular representation of land tenure.
The mystifying discourse on Ghanaian land tenure is anonymous in
the sense that it has involved, in various ways, different social actors:
legal scholars principally writing down what they thought or were told
was customary land tenure, focussing only on legal formulation and
court proceedings with little attention to actual dynamics; politicians
translating academic research – mostly by legal scholars – into legisla-
tion; judges and administrators selectively enforcing legal schema in
people’s lives through court houses and stool land administration; and
of course chiefs and elders producing a persistent and abundant array
of oral traditions to sustain their role as landowners. The interplay be-
tween these different agents – with convergent discourses – generated
a standardised land tenure orthodoxy that became the framework with-
in which most land tenure issues were understood and addressed. I ar-
gue that different actors located in academia, in parliament, and in pa-
laces across the country have converged on the utilisation of a certain
understanding of ‘tradition’ and on what are to be considered its legiti-
mate contemporary applications. The prevalent use of the idiom of tra-
dition has sustained the preservation of certain inequalities. There have
been social studies, based on in-depth fieldwork and on empirical evi-
dence, stressing disputes, power relations, and negotiations (See Ama-
nor 1999, 2001, 2002; Arhin 1986; Beckett 1944, 1945; Benneh 1970,
1988; Berry 2001; Chauveau 1982; Garceau 1982; Grier 1987; Hill
1963; Ninsin 1989). Overall, however, this empirical research has had
only a minor impact on prevalent and official land tenure discourses –
both at national and local levels – as well as on the formulation of
legislation.
This chapter questions the land tenure orthodoxy. It aims for a gen-
eral reconsideration, not just of the details but of the overall framework
of land tenure studies, with two objectives. First, prevailing land tenure
discourses claim to provide a clear and reliable understanding of what
is happening on the ground, whereas these representations in fact
show wide divergence with local realities. This chapter advocates a re-
jection of notions such as ‘tradition’ and ‘custom’ to be able to grasp
the transformations, indeterminacy, negotiations, and conflicts. Sec-
ond, the dominant land tenure rhetoric presents land tenure as com-
munitarian and equitable, while the opposite is true. The ‘traditionali-
sation’ of land tenure, the representation of current dynamic as if these
have remained unchanged since an unspecified past, inhibits the focus
on conflicts except as legal confrontations aimed at establishing the
‘true owner’. The overall organisation and distribution of land preroga-
tives has, however, been constantly questioned by marginalised groups.
Land disputes are, nevertheless, not seen as struggles produced by con-
flicting interests but inserted in the idiom of ‘tradition’ and judged ac-
cording to presumed violations of custom.
In the first section of this chapter I critically review three key con-
cepts: custom, ownership, and dispute. The definition of these notions
is crucial both to illustrate the flows of the prevalent land tenure dis-
course and to formulate a description accounting for the power strug-
gles over land. In the second section, I describe the judiciary channels
active in the Sefwi Wiawso district. In the third section, I illustrate his-
torically land disputes in the Sefwi Wiawso District of the Western Re-
gion with reference to four criteria: chiefly rank, ancestry, age, and gen-
der. These criteria are both principles according to which land has been
unevenly distributed and the loci of land disputes. I demonstrate that
‘customary’ land tenure in the course of the twentieth century has
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shifted constantly, elaborating new norms. These rules and their con-
textual application, moreover, change in relation to people’s ancestral
identities, their gender, and their age. While norms have changed, the
key principles of the land tenure orthodoxy have remained unaltered
and have produced and perpetuated an unequal distribution of land
prerogatives. In the conclusion I return to the principal argument of
this chapter: the relation between power structures and the formulation
of an ambiguous land tenure discourse and legislation. Those with the
power to interpret custom (i.e. chiefs, elders, men, those identified as
‘natives’, and government officials) have been concerned with preserv-
ing this indeterminacy, as it guarantees the faculty to determine the al-
location of land rights and revenues.
A critical review of crucial concepts in land disputes
Over the last century agricultural land in southern Ghana was a crucial
resource that became increasingly scarce, generating conflicts over the
attribution of titles. The continuous and dramatic land disputes that
emerged in the course of the twentieth century can hardly be under-
stood within the framework of the existing land tenure orthodoxy. Both
the understanding and the organisation of land tenure urgently need
to undergo deconstructive public scrutiny. While the principal assump-
tions of current land tenure legislation are grounded in the conserva-
tive evocation of ‘tradition’ and ancestral rights, the actual management
of land tenure is best understood with reference to interest-driven poli-
tics. Before presenting ethnographic illustrations of conflicts concern-
ing land, I show that the concepts of custom, ownership, and dispute
are often presented in ways that tend to obfuscate rather than promote
an understanding of the causes and unfolding of disputes.
Custom
Ghanaian land law – both legislation promoted by the government and
its ‘ethnic’ variants promoted by chiefs in the Traditional Councils –
has been conceptually and legally founded on the idea of a clear, stable
set of customary rules grounded in a past unspecified both historically
and geographically. Land legislation from the colonial period up to the
1992 Constitution is presented as the continuation of ancestral princi-
ples and values (Aidoo 1996; Kasanga 1988; Ollennu 1962; Woodman
1996). These are said to be characterised by the beneficial effects of a
hierarchical management of land. Crucial in this respect is the idea
that the head of a social unit (kingdom, village, lineage, household)
controls land rights for the general benefit: the chief is thus seen as
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the custodian of the community’s land; the lineage head as the custo-
dian of the family land; and the household head as the custodian on
behalf of subordinate members. This fiction, upheld and justified by
the state and chiefs as ‘custom’, has largely been a legal fabrication
that, in village disputes, allows these prominent figures to preserve
their privileges and contextually adapt these to twentieth century eco-
nomic transformations. Although ‘custom’ is presented as the founda-
tion of fair land tenure legislation, it has not generated convenient and
equitable solutions at a local level. While the use of ‘custom’ claims to
clarify existing titles, it produces ambiguities for two reasons. First,
there have been multiple agents (the state, the Traditional Councils, in-
dividual chiefs, elders) that have competed in the formulation of
norms, all evoking tradition while defining it differently. Second, the
legal apparatus derived from the ‘customary’ understanding of land
prerogatives – transplanted in the 1992 Constitution – uses a concep-
tual framework and terminology that renders its application in villages
virtually impossible. The actual process of definition of property rights
over land in villages is irreducible to the legal idiom: the complex, dy-
namic, and multifaceted title negotiations that actually occur need to
be greatly simplified, frozen, and mutilated to be squeezed within the
legal conceptual schemes. Contemporary customary land tenure is a
contradiction yet to be acknowledged.
Ownership
It is well established that titles over land in Ghana involve a multipli-
city of parties holding rights alongside each other. Some have proposed
the notion of stratified rights: according to this view, prerogatives are
clearly ranked (Aidoo 1996:3; Bentsi-Enchill 1964; Kasanga 1988:30-31;
Kyerematen 1971:24, 39-40, 97-123; Ollennu 1962:119). My view, how-
ever, is that land claims are exercised by each actor to an extent that is
determined by the outcome of confrontations, played out on the capa-
city to achieve recognition and the complicity of those recognised as
the rightful interpreters of land tenure, the two processes obviously
moving together (cf. Chauveau 1982; Lavigne Delville et al. 2002).
Rights are thus not static but continuously negotiated within structures
of power: there is no party that is inherently and eternally doomed to
hold a marginal right. Prerogatives are thus flexible and partial, as they
are shared with other parties. The legislative and scholarly codification
of traditional land tenure, however – clearly influenced by a colonial
setting aimed at preserving a powerful chieftaincy (Grier 1987) –
named the chiefly prerogative as ‘complete’ or ‘ultimate’ ownership,
(Kyerematen 1971:24, 39-40, 97-123) or as ‘allodial’ (Kasanga 1988:30-
31; Kasanga and Kotey 2001) and ‘absolute’ (Aidoo 1996:3) title. Along-
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side the chiefs’ title, the ‘usufructuary rights’, ‘freehold interest’ or ‘de-
terminable title’ of community members was recognised (Aidoo
1996:3; Ollennu 1962:72). This static and codified notion of titles, how-
ever, clearly contradicts the existence of a multiple, dynamic, contextual
exercise of prerogatives over land and seems intended to favour the im-
position of a codified, ranked, and stable set of rights. The intended
aim of the land tenure orthodoxy – that is to establish a clear and inal-
terable set of prerogatives over land – is far from being achieved in rur-
al areas of southwestern Ghana: land prerogatives are continuously dis-
puted and altered. Studies theorising an unequivocal set of land rights
do not, in fact, describe the land tenure system as it is practiced in
everyday life but make an effort to transform it in a direction that ne-
glects derivative rights and ignores the multiplicity of prerogatives.
Dispute
In most legal studies and in chiefly discourses the causes of conflicts
are downplayed. Disputes are presented as misunderstandings rather
than the product of divergent interests. Some studies hold that land
tenure disputes are resolved once the ‘correct’ historical precedent is
unveiled and custom re-established (Bentsi-Enchill 1964: 23; Kasanga
1988: 48-53; Kyerematen 1971; Rattray 1969, first published 1929:351-
352). If a dispute emerges within a kin group, the family elders preside
over the hearing. In more important confrontations the village elders
or the chief may hear the dispute. The Traditional Council hears all ser-
ious disputes, especially those concerning two or more chiefs. Each of
these panels is said to be searching for the truth that is contained in
custom and needs to be revealed. The self-legitimising idiom of tradi-
tion is used by all these panels to frame land disputes’ conceptualisa-
tions and solutions. At the end of an hermeneutic process that sees
men, elders, chiefs, and judges in privileged, monopolistic positions,
the outcome is announced (Cutolo 1999). The arbitrators address this
concern by offering a strategic interpretation of the ontological status
of the parties involved (Who are they? To what kinship background do
they belong? What is their rank in the political-parental structure of
the kingdom?) and, consequently, of their rightful prerogatives. Con-
flict resolution is presented as the legitimate re-insertion within tradi-
tion rather than as a decision-making process that privileges specific
views and interests. Parties are expected to abide by the authoritative
decisions. The judgment is presented as aiming to restore peace and
harmony. Those who do not abide with the decision of the courts are
presented as menacing the unity of the community. The perception of
conflicts as resulting from ‘confusion’ or non-adherence to custom,
however, does not silence political conflict between groups. Individuals
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and groups systematically penalised by the shifting – yet traditional –
interpretations of custom have voiced their concern. Land tenure ca-
nons have been, to a large extent, determined by chiefs and elders. The
state, besides drawing a consistent share of the land revenues, has
played its part through the courts, which, however, have addressed only
a relatively low number of cases. More systematic land reforms, such
as the review of migrants‘ taxation attempted by Nkrumah, or the land
registration attempted in 1986, failed to materialise (Ninsin 1989;
Woodman 1987).
Land justice administration in Sefwi
Everyday land practices are neither the product of state legislation nor
the result of the mere application of what I have termed the land ten-
ure orthodoxy. The management of land titles within agricultural vil-
lages has been continuously adapted to the shifting contexts in which
power relations are played out, producing confrontations structured on
persistent inequalities. With increased land commoditisation, conflict-
ing interests have generated clashes managed within judiciary arenas
that have varied according to the characteristics and importance of the
confrontation.
In villages, most struggles are decided by ‘family’ elders or by a
panel of elders, often senior men associated with the chief. House or
family disputes, awuro or abusua ns"m,1 do not normally involve pay-
ments – if no compensation is decreed: the outcome of the arbitration
often consists in an appeal to parties to live in peace indicating what
the elders present as the correct solution. Even though house arbitra-
tions are often presented as ‘equitable’ and ‘genuine’, elders’ interpreta-
tions and decisions reflect and enforce gender and age inequalities in
family relations. The enforcement of the ‘house’ arbitration’s outcome
does not rest on outright coercion but on social pressure and on the
political dimension of kinship ties.
Most land cases are heard by village courts presided over by chiefs.
This is not always the choice of the disputing parties. In 1957, the Sef-
wi Wiawso State Council decided to penalise what they termed ‘refusal
to arbitrate’.
Councillors noted that Arbitration was a Die-Hard-Custom
sought to actuate peaceful means of settling matters between
two agrivied [sic] parties in order to avoid unnecessary and ex-
pensive Litigations at the Law Courts of Justice; [councillors] (…)
felt that (…) this ancient Custom should still remain. It was
therefore decided that any unscrupulous person who refuses to
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attend the arbitration of his Local Chief with a view of disre-
specting or disparaging the Chief’s position should be penalised.
It was decided that the following should form the bases of pun-
ishment: - (a) Before the Paramount Chief £2.8/-; (b) Before any
ordinary Chief £1.4/-.2
I am unable to tell the actual impact of this deliberation, but at the
turn of the millennium chiefly panels still controlled – at least in the
first stages of the judicial process – a large percentage of land confron-
tations in the Sefwi Wiawso district. In the late 1960s chiefly justice
was further enhanced through an amendment deliberated by the Tradi-
tional Council of Chiefs. A clause, which remained unaltered at least
until the late 1990s, was added to the effect that ‘all farming disputes
between [immigrant] farmers shall first be determined by Arbitration
before the Omanhene [the king] or his representatives (Other chiefs) be-
fore any further action is taken’ (Boni 2006).
In village courts the panel consists of the chief, linguists, local of-
fice-holders (Kontihene, Gyaasehene, etc.), and elders. Parties pay ‘sum-
mons’ or ‘arbitration’, ‘hearing’, and ‘service’ fees, as well as further
payments if surveyors are sent on the land to gather information and
observe boundaries. Each party will disburse approximately the equiva-
lent of five euro, if the guilty party is not charged with ‘compensation’.
The sum will be shared amongst the panel, witnesses, and surveyors.
If the guilty party is fined, the sum will go in part to the offended party
and, in part, to the court panel. The court makes a decree on the par-
ties’ title, on the legitimate boundaries, as well as on the fine to be paid
by the party found guilty. Chiefly courts are organised hierarchically:
appeal to judgments can be put forward up the ladder of ‘traditional’
rulers, all the way to the king’s, the omanhene’s court at Wiawso. The
amounts parties are asked to pay increase as the judgment of more
prominent panels is sought. Land confrontations involving chiefs are
judged by a superior chief. Disputes between sub-chiefs are therefore
heard by the Traditional Council, presided over by the omanhene; con-
flicts between amanhene are heard by the Regional or National House
of Chiefs. The hierarchically superior party is both the legitimate inter-
preter of tradition and the one who establishes the adherence of land
narratives presented by the disputing parties to the required ‘custom-
ary’ schema.
Farmers at times resort to state justice – especially for appeals from
chiefly courts; however, for several reasons, conflicts over prerogatives
are more often managed informally in villages. District Courts and
High Courts are located in the district capital and even large farming
villages in the two districts do not have a state court. Trials in state
courts involve the payment of large and unspecified amounts both for
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procedures and for the payment of lawyers who need to be employed,
at times from neighbouring regions. Often appeals follow the first
judgment, and dealings are thus lengthy and uncertain. In the second
half of the 1990s the village Committees for the Defence of the Revolu-
tion (CDR) heard some disputes, but land cases were normally sent to
the chief. Even though few of the land quarrels that emerge in villages
end up in government courts, the state has played a crucial – although
often not fully recognised – role, providing judiciary procedures for ap-
peals, deciding, until 1992, the withdrawals of chiefs’ recognition, pas-
sing national land legislation, managing land tenure through the dis-
trict administration and, as we shall see, being an active agent in times
of crisis.
While confrontations between prominent stools are often heard in
the omanhene’s court or in state courts, the disputes over the manage-
ment of tenant farmers’ land rights, and over the prerogatives of the
youth and women, have – in most instances – been managed locally
through procedures that seldom see state justice involved. Settlements
of land disputes, in their multiple and multifaceted forms, are the lo-
cus in which the dominant discourse on land is continuously reframed
and results in the allocation of titles. The interpretations of these pa-
nels, often defending partisan interests while evoking tradition, have
often been challenged, generating continuous confrontations, before,
during, and after the decision-making process.
Inequalities and struggles over land in Sefwi
The unequal distribution of land rights as well as the monopoly in cer-
tain social categories of the legitimate capacity to address land cases, to
frame an interpretation, and to provide a judgment, reflect wider social
canons of evaluation (Boni 2003). Dominant groups hold the capacity
to produce land tenure norms, impose taxation, and establish the
terms of title transferrals. This produces an unequal distribution of
farming prerogatives, with those recognised as legitimate interpreters
of correct land rights management benefiting in terms of land rights
distribution. Pre-colonial canons of value attribution were adjusted,
through the prevalent discourse on land tenure orthodoxy, to the order-
ing of the twentieth-century land tenure system, characterised by in-
creasing population pressure on land and market-oriented productions.
The elaboration of a twentieth-century land tenure system – with its
ideological justifications, the redefinition of social taxonomies, and a
new set of rules, etc. – transformed the attribution and management of
power and value within Sefwi villages and inevitably produced confron-
tations over the management of a resource – land – that, in the course
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of the first half of the twentieth century, became both crucial and
scarce. Disputes over land, thus, reflect and express wider canons of so-
cial inequality and are therefore examined, in the next paragraphs, ac-
cording to four key criteria of value differentiation, namely the rank of
the stool, the ancestry of farmers, their age, and their gender. These do-
mains enable single confrontations to be located within wider patterns
characterising Sefwi land disputes. The social position of the parties in-
volved in the dispute determines to a large extent the causes and moti-
vations of the conflict, the procedures activated, the judicial authority
involved and, often, the outcome. Examined for each of these domains
are the interplay between ‘customary’ justifications, diversified notions
of ownership, avenues of negotiation, and the role played by the state.
The ethnographic and archival evidence that follows is largely drawn
from a previous work (Boni 2005), here refashioned with the aim of il-
lustrating the sources of justification of land tenure prerogatives, the
causes of land disputes, the available avenues of conflict resolution and
the inequalities produced in the process of title attribution.
Chiefly disputes
Land quarrels between stools are amongst the most frequent topics ad-
dressed in the diverse district judicial arenas.3 Endless territorial dis-
putes have accompanied the process of demarcation of stool lands and
the definition of the stool hierarchy. The relevance of chiefly status in
land disputes is due to the fact that a large part of the incomes of ‘tra-
ditional rulers’ derives from the management of land, mostly by rent-
ing out prerogatives to entrepreneurs (farmers, loggers, miners). The
determination of the rank of chiefs concerns land issues because it es-
tablishes the percentage of land revenues a stool should receive and
the percentage that should to be conveyed up the hierarchical ladder to
superior offices.4
In the early twentieth century land was abundant, and chiefs were
concerned more with the affiliation of kin groups and settlements than
with the definition of territorial titles. The extraction of gold and, later,
cocoa production and timber felling produced key sources of revenue
for chiefs, the importance of land titling clearly increased, and in the
chiefly struggle to lay a claim on all possible territories, land disputes
multiplied. Archival evidence shows that in the first half of the twenti-
eth century the colonial administration was a crucial agency in promot-
ing the transformation of a dynamic set of volatile titles into clearly de-
marcated and defined land rights. Colonial bureaucracy, rather than in-
venting boundaries, carried out in-depth surveys – with colonial agents
sent to determine the extent of stool lands – that were aimed at order-
ing and stabilising what were, in pre-colonial times, mutable and un-
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certain attempts to establish territorial hegemony (Boni 1999). Evi-
dence leading to the attribution of land rights was almost exclusively
oral and the attribution of titles painstaking. Where was the boundary
to be traced on maps when there was no clear demarcation on the
ground? How was the rank of chiefs to be determined when conflicting
narratives emerged?
The process of codification of ranked land titles was a complex issue
but one that, nevertheless, was a crucial part of the colonial administra-
tion’s work. Once the colonial administration decided that it would not
administer land rights directly but – as part of the general deal implied
in indirect rule – that chiefs would be recognised as having this prero-
gative, the clear allocation of land titles to stools was essential: only
when land titles were attributed could these be allocated to European
logging and mining firms (Grier 1987). The resources to be inserted
on the world market (exotic agricultural products, timber, minerals)
could be mobilised only if these had a clear owner who could rent out
concessions. Uncertainty and the resulting land disputes retarded capi-
talist penetration presented in terms of ‘development’. The extent of
the alteration of land rights occurring in this process was not acknowl-
edged: this exercise of fixation and codification was presented by the
colonial administration as a mere continuation of pre-colonial custom.
A close look at the context and motive of the demarcation indicate that
the evocation of tradition was, from the start, a strategic and rhetorical
mystification.
Chiefs understood readily that land titles were a source of quick cash
and thus began to decipher colonial procedures for the allocation of
prerogatives over the soil. Convincing ‘traditional’ histories – for the
canons of the British administration – were formulated and presented
in front of colonial officials to justify requests for the expansion of ter-
ritorial prerogatives, as well as petitions for the elevation of the stool’s
rank. Obviously colonial administrators recorded incompatible chiefly
claims with regard to both land boundaries and rank.
These trends appear clearly in the title dispute over the site of the Bi-
biani mines, in the South-East of what is today recognised as Sefwi. In
the late nineteenth century the area was scarcely populated, worked
periodically by miners with diverse ethnic backgrounds who paid tri-
butes to the neighbouring stools. In 1891 three ‘Sefwi’ chiefs gave out a
concession to the Sefwi Gold Mining Company Limited.5 In 1898 pro-
duction soared and the chief of ‘Sankori’ in Ahafo claimed a privileged
title over the area and received £300 from the mining firm to renounce
his rights. In 1902 the chief of Sankori advanced a fresh set of claims
and was accorded a bulk sum of £1000 and a mining rent of £650. In
1909 the chief of Nkawie in Asante claimed a title over the area and
was accorded half of the concession’s rent.6 With the suspension of
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mining operations in 1919, disputes focused on the right to tax cocoa
farmers rather than the appropriation of mining rent.7 To solve the
confrontations, colonial administrators and judges recorded the narra-
tives presented by the parties who claimed a title over the area and
tried, with little success, to find a compromise between the conflicting
claims.8 The Bibiani case is just an example of a widespread and
lengthy land dispute between stools: almost every stool in Sefwi has
been involved in some sort of land dispute lasting decades rather than
years.
Despite the belief that a clear map of ‘customary’ land rights could
be achieved, colonial and post-colonial governments faced continuous
claims to revise what was presented as ‘traditional’ in order to alter
land title allocation. Some disputes emerging at the very beginning of
the colonial administration are yet to be solved. For over a century, the
Wiawso Paramount Stool has periodically claimed – with an abundant
production of judicial proceedings – the village of Karlo. Wiawso claims
its rights over the stool, population, and stool land of Karlo, while the
settlement was inserted, in the early twentieth century, in the Aowin
domains by the colonial government. Another interesting case is the
claim by the Stool of Debiso, considered an odikro (village chief) from
the early twentieth century up to the 1970s, to be recognised as an
autonomous omanhene (paramount chief). Debiso has obtained some
backing by neighbouring communities, can boast some favourable
judgments in chiefly arbitration, and has successfully opposed attempts
by Wiawso supporters to solve the issue through violent confrontations
(Boni 2004). These diverse successes have enhanced the claims of De-
biso and forced the Wiawso Paramount Stool to negotiate a solution.
Chiefly disputes indicate that land tenure in the twentieth century
cannot be understood as a mere continuation of pre-colonial dynamics.
The commoditisation of land enhanced by colonial intervention gener-
ated a drastic alteration of the legal framework aimed at inserting land
resources on the market. This epochal change profoundly transformed
the notion of land rights, its management, the terms of negotiations,
the processes of title recognition, and the agents involved (cf. Austin
2005). While a scholar inevitably acknowledges the radical impact of
transformations in all domains concerned with chiefly land disputes,
these are debated by the state and the chiefs within the general frame-
work of orthodox ‘customary’ discourse: tradition is the accepted rheto-
rical device which the disputing parties activate to enhance their claims
(Boni 2000). Stool disputes are played out in courts by resorting to an-
cestral politics focused on the idiom of tradition. Each chief will try to
show that the rank that he is claiming has historical evidence to sup-
port it, because this is the official criterion used by judges to attribute
prerogatives. Even though it is clear to all parties that land conflicts are
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played out through political alliances and bribes, stools need to fabri-
cate credible ‘historical’ narratives to sustain their claims.
Conflicts between immigrant farmers and ‘indigenous’ Sefwi
The distribution of agricultural rights reflects the ancestral origin of
farmers. Members of the royal matrilineage tend to have larger plots.
Chiefs and other prominent figures within the lineage have at times
very large holdings, thus boosting the average holdings of the royal kin
group. Data from a field survey carried out in 1996 and 1997 in Sefwi
are significant.
The mode of acquisition of agricultural rights clarifies how this un-
equal distribution was produced. The royal lineage has had – in most
locations – a privileged right to clear the forest and control the agricul-
tural title on the deforested portions. Moreover, large holdings are nor-
mally passed on through succession. No member of the royal lineage
has had to purchase agricultural prerogatives. Sefwi belonging to other
kin groups and settled in the village exercised the right of first clearing,
while also receiving land through gifts and succession: very few bought
agricultural titles (Boni 2005). Immigrants – especially those from the
North – have had to purchase most of their agricultural prerogatives.
Tenants, moreover, had to face a more fragile, uncertain and shifting
regime of tenure.9 The terms ‘tenants’ or ‘settler farmers’ were a part of
a social taxonomy that emerged in the 1940s as a consequence of the in-
creased commoditisation of land rights. Since then, local regulations
were passed by the Traditional Council to limit and specify immigrants‘
conditions of tenure. Those who were identified as ’strangers’ were taxed
for their agricultural titles and were subject to norms limiting their right
to sell and sublet their agricultural prerogatives. Immigrants, moreover,
have had to clear their land within a few years or else their parcel would
Table 4.1 Number of farmers, their holdings, and age according to ancestral origin
Number
of farmers
Average holdings
in acres
Average age
in years
Members of royal
matrilineage 33 (13%) 36 45
Sefwi relating in village 173 (66%) 14 41
Sefwi foreign to village 3 (1%) 15 47
Southern Ghanaian
tenants 46 (18%) 14 50
Northern Ghanaian
tenants 6 (2%) 13 42
Total 261 16.7 43
Source: Field Survey, Anglo and Fiafano 1996; Dedimendi 1997.
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be confiscated. Titles of foreigners were in need of constant ratification.
Next I focus on disputes which arise due to conflicting interpretations of
the prerogatives of the tenants and on various forms of swindles.
Tenants’ prerogatives, rather than being applied in strict adherence
to local and national legislation, have been negotiated. With regard to
foreigners’ prerogatives, local ‘ethnic’ legislation passed by the Tradi-
tional Council was often more relevant than national regulations. Con-
frontations between tenants and the chiefly establishment were both
produced and legitimised by divergent readings of titles and transac-
tions. Chiefs – drawing their inspiration from governments’ interpreta-
tion of tradition which was based largely on chiefly statements – evoke
custom to present themselves as the custodians of the land on behalf
of the ‘indigenous’ population. Land, they hold, cannot be sold and
never could be. It was merely distributed temporarily to strangers for
farming purposes. Immigrants need to accept the tenurial conditions
imposed by their Sefwi hosts. Chiefs also claim that tenants seldom ac-
quired their title through the proper written contracts that chiefs have
drafted since the 1950s, termed ‘memorandums of agreement’ (Boni
2005, appendix). Immigrant farmers, on the other hand, state that
money was paid to chiefs and land bought. Even though most tenants
state that their devolutions should be understood as a form of pur-
chase, and that the title acquired should be considered full ownership,
it is clear that tenants’ rights have fallen short of legal notions of pri-
vate property. Tenants have acquired farming rights which have not
been encroached upon only when a series of demands were met. The
divergent notions of the title held by each party result in recurrent ten-
sions which are often solved in villages through panels of arbitration,
often presided over by the chief’s kin and associates. Let us examine
the perceptions and accusations of chiefs and tenants.
Table 4.2 Percentage of farming rights acquired in last transfer by mode of acquisi-
tion and ancestral origin of owner
Succession,
matrilineal
land
First clearing Gifts, inheritance10 Purchase or
finished abunu
Members of royal
matrilineage
16% 39% 43% -
Sefwi relating in village 11% 16% 64% 2%
Sefwi foreign to village - - 100% -
Southern Ghanaian
Tenants - - 39% 61%
Northern Ghanaian
Tenants - - 5% 95%
Source: Field Survey, Anglo and Fiafano 1996; Dedimendi 1997.
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Chiefs fiercely oppose tenants’ liberty to sell or sub-let part of their
plots. In farming contracts of the late colonial period it is stated that
tenants acquired the ‘bona fide property’ after the tripartite sharing of
the farm: they could therefore legitimately dispose of their plot how
they wished. Most of the tripartite agreements, according to which
chiefs were to receive a third of the farm once the plantation was fully
developed, however, never resulted in the division of plantations. Since
the 1960s, memorandums of agreement sanctioning transfers of farm-
ing rights from chiefs to migrants have no longer contained any refer-
ence to the right of tenants to alienate their share. In the 1990s tenants’
alienation of their title without chiefly consent is explicitly listed as a
breach of contract. Chiefs have frequently complained that tenants,
especially those who acquired very large tracts of land around the mid-
dle of the century, have illegally sold or sub-let their holdings to other
tenants making extraordinary profits (cf. Hill 1963:38-74).11 Chiefs feel
that, since tenants have failed to abide by the terms of the memoran-
dum, they may review the agreement themselves or seek additional pay-
ments. One of the principal chiefly concerns was that by allotting their
plots to other immigrants, tenants were acting as grantors of land inter-
ests, which was solely the privilege of chiefs. Discord over tenants’ sub-
letting inevitably exacerbated in the 1980s when Sefwi youth faced pro-
blems of land access, while some immigrants controlled tracts of pri-
mary forest they had acquired decades earlier but had not yet cleared.12
A second major chiefly complaint concerns the tenants’ failure to
pay a yearly tribute. Chiefly revenue collection has been scarcely effec-
tive, and tenants have managed to dodge, in several ways, an annual
tax payment, fixed by the chiefs, since 1967, at 10 per cent of the value
of their cocoa production. While chiefs actually received the ‘customary
consideration money’, upon the demarcation of the plot allotted to the
tenant farmer, the collection of the yearly tribute, termed afrishia tuo in
official documents and nton by tenants, proved more difficult. Chiefs
did not keep a reliable record of the allocation of farming rights to ten-
ants and therefore had trouble tracing the immigrants who were sup-
posed to pay. Moreover, revenue collectors often collected bribes from
tenants instead of receiving the required tribute for the chiefly appara-
tus. Since the 1960s the inability to receive stool revenue was ad-
dressed repeatedly in chiefly circles but failed to produce a more effi-
cient solution.13 Lately the Stool Lands Secretariat/Lands Commission
was involved in the revenue collection exercise and an acreage system
substituted the one-tenth fee on cocoa production; however, no signifi-
cant improvement was achieved.
Chiefs have also accused tenants of not having a contract or memor-
andum of agreement to sanction their rights, of delaying cultivation,
and of expanding their holdings beyond the boundaries allotted to
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them.14 One of the problems with chiefs’ complaints is understanding
what contract they accuse tenants of breaking. Three contracts may be
relevant in sanctioning the cession of the cultivation title: the written
‘memorandum of agreement’ current at the time in which the accusa-
tion is made; the written agreement that was actually signed by the
chief and the tenant; or the verbal, ‘customary’ one that was sanctioned
when farming prerogatives were conveyed. The contents of these con-
tracts are, almost invariably, different. Chiefs have progressively ex-
panded their prerogatives over the years, and it appears that chiefs of-
ten refer to recent norms that they expect tenants to abide by regard-
less of the fact that many strangers acquired their title decades ago, on
more liberal terms.
Tenants have also voiced their concerns in courts and through peti-
tions to the government: about the lack of security of their title; the re-
iteration of monetary demands by Sefwi landlords; and swindles. Both
the clauses of the ‘memorandums of agreement’ and actual practice
show that strangers in Sefwi do not acquire ownership but only unin-
terrupted use of the land. Overall tenants’ prerogatives vis a` vis those of
Sefwi are more fragile, in need of periodic confirmation, limited, and
taxable. The status of the title acquired by strangers is continuously
subject to redefinitions, which are mostly resolved in villages but which
may end up in court. The initial agreement for the acquisition of agri-
cultural rights between tenants and chiefs is usually oral. Typically no
contract is signed when the farmer produces the first payment, the ase-
da. This leaves immigrants with a set of volatile rights since they lack
documentation of their title (cf. Kone´ 2002:33-35; Lavigne Delville et al.
2002:85-86; Lavigne Delville 2003). Tenant farmers who seek to ratify
and confirm their interests by acquiring written documents, some
years after purchase, need to pay. The king and local chiefs demand
cash before signing written contracts, indentures and maps (cf. Arhin
1986:24-33; Benneh 1988:233).15 In 1986, the Ghanaian government
tried to secure tenants’ land rights stimulating the registration of agri-
cultural titles, but the law has had little practical impact on farmers’
lives (Agbosu 1990; Aidoo 1996; Takane 2002:50-54; Woodman 1987).
Tenants attempting to secure their title through documents often end
up being further exploited while not obtaining an ultimate guarantee.
Strangers who have made the effort to acquire written stipulations face
extortions as well as encroachment on their land. Moreover, both the
local government institutions and chiefs have, over the last decades,
questioned the validity of these documents or have sought to redefine
their terms. Having documents thus minimises but does not prevent
swindles.
Tenants have complained of continuous land frauds. As the state’s
judicial system is remote, expensive, and frequently corrupt, chiefs
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judge most small-scale land cases. Since the mid-1970s agricultural
contracts contain a clause stating that all land cases should be brought,
in a first instance, to the chiefs who granted the farming rights. ‘Tradi-
tional’ rulers are thus often both land grantors and judges. As a result,
tenants’ titles may be discretionally questioned or confirmed by chiefs.
This results, on the one hand, in swindles carried out by Sefwi – usual-
ly chiefs – against tenants and, on the other, in a continuous effort on
the part of the tenants to have their land rights further confirmed and
secured.
Many tenants have been cheated due to a lack of documentation of
their prerogatives. Allotments are undefined and what tenants consider
swindles are justified by chiefs as misunderstandings on the location
and size of the land, or are attributed to the tenants’ encroachment on
land that had not been allotted to them. Chiefs have often explained
confrontations as follows: ‘some of the tenants/farmers are greedy and
selfish and they want to grab more lands, even pieces of lands which
have not been granted to them. Hence incidents of encroachment’.16
From the tenants’ perspective, chiefs frequently refuse to acknowledge
the first payment, ask them to enter into new agreements, and thus re-
quire them to pay again to confirm their title. Frauds are frequent and
most tenants operating in Sefwi underwent some sort of land swindle:
various tricks are used to extort further payments (cf. Arhin 1986:24-
31), including the following.
First, immigrant farmers are led to reach agreements with false land
owners. After the payment of the aseda, the tenant is informed that the
one who received the money had no title over the land; and later the
‘rightful’ owner asks the tenant to negotiate a new contract and to pay
again.17
Second, chiefs send messengers to ‘remeasure’ tenant farmers’ land
boundaries some years after the stipulation and invariably find that im-
migrants trespassed beyond the land originally granted to them. Ten-
ants deny the accusation but are asked to pay additional amounts for
the part which, according to the chief, was illegally cultivated. If the till-
er does not abide with the chiefly intimation, the land deemed culti-
vated in excess may be expropriated – even when already developed –
and reallocated.18
Third, Sefwi may encroach on land allotted to a tenant and claim
portions of the plot as their own. These incidents are very frequent
even though they normally involve small stretches of land and are
therefore seldom brought to court.19
Fourth, the same parcel may be allotted to a number of tenant farm-
ers as different chiefs sell the cultivation title over the same land. This
is very often the case when an area is disputed between various stool-
holders. It is not uncommon, however, for the same chief to alienate
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farming titles over the same plot to numerous tenants.20 In such in-
stances, Sefwi witnesses who showed the land to the tenants and were
present at the oral agreement, simply refuse to acknowledge the con-
veyance. Immigrants dispute over the land amongst themselves, the
chief acting as judge. Typically the tenant who is ready to pay an addi-
tional amount is recognised as the rightful owner of the title. At times
this trick is used on Sefwi farmers as well.21
Strangers have repeatedly complained that there are periodic incur-
sions on their holdings. At times cocoa pods are found missing from
branches, at times the tenant finds that an animal caught in a game
trap set on his land has been removed prior to his arrival. Thefts are of-
ten of minor importance but tend to be reiterated, as a constant remin-
der of the immigrant’s judicial impotence and limited tenurial security.
Tenants have also been asked to disburse additional sums for the fun-
erals of Sefwi royals; upon the annual festival; to sponsor road con-
structions and the building of the palace at Wiawso; and to contribute
to chiefly expenses upon enstoolment or land disputes. These pay-
ments are indirectly linked to tenants’ farming rights: those who refuse
to comply with the chiefs’ demands are often harassed, and some are
chased out of their holdings (cf. Benneh 1988:235-236).
A further chiefly privilege, not stated in any contract but related to
the chiefs’ capacity as ‘ultimate landlord’, is their right to draw a share
of the property of strangers who leave the area forever or die in Sefwi.
The successor needs to cede part of the land or pay a fee to the local
chief. If upon the death of a tenant no successor is forthcoming, the
chief collects the whole property (cf. Ollennu 1962:87-88; Rattray
1969, first published 1929:356-357). If the deceased is said to have
been a slave, chiefs take over the whole property even when the chil-
dren or a successor are present.22 In 1970, with the introduction of the
Aliens Compilation Act, chiefs took over the property of non-Gha-
naians who were forcefully repatriated.23
There is a general understanding of the rights of chiefs, Sefwi com-
moners, and tenants. There are also, however, areas of ambiguity and
therefore, on certain issues, the claims of the various actors clash. Ten-
ants usually come off worst as they have had few weapons to challenge
chiefly interpretations and impositions of ‘custom’. They are usually in-
ferior to Sefwi in numbers, internally fragmented on ethnic lines, and
lack a structured political organisation and the capacity to render hege-
monic the ideological validation of their claims. Tenants end up com-
plying with chiefly demands in most instances for fear that the conse-
quences of their refusals will exceed the burden of chiefly require-
ments.
When tenants feel chiefly obligations are excessive, they appeal to
the national government or try to take advantage of divisions amongst
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chiefs. There have been some periods in which the government backed
tenants’ requests and tried to expand their agricultural rights. This hap-
pened in two periods in particular: in the last years of Nkrumah‘s lead-
ership (1962-1966) and during the early years of Provisional National
Defence Council’s rule (1983-1986). These governments presented
themselves as socialist or revolutionary, defending farmers’ interests
against chiefly descent privileges: their policies were supported by ten-
ants who felt they could now challenge chiefly harassment and claim
an extended set of land rights with the backing of the national adminis-
tration. Government support for tenants’ requests gave them the
strength to oppose swindles, disobey chiefs, and ameliorate their condi-
tions of tenure, albeit for short periods.
While contestations over farming rights were exercised peacefully or
with limited, localised violence in most periods, in 1986 the tension
between chiefs and tenants matured into generalised violence in Sef-
wi.24 Each party was exasperated by decades of low intensity conflict
over what both tenants and landlords considered breaches of contracts,
swindles, and lack of respect for lawful prerogatives. Throughout the
1970s and early 1980s, chiefs tried to impose new taxes on tenants. In
1986 the Traditional Council of chiefs, with the support of the recently
appointed government representative, began a new and more serious
operation to register tenants’ holdings. As the government opposed the
reform, the District Secretary was advised by the Provisional National
Defence Council’s Regional Secretary not to support the king’s attempt
to register tenant farmers. The District Secretary, however, did not back
down. Posters were hung on cocoa sheds throughout Sefwi announc-
ing the registration policy.25 Immigrant farmers saw the exercise as the
latest strategy to extort money. They feared that portions of their land
on which cocoa had not yet been planted would be expropriated and re-
allotted to Sefwi.
Until then, most of chiefs’ extortions of tenants’ resources had been
personal and informal, in the sense that tenants faced chiefly demands
for money individually, either in traditional court proceedings or when
summoned to palaces. In 1986, the situation was rather different: an
official act was passed by the Sefwi Wiawso Traditional Council applic-
able to all tenants. This brought unity amongst them, and immigrant
farmers firmly refused to comply with the ordinance. The king notified
tenants to submit or stop cultivation altogether. Immigrants disre-
garded the order and continued their agricultural activities. Violence
ensued as Sefwi chiefs sent villagers to dispossess strangers of what
the former considered land illegally occupied. Some immigrants fled.
A settler farmers’ union was established to protect tenants and oppose
the registration.26 In its membership card those days are recalled.
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The perfidy of the traditional rulers was at its zenith and in the
open and made no secret of their intentions. In the wake of var-
ious acts of provocation by the traditional rulers and their agents
which include outright confiscation of fully developed farms, en-
croachment upon lawfully acquired farmlands[,] the exaction of
the ten percent levy on all cocoa produced by tenant farmers,
unnecessary invocation of the traditional Oath ‘Takwa e Asante-
wa’ against settler farmers, and the extortion of large sums of
money from tenant farmers.27
The government stepped in to mediate between the parties. The Asare
Committee was hastily formed and sent to investigate the matter. The
results of the enquiry, sympathetic with the position of tenants, docu-
mented the violence committed on immigrant farmers and recom-
mended a fairer treatment of tenants.28 In May 1987, the government
posted the District Secretary elsewhere and passed the ‘Sefwi Wiawso
Settler Farms Law’, temporarily prohibiting proceedings by chiefs’
courts on land issues.29 In June and July 1987, several tenants who
had fled returned to their plantations making explicit reference to the
newly enacted law and the findings of the Asare Committee. Sefwi
youth and chiefs established an association to safeguard their privileges
on Sefwi land. The Association wrote to the Asare Committee:
We wish to bring to the notice of the [Asare] Committee that the
lands so brotherly and generously leased out to Tenant Farmers
for the production of food, cocoa and other valuable crops, re-
main the inalienable birth rights of the Sefwi Ghanaians whose
ancestors fought with their sweat and blood and that the present
generation will never toy with the land so bequeathed to us.30
Sefwi attempts to rationalise and increase the exploitation of immi-
grant farmers in the 1980s were not successful. However, even though
chiefs appeared defeated at the time, they continued to exercise consid-
erable authority locally and maintained their privileges with regards to
land rights and tenants’ taxation.31 Harassment of farmers continued
in the 1990s, but in a more contained and subtle fashion. Over the last
decade, there has been an attempt by chiefs to transform what was, at
first, ‘bona fide property’ and then ‘uninterrupted use’ of land by ten-
ants to a time-limited lease. While tenants feel they have acquired per-
manent farming rights that may be passed on to their children and
nephews, chiefs increasingly question the unlimited time extension of
immigrants’ title. In 1999 a ‘Committee on tenant/settler farmers’ es-
tablished by the government produced a report in which the need for
the documentation of tenants’ rights through site plans, the establish-
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ment of an acreage system of yearly tribute payment, and the elimina-
tion of land swindles are recommended.32 The causes of the strained
relations between chiefs and immigrant farmers have, however, re-
mained unchanged: the tenants’ title is weak and uncertain, and this
ambiguity allows swindles that benefit those who hold the authority to
voice tradition and utter judgement.
Age-related confrontations
The distribution of cultivation rights is strongly associated with age.
Holdings increase as farmers receive agricultural titles as gifts from el-
der kin and through succession. In the second half of the twentieth
century, the youth faced a shortage of land for cultivation, while elders
accumulated prerogatives over large tracts through first clearing opera-
tions in previous decades. Youngsters had to wait for elders to pass on
their rights over some of their holdings. The alienation of agricultural
rights to immigrant tenants further increased land scarcity for young
‘indigenous’ cultivators.
In the early twentieth century Sefwi villagers backed chiefs in their
alienation of cultivation rights to immigrants. The compliance of Sefwi
villagers suggests that chiefs used at least part of their money for com-
munal purposes and that some revenue was usually redistributed with-
in communities (Hill and McGlade 1957:9-10). When available farming
land began to grow scarce, conflicts emerged: the most sensitive politi-
cal issue was a triangular dispute between Sefwi commoners, chiefs,
and immigrant farmers. As Sefwi commoners rushed into cocoa pro-
duction, a competition developed between them and the chiefs, as the
former began to clear as much forest as possible while the latter inten-
sified alienation of cultivation titles to immigrant tenants.
When land began to grow scarce and the control of agricultural titles
became crucial, the youth managed to exercise very little influence on
Table 4.3 Percentage and number (in brackets) of farmers in age group per size of
holding
Age groups Percentage
of farmers
Landholdings (acres) 10-24 25-39 40-59 Over 60
Small ( < 5) 74% (21) 23% (24) 24% (19) 6% (3) 26% (67)
Medium (5 to 10) 18% (5) 33% (34) 22% (18) 23% (11) 26% (68)
Large (10 to 20) 4% (1) 32% (33) 27% (22) 29% (14) 27% (70)
Very large ( < 20) 4% (1) 12% (13) 27% (22) 42% (20) 21% (56)
Average acreage 4.6 (28) 11.8 (104) 22.3 (81) 24.7 (48) 16.7 (261)
Source: Field Survey, Anglo and Fiafano 1996; Dedimendi 1997. Landless farmers were
excluded.
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chiefly administration of stool lands. The younger generations, since
the 1960s, tried to halt alienation of agricultural prerogatives to immi-
grants and asked for a more equitable distribution of titles as well as
an increased clarity and security of their prerogatives. These issues sel-
dom became cause for concern in official politics: conflicts between
chiefs and youngsters concerning the overall management of land
rights failed to have a wider national or class resolution. The question
raised by young farmers concerning the legitimacy of chiefs – who
were supposed and claimed to be custodians of rights on behalf of the
community – selling the agricultural titles without accounting for the
profits, remained unanswered. The youth had limited means of influ-
encing the decision-making processes. As chiefs managed to label
youth concerns as illegitimate, arguing that the management of land
was not their prerogative, the diverse views became a cause of outright
confrontations.
The youth voted and took the sides of political parties that promised
a more equitable land tenure regime. In Sefwi Wiawso, the electoral
success of the Convention People’s Party can largely be attributed to
the youth. In the 1960s chiefs’ indiscriminate alienation of agricultural
titles to immigrants began to be questioned by young men who found
access to land for agricultural purposes increasingly problematic.
Chiefs found themselves under pressure to put an end to a major
source of revenue, the aseda, the amount received by chiefs when sell-
ing agricultural rights to immigrant tenants. The chiefly establishment
reacted by taking a formal pro-youth stance while the alienation of
farming rights to immigrants continued to be practiced up to the time
that land ran out, and indeed beyond. The manoeuvre failed to con-
vince the youth. In 1965 a Convention People’s Party councillor of the
Wiawso Local Council urged the appointment of a committee to look
(...) into rampant indiscriminate granting of Forest Lands (...) by
people who are financially exclusively benefited [sic] with heavy
sums of customary consideration monies [aseda] unduly exacted
from the prospective farmers.33
The reference to chiefly abuse of their role as custodians of communal
land is clear. The containment of the chiefly establishment’s privileges
– with regard to the administration of land rights and the cashing of
land revenues – however, was on the political agenda for just a few
years. Younger generations tried other means to halt the alienation of
land titles. In 1970, the intellectual elite of the youth, organised in the
Sefwi Wiawso District Scholars’ Association ‘resolved that (…) our
chiefs, elders, and young men stop selling land to stranger-farmers
forthwith’ and asked chiefs: ‘What provisions are we, the natural own-
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ers of the land, making for posterity?’34 Protests and appeals, however,
seldom produced tangible transformations in the chiefs’ attitude and
thus the youth in villages, at times, resorted to menace and violence to
make their concerns heard. Youth unrest has been common especially
in support of attempts to oust chiefs who failed to procure general ben-
efits for the community with land revenues. The formulation of
charges against the ‘traditional ruler’ was managed by elders and often
indirect: dissatisfaction has been expressed in terms of ‘stealing of
stool property’, ‘impoverishes his own subjects’, ‘ignore maintenance
and care of Stool Wives and children, directly under your care’.35
While chiefly political rhetoric was on the side of landless Sefwi
farmers, the alienation of agricultural titles to immigrants rendered
land access a real problem for Sefwi youth (cf. Amanor 2001:105-110).
In the 1970s a struggle developed as Sefwi farmers and chiefs were
both trying to control the remaining portions of virgin forest: com-
moners deforested large areas, as they knew agricultural land would
soon no longer be available, chiefs responded by speeding up the alien-
ation of cultivation rights to immigrants. By the late 1970s, even
though there was no change in local legislation, chiefs decreed their
agricultural prerogatives over most tracts of remaining virgin forest:
Sefwi commoners could no longer acquire farming titles through de-
forestation. Since then an increasing number of Sefwi youngsters has
been forced to purchase farming prerogatives.
The state did not take any legal initiative to promote youth control of
land rights, and protests could therefore be solved only in the arena of
local politics, managed by the elders of the Sefwi Wiawso State. The is-
sue of equity raised by the youth was channelled into village arbitra-
tions in which chiefs showed their ability to maintain their privileges
over both the alienation of land rights and dispute management.
Young farmers did not have the legal, political, institutional, or ‘tradi-
tional’ avenues to convey their concerns. The youth’s struggle to redi-
rect the overall policy of land administration – with the focus on new
generations’ right to land – was largely ignored or neutralised. In Sefwi
Wiawso youth associations were attacked by chiefs and some promi-
nent members were forced into exile. Once again the diverse power to
conceptualise the terms of the confrontation and thus manage its out-
come appears linked to the overall privileges in agricultural rights’ dis-
tribution. The youth’s weakness is manifest in the overall allotment of
land rights; in their loss of rights to the benefit of chiefs and elders; in
their inability to block the alienation of titles to immigrant farmers; in
their incapacity to channel their concerns through institutions; and in
their failure to activate a favourable judiciary or political settlement.
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Conflicts concerning the determination of the appropriate compensation for
wives’ marital toil
The data gathered in the course of a field survey shows that there is a
marked inequality in the distribution of farming rights between men
and women, both with regard to the total acreage controlled and the
age of acquisition.
Women’s acquisition of titles has been limited in comparison to
men’s from the very beginning of commercial agriculture. Historical
evidence from Sefwi shows that gender imbalance in the control of
agricultural products is due to the increased individualisation of rights
as a consequence of the spread of cocoa. Even though forest clearings
involved both men and women, men were seen as the righteous con-
trollers of the land title in most instances. This pattern of male accu-
mulation of valuable resources was a partial innovation in gender rela-
tions, extending established practices in gold and rubber extraction to
agriculture (Boni 2001; cf. Alden Wily and Hammond 2001). The un-
equal distribution of agricultural prerogatives was perpetuated by a sys-
tem of succession and inheritance that tends to transfer male property
to men. As a consequence both of the shortage of women’s title over
land and of marital dispositions, most wives in rural areas perform
most of their agricultural labour on their husband’s plots. Benefits
from the cultivation of cash crops (arrangements for food crops may be
somehow different) are controlled by men who should use part of their
incomes to cater for members of their household.
Women acquire agricultural rights by gifts from kin – mostly uterine
relatives though fathers are a relevant percentage of donors – and
through succession. Most rights controlled by women are, however, ac-
quired through the husband who should compensate the wife for her
working effort. Men carefully arrange transfers of agricultural title to
wives during their lifetime to provide them with what men consider an
adequate reward and to prevent conflicts after their death. Promises of
future gifts are a veiled, dissimulated form of bond and control. Men
Table 4.4 Acres of farming rights owned by sex and age of owner
Age groups Average
acreage
Total no. of
farmers
10-24 25-39 40-59 Over 60
Male 4.8 (22) 12.3 (80) 33.3 (42) 33.9 (27) 19.9 171
Female 3.8 (6) 10.2 (24) 10.4 (39) 12.9 (21) 10.5 90
Average 4.6 11.8 22.3 24.7 16.7 -
Source: Field Survey, Anglo and Fiafano 1996; Dedimendi 1997. The number in brackets
indicates the number of farmers in the age group. Landless farmers were excluded.
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usually point out that the lineage had done little to help them establish
their farm, while the services of children and wives are acknowledged
as crucial. When speaking of their own estate, Sefwi men state that giv-
ing self-acquired estates to children and wives is the righteous choice,
but when discussing the fate of the property of their maternal uncles
the view seems to change drastically and the matrilineal principle is of-
ten defended.
A man normally transfers the bulk of the property he has acquired
during his lifetime to his wife and children as gifts. Drinks and money
are provided by the one who receives the farming rights and passed,
through the donor, to his uterine kin. If lineage elders recognise that
the estate being conveyed is self-acquired property, the drink is ac-
cepted and the uterine group agrees to forgo all prerogatives over the
plot being passed over. The ritual and the provision of drinks are essen-
tial. At times men perform the ceremony just before death to make
sure that a certain parcel will be transferred to their spouses or off-
spring. If the husband/father dies unexpectedly, before officially allo-
cating portions of his farms to his wife and children, the deceased’s
lineage usually tries to get a hold of all the property, even when aware
of the deceased’s intention to convey some of the rights to the children
or the wife (cf. Roberts 1987:54-56). Such instances are repeatedly dis-
Table 4.5 Number of plots, acreage, and percentual importance of last mode of ac-
quisition of farming rights according to sex of owner
Land receiver
Women Men
Gift from father 36 (100; 17%) 76 (243; 13%)
Gift from mother 12 (66; 11%) 42 (158; 9%)
Gift from maternal uncle 12 (33; 6%) 52 (212; 12%)
Gift from spouse 28 (131; 22%) -
Gift from other male matrilineal kin 11 (50; 8%) 28 (135; 8%)
Gift from other female matrilineal kin 11 (38; 7%) 17 (74; 4%)
Gift from non-lineage kin - 16 (75; 4%)
Use of matrilineal land 9 (38; 7%) 7 (44; 2%)
Succession 5 (21; 4%) 31 (147; 8%)
Inheritance 11 (38; 7%) 13 (47; 3%)
Divorce 2 (5; 1%) -
First clearing 5 (19; 3%) 48 (415; 23%)
Purchase 8 (43; 7%) 22 (208; 12%)
Finished abunu contract - 1 (4)
Access to wife’s land - 9 (19; 1%)
Unknown - 4 (26; 1%)
Total 151 (582; 100%) 366 (1807, 100%)
Source: Field Survey, Anglo and Fiafano 1996; Dedimendi 1997.
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cussed and narrated in Sefwi as they are a cause of anxiety before the
death of the husband/father and of anger afterwards.36
Gifts of agricultural titles are offered to wives after years, usually dec-
ades, of marriage. Transfers are viewed as gifts which show the hus-
band’s appreciation of his wife’s agricultural toil and as a form of an-
ticipated inheritance: men state that they do not want trouble to break
out after their death between their wife and their lineage (cf. Amanor
2001:78-88). Procedures are decided by the donor. Wives may be as-
signed portions of cocoa farms or secondary forest, which may or may
not be suitable for cocoa planting: they frequently end up acquiring
small portions of their husbands’ least productive land. Data from Sef-
wi show that women generally acquire land at a more advanced age
than men; plots received from husbands as gifts or inheritance are ob-
tained at a particularly high age. The age of acquisition is crucial be-
cause cocoa plantations take several years to enter into full production.
Acquiring land titles beyond the age of forty renders cultivation both
more problematic due to decreasing physical strength, and less attrac-
tive because the farmer feels that she may not benefit from the full co-
coa cycle.
There is social pressure on husbands to perform these devolutions,
but no obligation. Tashjian (1996:214) describes husbands’ responsibil-
ities towards their wives as ‘so nebulous as to be unenforceable’. If wi-
ves work for several years without obtaining gifts in land, they may
bring the spouse in front of a panel of elders, divorce him, or stop
working on his farms (cf. Palumbo 1991:292-301). The ‘compensation’
for women’s toil on husband’s farms produces tension, especially in in-
stances of divorce and inheritance.
On divorce, spouses usually claim what Tsikata (1996:112-115) terms
a ‘send-off’ fee for their work performed in domestic enterprises with
their husbands. As jointly worked plots are normally cultivated on the
husbands’ land, men are supposed to provide a suitable compensation
for the labour performed by their wives towards the establishment of
these farms. In 1953, Abu Yaw divorced Adwua, a Sefwi woman, after
she had worked alongside him to establish nineteen cocoa farms. She
did not receive compensation upon divorce and therefore appealed to a
government officer to seek relief. In her petition she explained the
wife’s rights on divorce:
That it is obvious in the Government service, when one is grown
of age Government grants the one a compensation or pensions
the one. So do to [sic] we Africans, if a wife serves the husband
and the husband prospers out of his wife’s services the wife
ought to gain her share of one or two farms. But in my case the
relatives of Abu Yaw [the husband] have overlooked me.37
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Husbands usually comply with their wives’ kin requests for compensa-
tion, which habitually consist of agricultural title over parcels planted
with food crop or cocoa farms. The share is not predetermined but ne-
gotiated according to the woman’s labour contribution on the particular
farm, the cause of divorce, and the negotiating strength of the woman’s
and the man’s kin groups. The amount of land passed over is typically
small.
The determination of the ‘compensation’ to the woman rests on the
assumption that women and not men should be compensated. The as-
sumption is confirmed by the objective structures of unequal gendered
distribution of agricultural titles: in most cases women work on the
husband’s land rather than the opposite. While wives who work on
their husbands’ land receive small portions of the estate as compensa-
tion, husbands who jointly developed a cocoa plantation on the wives’
land, frequently claim half the farm (cf. Mensah-Brown 1968:84; Mi-
kell 1989:118-119; Okali 1983:118-123; Vellenga 1986:70-71).
In most cases tension concerning the determination of the compen-
sation to be given to divorcees and widows is solved through panels of
male village elders. Should one of the parties be unsatisfied – normally
the woman – recourse can be advanced at the government’s adminis-
tration. The first step is normally the recourse to the Social Welfare Of-
fice, and if this fails, court procedures may be started. The ‘Intestate
Succession Law’ of 1985 is the state’s most serious attempt to safe-
guard the recognition of women‘s agricultural contribution. This law is
one of the better known in rural areas: it is evoked in village settle-
ments, and women appeal to it when talking to government officials.
In Social Welfare Offices and court houses in rural areas the law, how-
ever, is negotiated rather than being rigidly applied, for the following
reasons. First, the law applies only to the self-acquired property of the
deceased. The deceased’s matrilineal kin tends to assert that a large
Table 4.6 Average age at acquisition of farming rights by sex of owner and mode of
acquisition
Land receiver
Female Male
All gifts 34 23
Gifts from spouse only 46 -
Inheritance 51 25
Succession 44 37
Purchase 32 35
First clearing 30 31
All modes 36 27
Source: Field Survey, Anglo and Fiafano 1996; Dedimendi 1997.
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part of what was cultivated was actually only in the custody of the de-
ceased while still belonging to the matrilineage and should thus be re-
turned before dividing the remaining assets according to the legal cri-
terion.38 Second, the deceased’s debts should be settled before sharing
the properties. Matrilineal kin often state that they had lent money and
covered some of the deceased’s debts (typically a debt occurs as a result
of funeral rituals). The money should be returned before the assets of
the deceased are divided. As the wife and children do not have ready
cash, the family keeps hold of the deceased’s farms for years claiming
that the profits are used to repay the debt.39 Third, matrilineal succes-
sors at times successfully argue that, notwithstanding the ‘Intestate
Succession Law’, their role requires them to cater for the deceased’s
wife and children and that the deceased’s property should be trans-
ferred to them to allow them to do so, even though the obligations are
seldom seriously met.40
Conclusion
Far from being managed clearly by a set of traditional norms, land ten-
ure in southern Ghana in the course of the twentieth century has un-
dergone profound transformations. Contemporary Ghanaian land ten-
ure is traditional in the sense that there has been a tradition – not a
pre-colonial but a twentieth century tradition – aimed at preserving a
good deal of indeterminacy in land tenure dynamics (cf. Alden Wily
and Hammond 2001). The ambiguity lies in ever-shifting, multiple,
and unclear normative sets tolerated by the state, promoted by the Sef-
wi Wiawso State/Traditional Council of chiefs, and reshaped and ap-
plied locally by chiefs and elders. All these parties have acted as legiti-
mate enforcers of laws they had themselves formulated within a dis-
course of unchanging traditions. The state has occasionally intervened
in land issues but most of the time has accepted rules decreed by
chiefs on land tenure which have been enforced, with a varied degree
of success, in individual villages or in the whole Sefwi Wiawso Tradi-
tional Area. Further uncertainty was produced by the fact that norms
were differentiated according to people’s ethnicity and ancestry, thus
transplanting all the ambiguities of identitarian determination into
land tenure management (Boni 2005).
Rules of ‘traditional’ or ‘customary’ land tenure, as formulated in the
land tenure orthodoxy, thus often prove to be neither applied by the
state nor applicable to concrete settings that shape farmers’ daily lives.
They are not applied by the state, as most land disputes are addressed
and solved outside state institutions: recourse to government courts
and the Social Welfare Office is limited, while most confrontations are
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solved by panels of elders and chiefs. They are, moreover, inapplicable,
because their conceptual framework rests on assumptions, centred on
the notion of ‘tradition’, without taking into account the dynamism,
multiplicity, and ambiguity of titles actually exercised in disputes with-
in Sefwi agricultural villages.
In this dynamic and uncertain context, some actors have been recog-
nised as having the authority to determine how the ambiguities were
to be understood and solved. The panels of arbitration in villages, and
to a lesser extent the government and State/Traditional Council courts,
selectively applied the multiple and shifting norms to concrete settings,
determining what was due to each party with regards to titles, bounda-
ries, prerogatives, fees, compensations, and taxations, while referring
to unchanging custom. The perpetuation of insecurity and uncertainty
in land-related procedures required and strengthened the existence of
authoritarian figures at a local level – elders, the chiefly establishment,
government officials – who, on the one hand, created and transformed
norms and, on the other, contextually employed rules (national, written
‘ethnic’ norms, oral directives) to address disputes. Those recognised as
the legitimate interpreters of custom have invariably been the promi-
nent figures (indigenous, elders, male) who – as we have seen – con-
trol the bulk of land titles and who impose the framework of under-
standing of property relations, appropriate procedures for title transfer,
and standards of documentation which preserve unequal relations.
Moreover, local ‘judges’ are often involved in disputes as interested par-
ties. Partisan interpretations have, however, been presented – in line
with prevalent discourses on land tenure – both as beneficial for the
community as a whole and based on tradition.
The idiom of tradition, even though continuously evoked by those re-
cognised as the legitimate interpreters, has produced only partial ad-
herence by residents. Weaker categories have constantly questioned
and disputed both reference to tradition and specific interpretations of
what was to be considered customary. Far from being the peaceful ap-
plication of equitable norms elaborated by past wisdom, traditional
norms concerning land have been the strategic imposition of partisan
interests leaving large sectors of the population dissatisfied.
Conflicts over land rights have been largely presented by those who
judge land disputes not as struggles produced by conflicting interests
but as the breaking of immemorial rules: the determination of titles by
the panels that have judged land confrontations, at all levels and in the
diverse contexts, has thus been largely seen as a technical issue. If one
considers that tradition and law have been continuously reshaped, it
becomes clear that there is nothing technical in the adjudication of pre-
rogatives: the determination of land titles has been and is inserted in
the realm of political relations between parties in shifting contexts. The
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state could very well intervene through practical measures to establish
recognised procedures of land title certification; to reduce costs for pea-
sants who seek to secure their rights; and to protect weaker categories
in court proceedings. The state legislation has done so to a very limited
extent and this has had a very limited effect; thus strong inequalities in
the distribution of land rights according to chiefly status, ‘ethnic be-
longing’, age, and gender still persist. The lack of clear advancements
in policies of equitable and clear land rights’ distribution, combined
with the application of the customary idiom in the 1992 Constitution,
shows the state’s unwillingness to address the ambiguity of land prac-
tices and thus reveals the intention to continue sponsoring the current
interpreters of an ambiguous land tenure ‘custom’.
Notes
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5 Chiefs, earth priests and the state: Irrigation
agriculture, competing institutions and the
transformation of land tenure arrangements in
Northeastern Ghana
Steve Tonah
Introduction
During the 1970s and 80s the construction of large-scale irrigation pro-
jects was a central part of the government’s agricultural policies in
Ghana. In this period, successive Ghanaian governments, but in parti-
cular the National Redemption Council (NRC) government (1972-’77),
mobilised large sections of the population to actively participate in the
development of irrigation projects throughout the country. The govern-
ment established irrigation projects at Dawhenya, Okyereko, Akuma-
dan, Mankesim and Asutuare in the south of the country and in Botan-
ga, Vea and Tono in Northern Ghana. The aim of these irrigation pro-
jects was to make the country self-sufficient in the production of food
and provide raw materials to Ghana’s infant industries (Hansen 1989;
Ninsin 1989; Nyanteng and Seini 2000). In Northern Ghana, the irri-
gation projects were also to provide economic opportunities and em-
ployment to large sections of the population, alleviate the perennial
food shortages that have been part of the rural livelihood for several
decades and stem the high rate of migration to Southern Ghana (Cleve-
land 1991; Goody 1980; Shepherd 1981).
The introduction of irrigation agricultural projects in Northern Gha-
na did not only affect the economic activities of individuals and house-
holds in the beneficiary communities but also transformed the social
and political institutions in the area. This paper examines the impact
of state-sponsored irrigation agriculture on the lives of the people of
Biu and its neighbouring communities in the Kassena-Nankana Dis-
trict (KND) of Northeastern Ghana. In particular, the paper will analyse
how the intervention of the state in agricultural production has trans-
formed the land tenure system in the area. One major effect of the pe-
culiar nature of state intervention in the agricultural sector in the area,
which is still manifest today, is the continuing struggle amongst earth
priests, chiefs and state agencies for control, allocation and manage-
ment of household and communal lands in the area.
This paper is based on detailed ethnographic research work con-
ducted at different periods in the KND over a period of nearly two dec-
ades. Initial fieldwork was carried out in the area between 1988 and
1991 (see Tonah 1993, 1994). Subsequent field visits to the area were
undertaken in 1994 and 2002. The author has also benefited from a
number of studies carried out under his supervision in Biu and the
KND between 1994 and 1998.1 Several secondary materials were also
reviewed by the author. A recent study undertaken between 2002 and
2005 in Biu that analyses the impact of irrigation agriculture on the lo-
cal resource regime in the settlement has been quite useful for pur-
poses of comparison (see Laube 2005). Thus, the author has been able
to follow developments and changes in the land tenure system in Biu
and the KND during the early years following the introduction of irri-
gation agriculture and the changes in the land tenure system in the
area.
This paper is divided into sections. It first provides an overview of
the livelihood of the inhabitants of Biu and adjoining communities.
The next section focusses on the land tenure system in the settlements
prior to the introduction of irrigation agriculture during the mid-
1980s. This is followed by an analysis of the state-sponsored Tono Irri-
gation Project and how the expropriation of land by the government
has transformed economic and social activities in the area, changed the
land tenure system and altered power relations in the community. This
section also examines the struggle among earth priests, chiefs and the
project management to control land in the irrigation project and in
areas where land is managed under customary laws. Furthermore, this
section will show how smallholder farmers and households whose an-
cestral lands were expropriated by the state are struggling with com-
mercial farmers and the project management for increasingly scarce
land on the irrigation project site and beyond.
Study area and population
This study was carried out in Biu and the surrounding settlements of
Kolnaba and Kologo. Biu lies eighteen kilometres south of Navrongo,
the district capital of the KND in Northeastern Ghana. Biu, with a po-
pulation of 2,748 inhabitants, is amongst the largest settlement in the
KND (GSS 2002). A total of 269 compound houses (in which 485
households reside) were found in the settlement. The average house-
hold size in 2000 was 5.7 persons, while 10.2 persons lived in each
compound (Laube 2005:114). Biu lies close to the main trunk road be-
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tween Navrongo and Naga in the East and is bordered in the west by
the Tono River and the southernmost portions of the Tono Irrigation
Project. Though essentially rural, the settlement is, in comparison with
many villages in the KND, quite well served with infrastructural facil-
ities. Biu has primary and junior secondary schools, a clinic, market,
churches, stalls, and shops at the centre of the settlement. The settle-
ment also boasts of a number of trained professionals including teach-
ers, health workers, carpenters, seamstresses, hairdressers, masons,
drivers, and mechanics.
Climatic conditions in this part of Northeastern Ghana are similar to
those found in the Guinea savanna region. The vegetation consists of
scattered, widely spaced trees and shrubs. In areas with high popula-
tion density and with extensive human activities, the tree landscape
has been replaced by high-growing grasses. The Biu area has a com-
paratively low population density. Forests and bushes are found south
of the settlement and cover the entire stretch of land between Biu and
the White Volta River. The area has a single rainfall pattern with an-
nual rainfall ranging between 850 mm and 1200 mm. Most of the rain
falls between August and October. This is followed by a long dry sea-
son (December to May) during which temperatures are as high as
45ºC. Soils are generally of poor quality except in the alluvial valleys of
riverine areas (IFAD 1989).
Biu is somewhat of an aberration in terms of the ethnic categorisa-
tion of the population. The inhabitants speak the Buli language, a lan-
guage of residents in the neighbouring Builsa District, but their cus-
tomary practices are in many ways similar to those of the Nankana, an-
other ethnic group that occupies the area south of the KND. There is
also at least one section of the settlement which traces its root to the
Kassena, the major ethnic group in the KND. This essentially means
that many residents speak, in addition to Buli, the Nankani and Kasem
languages. Some residents have a rudimentary command of the Eng-
lish language while residents who have sojourned in Southern Ghana
speak Twi and Hausa.
The inhabitants of Biu can be categorised into two main clans or sec-
tions – Seenza and Agobiza – which are further divided into several
lineages locally referred to as ‘houses’. Clans in Biu, just as amongst
the neighbouring Kassena and Nankana, are patrilineal and exoga-
mous. Descent is traced through the male line. The residence pattern
is patrilocal with the man maintaining close relations with his in-laws.
The typical residence pattern is a compound house with persons of
three or more generations living together. Some compounds, however,
have two or more households, with each household operating as a se-
parate economic unit. The head of the compound (Yidana) represents
the compound at sectional/clan meetings, performs religious sacrifices
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on behalf of its members, settles quarrels among them, and is respon-
sible for their social and economic well-being (Becher 1996; Gut-
schmidt 1996).
Prior to colonial rule, the settlement was under the headship of the
earth priest (Tengnyono)2 who was the religious and political leader of
the settlement. Each clan within the settlement was autonomous and
the clan head governed the activities of its members. Clan heads
would, however, consult with the Tengnyono in cases of intra- and inter-
clan disputes and for general directions on the administration of the
clan. During the period of colonial rule, the various clans or sectional
heads were transformed into headmen, and later chiefs, who served as
representatives of their communities in the Native Administration. The
transformation of clan heads into chiefs (and the creation of chiefs
where there were none) by the colonial government has altered the bal-
ance of power in Biu and indeed throughout the KND (cf. Der 2000).
The various chiefs in the KND were later grouped into a hierarchy with
the creation of village, divisional and paramount chiefs. The transfor-
mation of clan heads into chiefs, or rather the establishment of a hier-
archy amongst hitherto independent and autonomous chiefs, is a ma-
jor factor accounting for many of the conflicts that were later to engulf
Biu and the KND in general. From the period of colonial rule until the
present, chiefs are still considered by government officials to be the of-
ficial representatives of the inhabitants.3 Most of the earth priests who
used to govern these settlements have been sidelined, although they
still perform their religious rites and lay claim to the ownership, con-
trol and management of land in the KND.
Farming practices and the land tenure system4
Residents of Biu and surrounding villages can be described as being
agro-pastoralists. Besides their farming activities, most households
keep livestock and poultry. Trading, involving the sale of food crops
and livestock, also constitutes a major economic activity (cf. Gutsch-
midt 1996). The main crops grown include grain (mainly millet, rice,
and sorghum), cowpea, groundnuts and vegetables. All households
keep poultry and small stock but the ownership of cattle is increasingly
becoming the preserve of wealthy individuals and households. Farming
is typically done with simple equipment (like the hoe, cutlass, sticks
etc.) although the use of the bullock in the completion of agricultural
tasks has become common. A few households have purchased tractors
which they use on their own fields and hire out to neighbouring farm-
ers. Since the mid-1980s when dry season irrigation farming was gra-
dually introduced into the community, increasing numbers of indivi-
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duals and households have taken to irrigation farming where they cul-
tivate rice, soybeans and tomatoes mainly for household consumption
and for sale on the market. The majority of households in Biu have re-
mained subsistence farmers who cultivate less than five hectares of
land on farms located around the compound, in the village, the bush
area and on the irrigated fields.
The land tenure system in Biu, just as in all Kasena-Nankani settle-
ments, has been shaped both by the pattern of arrival and settlement
of the various clans and the social organisation of these clans. Tradi-
tionally, the first clan to settle on a particular piece of land claimed
ownership of the land and the area immediately surrounding the settle-
ment.5 The eldest male member of the clan was typically appointed as
the Tengnyono, that is, the spiritual, political and administrative head
of the settlement. Subsequently, the allodial title6 to land remains with-
in the ‘first-comer’ clan and a Tengnyono is chosen from amongst
members of the clan to succeed a deceased leader (cf. DaRocha and Lo-
doh 1995; Pogucki 1955; Woodman 1996).
A Tengnyono never owns the land but only holds land in trust or cus-
todianship for the members of the community. He allocates land to
members of the various clans and sections in the settlement and to
newly-arrived migrants. The Tengnyono remains only a custodian of
land and can hardly refuse a native land on which he wishes to settle
or farm. He may, however, express his dissatisfaction with a native
seeking farmland by not giving him enough land or by offering him
an infertile area. Land may be allocated only to adult males and fe-
males have no rights of usufruct. In practice, unmarried, divorced, or
widowed women are always allocated a portion of the household land
for farming purposes (cf. Becher 1996). Strangers, on the other hand,
may be refused land if they are known to be of doubtful character or
suspected of being able to destabilise the community. The Tengnyono
may also reallocate bush land which has been abandoned or is left fal-
low for several seasons (usually for more than 5 years) to another
household or individual willing to cultivate it. Virgin lands can only be
acquired through the Tengnyono. This involves having to send him
small amounts of cola nuts, oil, millet-flour, salt, tobacco, and alcoholic
drinks to be used in sacrifices to the ancestors, in prayers for a good
harvest and for the protection of the individual acquiring the land. All
items found on such acquired lands, including strayed livestock,
metals, bangles, axes, hoes etc. remain the property of the Tengnyono.
After the harvest, it is customary for individuals who have been given
farmlands to send a small part of the harvest (typically, two or three
bowls of maize or millet) to the Tengnyono to be ‘given to the ances-
tors’. This practice is often waived when grain harvests during a parti-
cular season are poor (Tonah 1993; 2002).
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Land lying fallow, virgin lands, forests and indeed all land not allo-
cated to a particular individual or household are regarded as communal
property. Usable resources on these plots of land may be used by any
member of the community. Livestock may graze freely as long as they
do not destroy crops or property. Forests and bush resources may be
exploited for their fruits, wood, vegetables and meat. Rivers and ponds
may be used for minor irrigation and fishing.
An individual who acquires land from the Tengnyono may transfer it
to his descendants for farming purposes. Once a household or lineage
has established its right over a piece of land, no one can dispossess that
household/lineage of the usufructory right unless it acts contrary to
the conditions under which the land was given to the household. Cur-
rently, most of the compound and in-village plots have been allocated
to the various households and lineages. The use and control of these
plots are subsequently transferred to the male children within the
household. Land for farming purposes is, however, available in the
bush and forest areas far away from the settlement.
Generally, the Tengnyono of Biu still has considerable authority with-
in the community and has maintained control over the administration
of land. He is regarded as the legitimate authority over land matters by
the vast majority of the inhabitants. His exclusive right to perform the
numerous religious rites associated with the use of land and the belief
that the non-performance of these rites has serious implications for the
community has contributed to strengthening the position of the Teng-
nyono vis-a`-vis other individuals and groups. While the Tengnyono has
largely retained his authority over land in Biu, he has over the years
lost control over a vast stretch of land in the KND (Laube 2005:137).
Two major factors were responsible for the Tengnyono’s gradual loss of
power and control over land in the Kassena-Nankana area. The first
was a result of the imposition of colonial rule in the area. This resulted
in the transformation of clan heads into chiefs and the creation of a
hierarchy among the chiefs. The chiefs later on became the political re-
presentatives of their communities and eventually constituted them-
selves into a powerful group meddling in land issues (cf. Berry
2006:256). The second was the negative impact that colonial land pol-
icy had on the authority of the Tengnyono.
Since the period of colonial rule, the Tengnyono of Biu has seen his
authority over land being challenged by several paramount chiefs in
the KND. Prior to colonial rule, the Tengnyono was in charge of the en-
tire territory stretching from Biu to Paga, along the border with Burki-
na Faso. This includes all the land in Paga, Pungu, Navrongo and parts
of Chuchuliga. However, with the creation of divisional and paramount
chiefs in areas that did not have any hierarchical leadership structure
prior to colonial rule and the provision of such chiefs with powers by
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the colonial authority, such ‘government-sponsored’ chiefs gradually be-
came more powerful than the Tengnyono. The power and authority of
the Tengnyono as the ‘owner of the land’ has been systematically
eroded.
The various colonial administrations did not recognise the authority
of the Tengnyono of Biu. Instead they created divisional and paramount
chiefs in the neighbouring settlements including Kologo and Naga.
Biu, on the other hand, was provided with only a headman, who be-
came the political representative of the community with the colonial
government. Similarly, the colonial authorities recognised the chief of
Navrongo (Navro-pio) as the leader of his community. The Navro-pio
utilised his closeness to the colonial administrators to enhance his sta-
tus and power. In subsequent years, the chiefs of Kologo, Naga, and
many other settlements were made paramount chiefs while the Navro-
pio also became the paramount chief of Navrongo. Residents of Biu, on
the other hand, lost out in the colonial administrative set-up and had
to content themselves with a divisional chief. In recent times, as a re-
sult of their elevated status and their close connections with persons in
central government, chiefs have been claiming to hold the allodial title
to land in areas where they traditionally did not have such powers (cf.
Lund 2006). For example, during the period of colonial rule, the chief
of Kologo (Kologonaba) successfully wrestled control over land in the
Kologo settlement and in the neighbouring bush area from the Teng-
nyono of Biu and this situation has been maintained until today. Simi-
larly, the Navro-pio, using his position as the paramount chief of Nav-
rongo and his closeness and influence amongst top government lea-
ders claims allodial title to lands in Navrongo and its environs. His
claim is hotly contested by the Tengnyam in the various settlements.
Currently, all persons wishing to acquire land for non-agricultural pur-
poses in the Navrongo area have to seek the consent of the Navro-pio
as well as that of the Tengnyono of Navrongo (Konings 1986:243). This
has resulted in some confusion over the ownership and control of land
in Navrongo and the surrounding settlements. There are reported cases
of some Tengnyam contesting the claim by the Navro-pio to be solely re-
sponsible for administering lands in Navrongo and its environs. Some
of the Tengnyam are demanding that compensation paid by the govern-
ment with respect to lands acquired by government agencies in the
area be given to them instead of the Navro-pio.7 Generally, one can con-
clude that the colonial government, while strengthening the powers of
chiefs, weakened the position of the Tengnyono in many parts of North-
eastern Ghana.
The land policies of the colonial and post-colonial governments have
also curtailed the powers of the Tengnyono. A Land and Native Right
Ordinance introduced by the colonial government in 1927 declared all
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lands in Ghana ‘public lands’. Such lands subsequently came under
the management and control of the Governor. The Ordinance empow-
ered the colonial government to claim land in any part of Northern
Ghana for ‘development purposes’ without the payment of any com-
pensation to the original landowners. Similarly, the government could
grant rights of occupancy to any persons who required the use of land
and charge the appropriate fees (Agbosu 1978; Konings 1986). In this
way the powers of chiefs and the Tengnyono with respect to the man-
agement of land were rather limited and made subordinate to that of
the colonial government. After the attainment of independence, all
lands in Northern Ghana continued to be vested in the President who
held them in trust for the people of the area. This remained the case
until 1979 when the state finally relinquished its authority over lands
in Northern Ghana and returned the ownership and control of such
lands to their traditional owners. Given the different land tenure re-
gimes in Northern Ghana and the changes that have taken place since
the expropriation of these lands by the colonial government, it has be-
come increasingly difficult for the government to determine the ‘tradi-
tional owners’ of lands in parts of Northern Ghana as a result of con-
flicting claims by different persons and groups to ownership of a parti-
cular land. This is particularly the case in the towns and major
settlements where there is considerable rent to be obtained from the
ownership and control of such lands. Since 1979, there has been an in-
tense competition in many parts of Northeastern Ghana between the
Tengnyam and chiefs over who has allodial title to land. During the co-
lonial and post-colonial period, many chiefs were able to use their privi-
leged position and power to wrestle control over land from the Teng-
nyam. However, it appears that the Tengnyam are beginning to fight
back and are re-claiming their rights to control land and reverse their
loss of authority over land (Laube 2005; Lund 2006).
In the next section, I examine in detail how the introduction of
large-scale irrigation farming in Northeastern Ghana during the 1980s
has intensified the conflict over land between chiefs, the Tengnyam and
the Ghanaian state. I shall also indicate how commercial irrigation
farming has changed the environment under which farming takes
place, transformed the land tenure system as well as the authority of
the Tengnyono in Biu. Today, residents move between commercial irri-
gation agriculture that largely ignores the social and religious rules in
the area and rain-fed agriculture on household/communal land that is
embedded in and regulated by the social and religious practices of the
population.
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Irrigation agriculture and the transformation of land tenure and
rural livelihood
The Tono Irrigation Project, located in the KND, was initiated in the
early 1960s but was abandoned following the overthrow of President
Nkrumah in 1966. It was not until 1974 that the National Redemption
Council (NRC) government decided to construct the irrigation project.
The Project was expected to provide the raw materials required by the
newly-refurbished Pwalugu tomato factory. Furthermore, it was ex-
pected to improve the livelihood of farmers in this impoverished part
of Ghana and contribute substantially towards the NRC government’s
‘Operation Feed Yourself’ and ‘Operation Feed Your Industries’ cam-
paigns (Hansen 1989; Ninsin 1989).
The irrigation project itself consists of an embankment across the
Tono River to form a 1,860 hectare reservoir capable of providing water
for irrigation purposes. The reservoir is linked to the irrigated lands by
a canal network of about 250 kilometres with 100 kilometres of access
roads. The Tono Project was financed by the Ghana government with
loans obtained from the Canadian and British governments. Besides
developing irrigation lands, the Tono Project developed a reservoir that
facilitated fishing activities, installed a scour pipe that provides Navron-
go with potable water, and built housing facilities for the staff of the
project. Farming commenced in 1979 and the project was initially
managed by a foreign-owned company (Tate and Lyle). The project
management was transferred to the Irrigation Company of Upper Re-
gion (ICOUR) in 1981 (ICOUR n.d; Kasanga 1992; Konings 1986).
During the construction phase of the irrigation project, all lands in
Northern Ghana were vested in the President of Ghana. Land used for
the construction of the irrigation facility was expropriated by the gov-
ernment without extensive consultations with the stakeholders and the
inhabitants and without the payment of adequate compensation to the
landowners. Settlements, farms, religious and sacred sites, forest re-
serves and groves in communities including Bonia, Korania, Tono, and
Yobgania were destroyed. The administration of the meagre compensa-
tion paid to the landowners was handled by the Navro-pio without the
involvement of the Tengnyam in the area. Here again, although the
Tengnyam were traditionally responsible for land matters, the post-colo-
nial government, just like the colonial government, worked through
chiefs and imposed its decisions on the communities. By dealing exclu-
sively with chiefs on land matters and elevating them above the Teng-
nyam the government effectively took the side of chiefs in the struggle
for the control of land in the district. The Navro-pio and other chiefs in
the area were thus able to gradually legitimise their hold on land in
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their traditional areas with the connivance and active support of the
state (Konings 1986).
Household, lineage and communal lands in Biu were also expro-
priated by the state for the construction of the irrigation facility. As
elsewhere, neither the Tengnyono nor the landowners were consulted
prior to the demolition of their property. Landowners in Biu still claim
that they did not receive any compensation from the government for
property destroyed during the construction phase. Many residents in
Biu were initially hesitant about participating in irrigation farming
partly due to the grievances they had against the project. There was still
abundant fertile land in the area and many households did not see the
reason why they should pay to work on land that originally belonged to
them. Other farmers feared that the non-observance of religious rites
and the destruction of holy sites were bound to bring calamity unto
participating households and the entire community.
Villages whose lands were expropriated by the government were allo-
cated plots in the irrigation project area on which to farm. Zones Q, S,
U, V and X which are located at the tail end of the irrigation scheme
were allocated to residents of Biu. Besides the communities, small-
holders, commercial farmers and workers of ICOUR were also allo-
cated farming areas in the project area. Until 1989, only a few young
men and women in Biu participated in dry season irrigation farming.
Some residents could not mobilise the labour and funds required to
participate in irrigation farming. Others were discouraged by the fact
that only commercial crops such as tomatoes, soybean and rice were al-
lowed on the irrigation facility. The Village Management Committee
therefore decided to give part of its unused irrigation land to commer-
cial farmers and ICOUR workers (Tonah 1993). However, by 1995 the
number of households participating in irrigation farming in Biu had
increased three-fold and the average size of land under cultivation had
also increased (Gutschmidt 1996:59). By the 2004 farming season, re-
sidents of Biu were fully using their portion of land under the project
and irrigable land had become very scarce (Laube 2005).
During the initial phase of the project, the Land Allocation Commit-
tee of ICOUR was responsible for the allocation of zones and plots of
land on the project. Members of the Committee included the Regional
and District Administration staff, chiefs and the ICOUR project man-
agement. The Upper East Regional Commissioner was the Chairman
of the Committee. The membership of the Committee was itself an in-
dication of the extent to which chiefs had entrenched their influence
and interests in land matters in the district. While the Tengnyam were
not part of the Land Allocation Committee, chiefs were well repre-
sented on it. Many of the administrators, prominent chiefs, top civil
servants and military officers were able to use their position on the
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Land Allocation Committee and their influence on the project manage-
ment to obtain land in the most fertile areas on the irrigation project.
As the cost of irrigation farming grew following the withdrawal of agri-
cultural subsidies by the Ghanaian government, ICOUR was compelled
to cut its staff and transfer part of its activities to the communities (To-
nah 1993:185-6). In 1987, ICOUR set up Village Committees (VC) in
all the participating communities to allocate irrigation land to resi-
dents, repair canals, clean laterals, distribute water, handle credits pro-
vided to smallholders and collect debts from farmers (Laube 2005:102).
ICOUR had no clear cut criteria for determining the membership of
the VC. Members are, however, expected to reflect a cross-section of
the community. Individuals chosen are also expected to be honest,
hardworking and fair in the execution of their duties. For practical pur-
poses the VC executives in Biu typically include a representative of the
Tengnyono and two other members selected from the two main clans
in the community. Due to the influence that members of the VC wield
in the allocation of project lands, the two chiefs of Biu8 are often at log-
gerheads as to who should be on the committee. Disputes between the
two chiefs over land and the quest to represent the village on the VC
were partly responsible for the ‘Biu war’ in 1997 during which sym-
pathisers of the two chiefs and their clan members clashed (Laube
2005:137-141). Members of the VC typically use their position not only
to ensure that they get a sizeable plot on the irrigation scheme but also
to secure the interests of their friends and supporters. Allocation of ir-
rigation plots has thus become a means of ensuring political support
and patronage within the community.
The establishment of the VC and the involvement of communities
whose lands were expropriated by the state in the management of land
have increased rivalry among the chiefs and the Tengnyam in the area.
In Biu, there is a fierce competition for power and irrigated land
among the two chiefs, the Tengnyono and other landowners. Prior to
the involvement of the communities in the management of land, the
Land Allocation Committee of ICOUR was the main institution allocat-
ing land on the project site and had exclusive management control over
the irrigation project. ICOUR was also responsible for meeting the
land and water needs of commercial farmers, smallholders and the
project staff. The project management could thus more easily hold in
check the activities of chiefs and the Tengnyam who have long claimed
ownership and control of communal land in the project site. With the
increasing participation of the communities in the project, the Teng-
nyam appear to be regaining their authority and control over part of
the land that they lost to the state and the chiefs. The Tengnyam are
still very much revered by large sections of the population and still play
significant social, economic and religious functions in their commu-
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nities. They have tried to maintain the traditions of their people and
are not associated with the institutions of the modern state. Chiefs, on
the other hand, are directly associated with politicians and the state ap-
paratus and institutions. They benefit considerably from the largesse
and support of politicians and the government. Chiefs are therefore
sometimes viewed with suspicion by their subjects. However, chiefs are
able to influence the decisions of the project management by using
their links with government officials and top civil servants in the area.
In Biu, farmers sometimes seek the permission of the Tengnyono to
work on abandoned plots or waste lands on the irrigation project under
the pretext that these lands should be given back to their original own-
ers in the community. Plots under the cultivation of the expropriated
communities are increasingly coming under the influence of chiefs
and Tengnyam who are systematically influencing and interfering with
the allocation of land within their communities. This has resulted in
the development of a parallel land management regime, especially on
the so-called waste lands within the irrigation project. These waste
lands are managed according to customary laws that sometimes contra-
dict official ICOUR regulations. Farmers who cultivate areas declared
as waste lands by ICOUR end up using the project’s facilities on their
fields without having to pay any land and water levies. The project
management often turn a blind eye to some of the negative activities of
beneficiary communities because they do not want to estrange these
communities. Although backed by state power that has vested owner-
ship of all land in the Tono project in ICOUR, the authority of ICOUR
appears increasingly limited to areas cultivated by small-scale and com-
mercial farmers. The management of zones and plots allocated to the
communities are increasingly left with the Village Committees. How-
ever, ICOUR does intervene directly in the affairs of the VC when the
VC is unable to manage its affairs as a result of conflicts or when the
communities are highly indebted to ICOUR. The project management
appears not very keen to dabble in land politics within the commu-
nities. Instead, ICOUR prefers to indirectly control the use of land in
the project area by controlling the provision of water. ICOUR can and
intermittently does withhold the provision of water to recalcitrant com-
munities and individual farmers indebted to the organisation, thereby
preventing them from undertaking irrigation farming.
While most residents contest ICOUR’s claims over the ownership of
land, they do accept the fact that the irrigation water belongs to
ICOUR. ICOUR has, so far, been able to maintain its authority over
land use in the irrigation project through its unassailable monopoly
over the control and distribution of water. Individual farmers and the
communities, on the other hand, do employ the ‘weapons of the weak’
(Scott 1985) in putting pressure on ICOUR. They may damage or steal
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irrigation property, steal crops from the fields, divert irrigation water
courses, burn the fields, etc. in protest against any unfair treatment by
the project management. Chiefs also commonly employ their links
with politicians to expand their influence on the project management.
They typically use their influence to obtain a large acreage of land in
the best farming areas. They usually have access to any credit packages
provided by the government and donor agencies in support of the agri-
cultural sector. Commercial farmers are another powerful group oper-
ating on the irrigation scheme. They are usually members of the local
and regional elite with links to persons in high authority in the govern-
ment or in government agencies. They work to protect their interests
in the project. In view of their enormous contributions to the viability
of the project, they tend to have very close relations with the project
management. Generally, the irrigation project therefore provides the
environment where the various actors and institutions can compete for
land and other resources, and ultimately for influence and power in
the area.
Three decades of state-sponsored irrigation farming have resulted in
the creation of two land and resource management regimes in the
KND that operate alongside each other in an often contradictory and
confused fashion. One set of rules operates on the irrigation project
while another operates in areas under customary land laws and social
conventions. This is in spite of increasing and subtle attempts by the
Tengnyam, chiefs and other traditional leaders to introduce customary
rules and practices into irrigation farming. The rules and social condi-
tions under which individuals and households participate in irrigation
farming remain very different from those that operate within the tradi-
tional rain-fed farming environment.
On the irrigation project, plots are allocated by members of the Vil-
lage Committee upon the payment of water and other levies. The farm-
ing season is regulated by the ICOUR project management and is sub-
ject to the availability of water. Some zones may be closed and farmers
denied access to their plots when there is too little water in the dam.
Hired labour is commonly used for the execution of several agricultural
tasks, including land preparation, transplanting of crops, weeding, har-
vesting and threshing of produce. Crops that are planted on irrigated
fields are mainly those with high economic value such as rice, toma-
toes and soybeans. These crops have little social or religious value in
the community. Generally, farming on the irrigated plots involves the
use of modern equipment and machinery for several stages of farming.
Irrigation agriculture is essentially individualistic in nature. Women
can acquire, own and use plots on the irrigation projects in their own
right and do not have to depend on their male relatives for access to
land and labour, as long as they can afford the cost involved. The har-
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vest belongs exclusively to the farmer and s/he can market the produce
and keep the proceeds from the sale of the harvest. Harvests are com-
monly stored in jute sacks and hidden from other members of the
household or the extended family to ensure their exclusive use by the
farmer.
Farming on household or communal lands, on the other hand, takes
place under very different social conditions and land tenure arrange-
ments. Farming typically commences with a religious ceremony and
sacrifices are made to the ancestors to announce the commencement
of the farming season. Farming takes place on household or lineage
land, or on plots provided by the Tengnyono. Farming on household
plots involves the extensive use of family and kin labour. The labour of
relatives and in-laws is commonly used in the completion of all agricul-
tural tasks. Similarly, communal labour may be organised, during
which the host provides food and drinks for persons who participate in
the work. Contrary to practices that prevail under irrigation agriculture,
crops with social and religious significance, such as millet and sor-
ghum, are commonly planted on household lands. Traditional agricul-
ture involves expectations of reciprocity on the part of relatives and
community members. A small part of the proceeds from the harvest is
given to the Tengnyono to be used in sacrifices, for the performance of
funerals, weddings and other community activities. Part of the harvest
is frequently shared with relatives and neighbours, especially during
the lean season or in case of a drought. Harvested crops are tradition-
ally kept in barns and shared amongst households within a compound.
While farming under irrigation conditions is largely profit-motivated
and self-centred, farming on household land is mainly of a subsistence
nature and driven by reciprocal relations.
Dry season irrigation farming was slow to catch up in Biu and other
communities in the KND. The commencement of irrigation farming
was associated with the expropriation of land and the destruction of
the economic, social, and religious property of the affected commu-
nities. Some communities lost all their farmlands and the basis of their
livelihood in this largely impoverished part of Northern Ghana. Others
had to be relocated to make way for the building of the dam and the ca-
nals. The non-payment of compensation to the landowners and resi-
dents whose farms and property were destroyed also contributed to the
initial frustration and despondency found among large sections of the
rural population in the KND. During the 1970s the bulk of the farm-
lands on the project was allocated to commercial farmers, most of
whom were government officials, military officers, civil servants and
large scale farmers. Most of them had ventured into irrigation rice
farming to take advantage of the huge subsidies that the government
provided to the agricultural sector. During this period the level of parti-
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cipation of the rural smallholder farmer in the Tono Irrigation Project
was very low. Only those communities without adequate bush farms
felt compelled to participate in irrigation farming.
During the early 1990s the level of participation of smallholder
farmers in the project increased considerably. This was partly because
the benefits to be derived from dry season irrigation farming became
evident to more farmers but also because of a new policy that placed
emphasis on increasing community participation in irrigation farming.
Irrigation farming has greatly alleviated poverty in Biu and the KND in
general: it provides grain (especially rice) needed by poor households
to survive the long and harsh dry season in the savanna region. Irriga-
tion farming has also been beneficial to the poorest households, espe-
cially female-headed households, who did not own livestock that could
be exchanged for grain during the lean season. Furthermore, it has
provided the opportunity for women to acquire farmlands in their own
right. Single women, widows, and female-headed households can now
acquire land without having to depend on their male relatives. Women
may also keep the proceeds from the sale of crops for the use of their
family members. Under the traditional farming practices, crop harvests
are usually managed by the male head of the household and any cash
income from the sale of grain belongs to him.
Irrigation agriculture has also been a major source of employment
and income for the poorest households in Biu and neighbouring com-
munities. Persons from poor households form the majority of those
employed as labourers on the fields of commercial farmers. Women as
well as young boys and girls constitute the bulk of the agricultural la-
bour on the irrigation project. Women are frequently employed to
transplant rice, weed fields and harvest crops. Young boys and girls are
typically employed to scare away birds from the rice fields. Irrigation
farming has also reduced the level of migration of the youth to South-
ern Ghana. Persons who leave their communities to do menial jobs in
Southern Ghana often return to their home villages during the dry sea-
son because of the possibility of undertaking irrigation farming.
The availability of employment in the irrigation facility has, however,
resulted in an increase in the incidence of child labour and truancy in
the district. Many children who should be in school are found working
on the irrigation fields, especially during periods of peak demand for
labour. Another negative effect of the introduction of irrigation farming
in the KND is the high level of social differentiation within the partici-
pating rural communities (cf. Kasanga 1992). Households that can mo-
bilise adequate material and human resources and possess the neces-
sary power to influence the decisions of the project management have
been able to secure large acreages of land for irrigation farming. They
have, with time, been able to make a fortune from irrigation farming.
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Such households have invested part of their wealth in the renovation of
their buildings and the purchase of solar panels, motorbikes, bicycles,
tractors and other farming equipment. Poor households, on the other
hand, have to eke out a living from small irrigation plots. A large num-
ber of those working as wage labourers on the irrigation project come
from the poorest households.
Summary and conclusion
This paper has examined the changing land tenure arrangements in
Biu and the KND before and after the introduction of irrigation agricul-
ture by the state in the 1970s and ’80s. It has shown that prior to the
construction of the Tono Irrigation Project there was a stiff contest be-
tween the Tengnyam and the chiefs for the control over land in the
area. Developments during the colonial period favoured the chiefs who
were considered to be the political representatives of the communities
in the Native Administration. The Land and Native Right Ordinance in-
troduced by the colonial government in 1927 declared all lands in Gha-
na ‘public lands’ and placed them under the control and management
of the Governor. This law enabled the colonial government to obtain
access to land without hindrance or the payment of compensation.
However, the control of land by the government was only effective in
the major towns. In the rural areas, landowners and Tengnyam contin-
ued to administer land according to customary laws. Chiefs used their
powers and closeness to the colonial administration to gain some con-
trol over land, especially in the urban areas. Some of the paramount
chiefs later claimed allodial title over land in their traditional areas.
The contest for control over land thus intensified with the chiefs gradu-
ally gaining the upper hand due to their influence in national politics.
The Tengnyam gradually lost effective control over some lands that had
hitherto been under their control. By and large, the various post-colo-
nial governments in Ghana maintained the status quo by leaving all
lands in Northern Ghana as ‘public lands’ until 1979 when these lands
were returned to their traditional owners. The return of northern lands
to their traditional owners further heightened the struggle for control
of land between the Tengnyam and the chiefs, as the former began to
reassert their authority over land that apparently had come under the
administration of the chiefs.
It was against the background of the ongoing struggle for the control
of land that the Tono Irrigation Project was constructed. The National
Redemption Council government with the support and connivance of
the chiefs expropriated land from communities lying along the Tono
River for the construction of the irrigation project. The Tengnyam who
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were traditionally accepted to have authority over community lands
were largely ignored during the process. The Ghanaian government
paid a meagre compensation to the chiefs to be distributed amongst
households and communities whose lands were expropriated, but
many residents claimed they did not receive their share of the compen-
sation. The Tono Irrigation Project has further intensified the struggle
for the control of land between the chiefs, the Tengnyam and the state
since the introduction of community management of irrigation fields.
The Tengnyam or their representatives have almost everywhere been
made part of the Village Committees created to manage the allocation
of irrigated land to individuals and households participating in the
Tono project. This has resulted in attempts by the Tengnyam to reassert
their claim and control over land expropriated by the state. They have
tried to bring part of the irrigation project indirectly under their control
by introducing traditional religious practices in areas under the control
of the VCs. Chiefs have also used their influence with the project man-
agement and government officials to secure access to large acreages of
irrigated lands on the project. They have also strived to be members of
the Village Committee to ensure that their supporters have access to ir-
rigation plots. They often use irrigation land for patronage purposes.
The contest for land and power between chiefs and the Tengnyam in
Biu and the surrounding communities has had a disastrous impact on
these communities. It has polarised the inhabitants along their various
sections and interest groups. It has also intensified chieftaincy succes-
sion conflicts and politicised the life of the residents. The competition
for chieftaincy has become intense as the various sections in the settle-
ment support different candidates for the chieftaincy position. Indeed,
these animosities were partly responsible for the ‘Biu war’ in 1997 and
the continuing tension within the community.
While the ICOUR has lost some control over land allocation in areas
under the management of the VCs, it still controls the use of land by
commercial farmers, smallholder farmers, public and civil servants, as
well as politicians. Besides, ICOUR maintains a certain amount of con-
trol over the use of land in the project area through the control of
water. ICOUR exerts its influence by refusing to provide water to in-
debted farmers and communities. This has enabled it to maintain its
fragile hold over lands in the irrigation project. The Tono Irrigation
Project provides a good example of the changing land tenure system in
the KND and the on-going struggle between chiefs, earth priests and
the state for the control over land in Northeastern Ghana. The Project
also shows the considerable extent to which rural livelihood in the
KND has been transformed through the introduction of irrigation agri-
culture.
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Notes
1 See Becher 1996; Gutschmidt 1996; Lachenmann 1995; Rabbe 2004.
2 The local name for the earth priest varies amongst the different ethnic groups in
Northeastern Ghana. He is called Tindana and Tegatu amongst the neighbouring
Nankani and the Kassena respectively. I will use the Buli word Tengnyono (pl. Teng-
nyam) which is the language of the residents of Biu and the neighbouring Builsa Dis-
trict.
3 Some of the important roles of chiefs, including being the main link between the
government and the inhabitants, have since the introduction of the local government
system in 1988 been taken over by the Assemblyman. Nevertheless, chiefs still repre-
sent their communities and have remained influential in national life and politics.
4 This section relies heavily on earlier fieldwork in Biu. See Tonah 1993:69-82.
5 See Kunbuor 2003 and Lentz 2006a for an extensive discussion on the relationship
between ‘first-comers’ to a particular locality and ‘late-comers’ with respect to the type
of rights a group or individual asserts over land and the security of tenure associated
with such rights.
6 According to Kunbuor 2003, the allodial title is ‘the highest proprietary interest
known to customary schemes of interest in land. It is sometimes referred to as the
paramount title, absolute title or radical title’. See also Kasanga 1988.
7 In the neighbouring Builsa District, for example, the paramount chief of the area
(the Sandemnab) and his elders are claiming that the allodial title to land in the Buil-
sa area is vested in the paramount chief who holds land in trust for the people. The
paramount chief has succeeded in displacing the Tengnyam who previously held the
allodial title to land in the area (Konings 1986: 154). Similarly, the paramount chief
of Bolgatanga (the Bolganaba) is also claiming allodial title to land in the Bolgatanga
area although this is being contested by the Tindana (earth priest) who apparently
had authority over land in Bolgatanga prior to the colonial era (see Lund 2006).
8 The Biu community has the unenviable situation of having two chiefs. Each of the
two clans/sections has its own chief and both of them are laying claim to being the
direct descendant of the first settler in the settlement.
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6 Customary justice institutions and local
Alternative Dispute Resolution: What kind of
protection can they offer to customary landholders?
Richard C. Crook
Introduction: Chiefs, customary landholding and legal pluralism
in Ghana
In Ghana, as in most of tropical Africa, the majority of landholdings
are based on customary forms of tenure which are either unwritten or
are at best only informally recorded. Landholders’ rights depend on
agreements embedded in local society and derive from their social rela-
tions with family, lineage, and community (Berry 1993). Ghana is spe-
cial, however, in the extent to which customary chiefs in the dominant
Akan cultural areas are legally recognised as ‘trustees’ or allodial own-
ers of community land, and in the extent to which customary land law
has been incorporated into the common law of the state courts and re-
cognised by the Constitution.1 In the non-Akan areas chiefs were not
traditionally recognised as having such extensive claims over land, but
the impact of colonial rule encouraged chiefs especially in the north to
develop such claims, leading to contemporary conflicts with land
priests (tendana) and family heads. The chiefs’ Native Courts were abol-
ished throughout Ghana in 1958, after independence, and the chief-
taincy has since been progressively stripped of virtually all of its formal
judicial and administrative powers including the collection of land rev-
enues. Nevertheless, chiefs continue to be the de facto land managers
of most customary landholdings even in the urban areas, allocating
plots and selling leases for ‘drinks money’ (fees) at market rates, and
running ‘customary courts’ for the settlement of land and other dis-
putes.
Most customary landholders are, therefore, still very much depen-
dent on chiefly and local or family institutions to uphold their right of
access to land, and for protection against unlawful dispossession of
their customary landholdings, especially if they cannot afford to go
through the state’s land sector agencies (Lands Commission, Survey
Department, District Physical Planning Departments, Deeds Registry,
Land Title Registry), or to engage with surveyors, lawyers, and courts.
What happens if those rights are threatened – by the state, local gov-
ernment or the community itself through the chief – or if they come
into conflict with other parties? If they cannot be resolved amicably,
the situation of legal pluralism which prevails in Ghana means that
there is a wide range of possible dispute settlement institutions to
which they can turn, ranging from state courts and administrative
agencies through superior chiefs’ customary ‘courts’ or tribunals to vil-
lage level arbitrations by village chiefs, family heads, elders, and com-
munity leaders. But whether those different fora or ‘Dispute Settle-
ment Institutions’ (DSIs) offer equally good protection of customary
rights is by no means certain; the norms or legal codes used in each
DSI can differ quite markedly, and the legitimacy, authority and fair-
ness of the procedures used may also lead to quite different outcomes
according to the status of the parties. Nevertheless, given the reality
that most landholders in practice use mainly local and customary
forms of dispute resolution, and given the congestion and huge back-
logs in the state courts, state policy in Ghana now favours an emphasis
on encouraging these local and customary DSIs. Current policy dis-
courses also tend to equate such local and customary DSIs with the
fashion for using ‘Alternative Dispute Resolution’ (ADR) mechanisms
as a way to deal with the crisis in the state courts. The intention of this
paper is therefore to address two main issues:
L How legitimate, effective and inclusive are these customary and
informal local level systems of land dispute settlement?
L To what extent can they really be promoted as ADR-type solu-
tions to the land case backlog facing the state courts?
Evidence will be drawn from research on land disputes and DSIs car-
ried out in peri-urban Kumasi, Brong-Ahafo and Upper West Regions
during the 2001-2005 period (Crook et al. 2007).
ADR and its transposition to Africa
Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR), is currently extremely popular
in justice sector reform programmes throughout the developing world,
and has been officially introduced in India, Bangladesh, and various
Latin American and African states in recent years (see PRI 2001). It is
primarily seen as a method for relieving the crisis of overburdened
state courts facing impossible backlogs of unresolved cases. More posi-
tively it is also advocated as offering a cheaper, faster and more accessi-
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ble form of justice for ordinary citizens, particularly the rural and ur-
ban poor, who do not have access to state justice either because of lack
of resources, social exclusion or lack of physical access (distance).
The essence of the modern ADR concept, as developed by its Eu-
ropean and North American advocates, is the idea that a better form of
justice can be obtained by focussing on mediation or the search for an
agreed settlement, rather than on binding adjudication by an external
(usually state) authority. Both state and non-state institutions or media-
tors can offer ADR; what makes it different from the practice in formal
courts is the procedure, which is ‘de-legalised’, relying on an informal
search for an agreed and just solution, as opposed to deciding who has
won or lost. This emphasis on ‘better’ and ‘non-compulsory’ justice dis-
tinguishes the recent ADR movement from the already well-established
contractual forms of commercial ADR, which rely on binding arbitra-
tion and may exclude the right to go to court (Ryan 2000).
In European and North American states, the ADR concept is based
on three main assumptions:
L Disputes are about individual rights and agreement between the
individual parties, which is appropriate in urban societies where
one cannot assume a ‘community public’ with an interest in so-
cial harmony or groups which will somehow police the settle-
ment between the parties.
L ADR will be monitored so as to ensure fair procedure, and
should not lead to denial of the right to trial under the law (Ryan
2000:1869).
L ADR is based on finding a neutral mediator who will help the
parties to bargain freely to reach an agreed settlement without
pressure or intimidation – an assumption which has provoked
much criticism from those who argue that ADR enthusiasts too
often ignore differences in status and power between the parties
(Nader 2001).
The idea that ADR could be a powerful reform tool in developing coun-
tries may well have emerged from the ideals of some of the original
campaigners for ADR, who were predominantly anti-state and pro-
community empowerment. They sought justification in the popular,
community-based or rural traditions of their own societies; but they
also drew inspiration from what they saw as the virtues of traditional
approaches to dispute settlement in African and some Asian societies.
These were praised for emphasising consensus and socially-sanctioned
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compromise; hence ADR became linked with a rhetoric of ‘harmony
law’ (Brown and Marriott 1999; Nader 2001; Silbey and Sarat 1989).
This strong ‘communitarian’ strand in the ADR concept underpins a
strong tendency in many of the justice sector reform programmes
adopted by donors to equate ADR with customary forms of justice or
chiefs’ courts, an equation which has become widely adopted by Afri-
can advocates of ADR themselves. An ideal of African village justice –
the ‘meeting under the tree’ in which a dispute is resolved through a
search for community consensus – is often cited as a basic inspiration
for ADR in Africa. But this idealised picture may conceal a real misun-
derstanding of the nature of community and traditional dispute settle-
ment procedures in African societies (Grande 1999). The analysis of
the Ghana cases which follows will illustrate some of the real differ-
ences which exist between the practice of customary DSIs in particular,
and the principles of ADR.
Policy responses to the land conflict issues in Ghana
In Ghana, as elsewhere in Africa, policy responses to the issue of how
to deal with the increasingly serious levels of conflict over land and the
associated rise in both individual and communal land disputes have
been driven by two main assumptions:
L It is assumed that the ambiguity, uncertainty and flexibility of
customary land tenure cannot deal with conflicts caused by land
shortage and urban development, and must therefore be made
more certain through various modernising measures such as
mapping and documentation of titles. Even with the current
‘adaptation paradigm’, which aims to recognise and formalise
customary tenures, the basic assumption remains that greater
certainty through mapping and documentation of titles will help
to reduce conflict and therefore the numbers of cases coming be-
fore the courts or other DSIs (Atwood 1990; Bruce et al. 1994;
Platteau 1996).
L The inability of state courts to deal with an ever increasing flood
of land cases is seen as a capacity problem which can be dealt
with by diverting them to a range of alternatives to the state judi-
cial system, such as customary and informal local institutions,
and ADR. The situation in Ghana is undoubtedly serious; it has
been estimated that land cases accounted for around 42 per cent
of all pending High Court cases in 2002 (Kotey 2004) and in
the Kumasi High Court, for instance, the rate at which new land
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cases were being filed during the period 1997-2002 was on aver-
age four times the number being settled, so that the settlement
rate fell from 1.5 per cent per annum to 0.6 per cent per annum
(Crook et al. 2007). In Accra, the settlement rate fell from 4.2
per cent to 2.6 per cent between 1998 and 2001 (Wood 2002).
The Ghana Land Administration Project (LAP) incorporates both
of these assumptions in its main components, which are
strongly supported by various bi-lateral donors and the World
Bank. Institutional reforms such as the restructuring of the state
land sector agencies (LSAs), decentralisation of land manage-
ment, and documentation to Customary Land Secretariats (CLSs)
under the aegis of customary authorities all address the need for
more effective and certain dispute resolution as an accompani-
ment to the development of greater certainty of title. The LAP
therefore suggests a two-pronged approach: the creation of spe-
cial Land Courts (Divisions of the High Court) in regional capi-
tals, to try to deal with backlogs in the state system; and the de-
velopment of ADR. But what type of ADR mechanisms these
should be and where they should be located is the subject of
some variation in the different official and donor memoranda.
There are three different kinds of proposal on the table:
L It is proposed that ADR be set up as an integral element of the
new CLSs, in order to resolve disputes over land allocation and
recording of land rights at the local level. Thus the chiefs and
their customary tribunals will be recognised as a form of ADR.
L There are plans to introduce an ADR bill in Parliament which
will empower the courts, the judicial service and the legal profes-
sion to use (perhaps impose?) court-supported ADR.
L Other proposals focus on the role of the elected local authorities
and NGOs: for instance, the LAP Appraisal Document of April
2003 envisages that Local Advisory Committees of ‘community
elders’ be organised by the elected District Assemblies to resolve
cases where the parties have not been able to reach agreement in
any of the chiefs’ tribunals (a form of proto–District Lands Tribu-
nal). And some District Assemblies have supported local ‘dispute
settlement’ NGOs organised by respected community leaders, of-
ten with the help of retired members of the legal profession.
These various proposals for the introduction of ADR reflect differing
and in some respects contradictory understandings of what ADR me-
chanisms are, and how they are supposed to operate. There is (perhaps
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deliberate) confusion over whether ADR mechanisms are ‘non-state’ al-
ternatives or whether they can and should be state-supported. But the
differing institutional locations proposed also reflect different political
interests within the current regime, and ‘bureaucratic politics’ among
rival agencies: the chiefs, various ministries, the LSAs, and the Judicial
Service.
The policy for reviving customary justice under the banner of ADR
is, however, of particular interest to the chiefs. Since the NPP govern-
ment came to power, the leading chiefs in the country, mainly from
the Eastern and Ashanti Regions, have pursued an open political cam-
paign to reverse as many as possible of the legislative measures
brought in by the Nkrumah (CPP) government and successive govern-
ments since 1952, measures which not only took away the chiefs’ offi-
cial judicial and administrative functions but also gave most of their
powers to collect revenue from stool land, and to manage the develop-
ment of land, to the LSAs.2 Chiefs welcome the titling programme in-
sofar as it may lead to the registering of their stool land allodial titles
as the first stage of the process (see World Bank 2003a).3 The chiefs
quite naturally see policies for recognising and strengthening custom-
ary land law and management as an opportunity also to revive their
customary judicial powers, formerly exercised in the Native Courts.
They therefore claim that their customary tribunals are an authentic
form of ‘ADR’, which should rightly be located in the proposed CLSs,
not within the ‘modern’ elected local government or judicial service in-
stitutions.
Customary and local forms of DSI: The institutional and historical
context
Essential in any discussion of customary and local forms of land dis-
pute resolution in Ghana is recognising their wide variety, in terms of
scale or level of operation, degree of formality, and the kinds of codes
or legal norms utilised. At the most intimate and informal level, many
disputes are settled by family heads and elders, or by mutually re-
spected persons such as an elder, an educated community leader, tradi-
tional priest, or modern church leader. Family heads are most likely to
use ‘traditional’ norms of obligation and conventions when it comes to
the issues surrounding the use and inheritance of land. Also at the
very local level, village chiefs are resorted to as repositories of custom-
ary knowledge and norms. At the community level, leaders of modern
political institutions such as Unit Committee chairpersons or District
Assembly members are used, as well as associational leaders (ethnic,
neighbourhood, even NGOs); they will tend to use commonsense
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norms of fairness and search for mediation and consensual agreement.
A clear distinction must be made between these forms of dispute set-
tlement and the more formal customary hearings offered by higher
ranking chiefs within the traditional hierarchy – divisional and sub-
chiefs of the established Traditional Councils, who may be located in
particular towns, and paramount chiefs who are heads of the Tradi-
tional Councils.4 In these hearings, chiefs apply customary law and
procedure as they understand it.
The difference between the dispute resolution offered by village
chiefs and that offered in the customary hearings or ‘courts’ of the
superior chiefs is highly significant and reflects not just the traditional
political hierarchies of Ghana’s pre-colonial states, but also the legacy
of colonial rule and its impact on the political and economic roles of
the chiefs. The superior chiefs in Ghana continue to wield a political
authority which until recently was a formal part of the governmental
system of Native Authorities (NAs) and Native Courts (NCs) created by
the British. The NA gave an institutional, legal and economic basis to
the chieftaincy which both consolidated the political identities of the
pre-colonial entities upon which they were (more or less) based and
produced a powerful ‘neo-traditional’ elite of wealthy and western-
educated chiefs who were a major bulwark of colonial society. The
power of these rulers was recognised formally in the colonial system
through the role given to the territorial councils of the ruling chiefs
(the Joint Provincial Council of the Colony, the Asanteman Council
and the Northern Territories Council). Recognition of the concept of
‘allodial ownership’ of stool lands by the chiefs also underpinned the
power of the chiefs to manage and allocate land, a power which be-
came highly significant economically as the growth of the cocoa indus-
try in Southern Ghana and urbanisation throughout the colonial period
led to the wholesale commercialisation of land values. The contempo-
rary role of the chiefs in the control and management of land and their
ability to profit from its market value are a direct legacy of the law and
institutions developed during the colonial period; this legacy is particu-
larly strong in the Akan areas, where political jurisdiction has long
been conflated with allodial land ownership or ‘trusteeship’ and man-
agement rights.5
The most powerful chiefs today are the heirs of the largest NA chiefs
and include the rulers of large traditional states such as the Asante
Confederacy or Akyem Abuakwa who are ‘modern monarchs’ of politi-
cal entities with populations in their millions. The current Asantehene,
the Okyenhene, or the Ya Na of Dagbon are figures of national political
importance who, whatever the formal rule which prohibits chiefs from
participating in ‘party politics’, have in fact played key roles in Ghana’s
political history since independence.
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The customary courts which the superior chiefs continue to run are
the direct descendants of the Native Courts, in which customary land
law was formalised and developed over a period of 60-70 years. The
current campaign to give the superior chiefs more formal powers to ad-
judicate land disputes is, in effect, little more than an attempt to revive
the old Native Courts. The Native Authorities in colonial times were
empowered to administer their own customary law through Native Tri-
bunals, renamed Native Courts in the 1935 Ashanti Native Courts Ordi-
nance and the 1944 Colony Native Courts Ordinance. The Native
Courts, as the lowest level of first instance courts, not only had the
power to administer the customary law of family, inheritance, land and
religious customs; they also had jurisdiction over minor criminal cases,
local bye-laws and various offences against colonial regulations (mar-
kets, licenses, health and sanitary rules etc.). The grade ‘A’ and ‘B’
courts set up by the 1935 and 1944 Ordinances had unlimited jurisdic-
tion in land cases – in Ashanti, the Asantehene’s court was the only
grade ‘A’ court, in recognition of the Asantehene’s jurisdiction over the
whole of the recently restored Asante Confederacy. The judges of cus-
tomary law in the Native Courts were the chiefs and elders who formed
their benches. Until the 1944 reforms in the Colony, the benches were
formed as of right by the chiefs and their hereditary office holders and
elders, with the paramount chief as president; there was therefore no
distinction between political or executive office and judicial functions.
Lawyers were not allowed to plead in the Native Courts, although their
influence was undoubtedly felt in the litigations which engulfed many
of the large chieftaincies during the 1920s and ’30s.
Even more importantly, the Native Courts were regarded by the Brit-
ish as part of the hierarchy of state courts; customary laws could be
pleaded and ‘judicially recognised’ in the state courts, both on appeal
and at first instance. Over time it was established that a customary rule
would be accepted as a legal rule if it could be shown that it had been
applied by a Native Court; the resulting decision then became part of
the common law under the normal rules of stare decisis (Allott 1994;
Woodman 1996:45). Thus ‘customary law’ developed during the colo-
nial period as a body of written, court-developed law, or what Wood-
man calls ‘lawyers’ customary law’.
In spite of their crucial role in the development of customary land
law and the colonial judicial system, the Native Courts did not have a
good reputation during the colonial period. Criticisms of corruption,
oppressive procedures and lack of accountability for funds came not
just from administrators and lawyers but also from litigants and in-
creasingly from local ‘youth associations’ and emergent nationalist
movements led by new generations of educated Ghanaians. The fact
that members of the panels derived personal income from sharing out
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fees and fines was one of the most obvious areas of abuse which en-
couraged the proliferation of tribunals and excessively large benches.
They also ‘fomented’ litigation, even as ‘informal’ costs to litigants spir-
alled. The Blackall Committee of Enquiry in 1943 described their pro-
cedures as ‘amounting to a denial of justice’ and noted that expendi-
ture by litigants in the Gold Coast was ‘without parallel in native Afri-
ca’ (Hailey 1951). Although the reforms of 1944 regularised payments
and appointments to panels, the move to ‘democratise’ colonial rule in
the late 1940s/early ’50s signalled the end of the indirect rule institu-
tions of which the NCs were so much a part (Crook 1986). In 1951 the
Korsah Committee recommended their abolition and replacement by
Local Courts under the control of the Chief Justice, with appointed lay
and stipendiary magistrates. But it took another seven years for them
to finally disappear, with the passing of the Local Courts Act in 1958.
During those seven years, which coincided with the transfer of power
to Nkrumah‘s CPP government, their reputation was further under-
mined through the systematic replacement of traditional panel mem-
bers by ‘politically reliable’ government appointees whose behaviour
was no better (Rathbone 2000; cf. Gocking 1993).
The legacy of the Native Courts is therefore an ambiguous one, inso-
far as the justice offered by the superior ranking chiefs is concerned.
Their development up to 1958 undoubtedly produced an uneasy synth-
esis of traditional procedures and concepts with those imported from
British law and justice. Scholars disagree on the outcomes; Woodman
argues that living custom or social practice inevitably diverges from for-
malised (written) ‘lawyer’s customary law’, to the extent that real con-
tradictions can emerge on what the ‘authentic’ rules are (Woodman
1988, 1996; cf. Ubink 2002-2004). Insofar as the chiefs and elders are
both the custodians of customary law and holders of political and eco-
nomic power over land, customary rules are bound to be reinterpreted
by each generation in the light of their own interests and changing
socio-economic circumstances. Customary courts in the past provided
an institutional setting within which social and economic conflicts
could be played out. But the decoupling of the chiefs’ tribunals from
the formal legal system over the past 48 years or more has probably
contributed to an increasing divergence between the chiefs’ vision of
customary law and that of the common law courts.6 Woodman also
points out that the customary forms of justice clung to quite different
processes of reasoning and offered different remedies; one obvious ex-
ample is the key role which discourses or political ideologies of genea-
logical legitimacy and histories of settlement still play in customary dis-
pute hearings (Berry 1997, 2001; Crook 1973). Although these argu-
ments are still brought before the state courts, the way in which the
court comes to a decision will probably be different, not least because
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of the basic common law practice of discussing a case in terms of the
ratio decidendi of the relevant precedents.7
Gocking on the other hand, argues that the Native Courts incorpo-
rated a large number of British legal practices which were absorbed in
such a way that they soon came to be viewed as authentically tradi-
tional – for instance the alternate cross examination of witnesses, de-
fendants’ statements, the taking of surety from litigants, and of course,
the writing down of proceedings and decisions. Much of this happened
under pressure from administrative officers and then, perhaps more
importantly, from the influence of the post-1927 formally trained Na-
tive Court Registrars or court clerks, who became pivotal figures dis-
pensing advice to the chiefs and even influencing case outcomes. Cus-
tomary law was therefore subtly mediated and modified over a long
period of time through its interface with British common law, and this
legacy has been thoroughly incorporated into what are thought of as
‘traditional’ procedures (Gocking 1993).
Arguments about the ‘authenticity’ of the Native Courts and their
successors, the superior chiefs’ customary or traditional tribunals are
probably fruitless in that they can never now be resolved. What is clear
is that they cannot be described as informal, surrounded as they are by
the trappings of traditional office, ancient rituals of spiritual signifi-
cance, and the legacy of their recent colonial past. Nor can they be seen
as mediations in which the parties have equal bargaining power and
the judges are neutral ‘arbitrators’ with no coercive or other social
power. On the contrary, the chiefs still wield significant political and
economic power, particularly with respect to land, which is highly
likely to lay them open to accusations of having an interest in the cases
they may be hearing.
The courts of the biggest chiefs are very formal and ‘theatrical’ af-
fairs where the large number of ‘judges’ or those attending can pro-
duce an intimidating effect. Appearing before an important Ashanti
chief and his councillors (e.g. a divisional chief, or an omanhene) is, for
village people, to appear before officials who must be shown the full re-
spect due to persons of high status and power. Although the public can
observe, their opinion is not sought, and deliberation is the prerogative
of the chief and his council. Order is strictly maintained by the Lin-
guists. The Asantehene’s full court, which is both a court of first in-
stance for large cases and an appeal court for the whole of the Asante
kingdom, is highly formal and traditionally accessed through the sol-
emn swearing of the ‘Great Oath of Asante’ followed by payment of
fees and sureties by the parties.8 In colonial times, the Asantehene’s
Court A included the Asantehene himself as president, his twenty divi-
sional or head chiefs, the Kumasi clan chiefs and Linguists through
whom all discourse was passed. The setup today is little different; the
140 RICHARD C. CROOK
full court may number two hundred chiefs and take all day to assem-
ble. The procedure is extremely lengthy as all counsellors can cross ex-
amine parties and witnesses. The traditional procedure aims at per-
suading the winning party to publicly accept an apology and reconcilia-
tion or ‘pacification’ from the other party, and Yeboah argues that it is
basically non-adversarial and conciliatory in character (Yeboah 2005).
Nevertheless, the format, especially in Ashanti, gives a very strong
sense of ‘winner and loser’, as embodied in the traditional concepts
and language used. A loser is deemed to have ‘wasted the time’ of the
chiefs and has to ‘purchase his head’ by paying a fine (the equivalent
of slaughtering sheep) and pay a ‘thank you’, in addition to any fines
or compensations to the winner. Overall, it can be argued that the high
status and wealth of the royal judges, and the fact that it is an enforced
procedure not a voluntary mediation, indeed make the experience
somewhat intimidating.
With respect to land cases, the Asantehene has recently introduced
various innovations, following on his edict in 2000 that all disputes
should be withdrawn from court and from the Regional House of
Chiefs and sent to him for settlement. It is clear from the research
done at the Kumasi High Court that not all land cases have in fact
been withdrawn and remitted to the Asantehene. This is because the
likelihood of them being heard more quickly at the Asantehene’s palace
is in current circumstances even less than in the state court system. In
November 2004 the Asantehene set up four new courts (labelled A - D)
to deal with the hundreds of outstanding land cases; for each court,
there are Lands Sub-Committees of five sub-chiefs and officials ap-
pointed to carry out all the preliminary investigation work and report
to the court. It is envisaged that the proceedings in the courts (which
have only deliberative functions) will be videotaped and then the notes
of the decision and the tape sent to the Asantehene and his eleven
Councillors for review and final decision. A decision is pronounced
with the parties present at a full Asantehene’s traditional court with all
his Councillors and sub-chiefs present. So far, however, few cases have
been actually tried through this new procedure which has been in ges-
tation since 2004, and little evidence could be obtained on how many
cases had been heard. The Asantehene’s Lands Secretariat, located in
the palace (Manyhia) is still a small and very traditional office with few
professional staff and no modern recording systems (Crook et al.
2007).
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The legitimacy and accessibility of customary and local forms of
justice
Arguments about the legitimacy and accessibility of customary justice
can only really be resolved, however, by looking at empirical evidence
of the ways in which it is viewed and used by ordinary people or liti-
gants. Research conducted between 2001 and 2005 in Ghana and Coˆte
d’Ivoire looked at customary and local forms of justice within the fra-
mework of a wider study of the whole range of dispute settlement insti-
tutions (DSIs), ranging from informal types of arbitration at family
and local levels to administrative actions and formal state courts. The
key question addressed was whether, in situations of legal pluralism,
the land rights of the poor and vulnerable are best protected through
sustaining the mix of legal codes and procedures characteristic of legal
pluralism, or whether an integrated system of state justice affords bet-
ter protection. The different DSIs were analysed and compared with re-
ference to their effectiveness, legitimacy and inclusiveness (see Crook
et al. 2007 for a full account of the research results). The evidence pre-
sented below is drawn from studies of land disputes and DSIs in three
areas of Ghana: Asunafo District (Brong-Ahafo Region), Nadowli South
District (Upper West Region) and peri-urban Kumasi (Ashanti Region).
A village-level survey of 676 respondents was carried out in selected
villages, in order to find out what kinds of disputes were most com-
mon, how people resolved them and what they felt about the different
kinds of dispute settlement which they had experienced.
Causes of land disputes at the local level
In the three case-study areas, 22.6 per cent of respondents in the vil-
lage-level surveys said that they had personally experienced a land dis-
pute.9 (This group of 153 respondents will hereafter be referred to as
the ‘popular survey sub-set’). The largest group of disputes concerned
trespass (encroachment on or misuse of the owner’s land), or some
kind of difference with a neighbouring farmer (Table 6.1). The experi-
ence of disputes came disproportionately from villages in the Asunafo
area, which accounted for 63 per cent of the sub-set. To some extent
this can be attributed to the fact that this is a cocoa growing agricultur-
al area with a large population of migrants, although the Kumasi peri-
urban areas might have been expected to have been even more conflic-
tual. But Asunafo is also an area where migrants have been established
for a long time, and the survey tends to show that relations with the
host communities are, at the present time at least, relatively peaceful.
Thus there were surprisingly few cases of disputes with a ‘landlord’.
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The choice of local dispute settlement institutions (DSIs)
When the sub-set of respondents (those who had experienced a dis-
pute) were asked where they had first gone to resolve their dispute, a
surprisingly wide range of DSIs was revealed (Table 6.2). The contrast
between these village level disputants and those who had become liti-
gants in the state courts was striking; of the latter, 46 per cent overall
(and over 50 per cent in Kumasi) had gone straight to court without
using any other procedure, compared with the village disputants, of
whom only 10.5 per cent had gone to court (Crook et al. 2007:46). But
particularly noteworthy is that only a minority of the village respon-
dents – just over a quarter overall (26 per cent) – had used a ‘tradi-
tional’ court (superior or village chief, chief and elders, or land priest
[tendana]). And there were significant differences between the Kumasi
Table 6.1 Popular survey sub-set: cause of dispute
Cause of dispute Valid percent
Trespass 34.6
Unlawful sale 3.9
Inheritance 2.6
Disposition of rights 11.1
Family dispute 23.5
Dispute with another
farmer
13.1
None specified 9.2
Dispute with landlord 1.3
Other 0.7
Total 100.0 (n= 153)
Table 6.2 Popular survey sub-set: dispute settlement institution by location
Location Totals
%
Dispute settlement institution Kumasi % Asunafo % Nadowli %
Not specified 3.3 14.4 19.2 13.1
Court 13.3 11.3 3.8 10.5
Traditional court 40.0 22.7 23.1 26.1
Family gathering 20.0 22.7 15.4 20.9
Police 3.3 0.0 0.0 0.7
Not resolved 6.7 1.0 0.0 2.0
Between concerned parties 3.3 10.3 15.4 9.8
Arbitration 10.0 16.5 23.1 16.3
CHRAJ10 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.7
Total 100 100 100 100
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peri-urban villages and the other locations: in Kumasi, chiefs’ courts
were much more popular (40 per cent) as opposed to Asunafo and Na-
dowli (23 per cent). In spite of the generally good relations between
host and migrant communities, strangers or non-locals were also much
less likely to use a chief’s court – 16 per cent of non-locals had used a
chief’s court as opposed to 31 per cent of the locals. This can be inter-
preted as a preference for using their own community leaders or for re-
solving matters between themselves, as well as a lack of trust, to a de-
gree, in the local chiefs.
The next most-used types of DSI were in fact a family gathering (21
per cent) and an informal arbitration (16.3 per cent) – that is, the par-
ties sought the help of ‘informed’ or respected persons which could for
instance be an elder, their landlord, or the local elected Unit Commit-
tee Chair or a respected District Assembly member.11 An unusual case
was the predominantly migrant village of Ahenkro in Asunafo, where
the Unit Committee Chair was also the head of the Pentecostal Church
which incorporated the main elected leaders of the community (Kro-
bos, Ewes, and Kwahus from the Eastern Region) and effectively com-
bined religious and secular leadership. The socially-embedded author-
ity of the Chairman was consequently both legitimate and strong, and
the community was peaceful and well run.
As to why they chose the DSI they had used, the most frequently ci-
ted reason amongst villagers was to ‘maintain peace and harmony with
neighbours’; but a close second was the need for a ‘final’ settlement
(most of those who had gone to court), followed by the need to ‘respect’
the elders and respect local norms of behaviour.
The legitimacy of the different forms of DSI
All respondents (not just those who had had a dispute) were asked
who they would most trust to settle any problem they might have con-
cerning their land. The people named most frequently as ‘trusted a lot’
(an unambiguously positive choice) were: first, village chiefs; second,
family heads; and third, court judges, with Unit Committee Chairmen
coming a close fourth (Table 6.3). Even more surprisingly, lawyers fig-
ured on the list at a respectable number 8! If we add in the ‘to some
extent’ responses, to get an aggregated positive scoring, we find village
chiefs and family heads in first and second places with virtually equal
scores, named by 80.6 and 80.5 per cent of respondents; Unit Com-
mittee Chairmen third with 65.6 per cent; and court judges fourth
with 58.5 per cent. On the other hand, the people they were most unli-
kely to trust were village school headteachers and the police (except in
the Upper West Region) (Table 6.4).
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The legitimacy of chiefs’ courts
Although it is clear that chiefs remain an important source of dispute
settlement at the local level and enjoy high levels of respect and trust,
there are important ambiguities and difficulties surrounding their role,
as well as differences amongst the three areas of study (Table 6.5).
Respondents in all areas made a clear distinction between the village
chief and paramount and other important chiefs. Everywhere the vil-
Table 6.3 Whom would you most trust to settle any land dispute? ‘Trust a lot’
Trust in % choices Ranking
Village chief 62.1 1
Head of family 61.4 2
Court judge 35.4 3
Unit Committee Chairman 34.2 4
Paramount chief 32.1 5
Divisional chief 28.8 6
Tendana 26.2 7
Lawyer 19.8 8
Police 14.2 9
Agriculture Department officer 13.8 10
District Commissioner 13.2 11
School headmaster 11.4 12
Lands Commission officer 11.1 13
Town and Country Planning Officer 10.4 14
CHRAJ 8.6 15
Church leader 3.4 16
Elder 1.6 17
Table 6.4 Whom would you most trust to settle any land dispute? ‘Not at all’
Trust in: % choices Ranking
School headmaster 47.6 1
Police 38.2 2
Agriculture Department officer 28.0 3
District Commissioner 25.4 4
CHRAJ 22.0 5
Town and Country Planning Officer 19.2 6
Unit Committee Chairman 18.3 7
Lands Commission officer 17.2 8
Lawyer 16.9 9
Court Judge 15.1 10
Paramount chief 12.0 11
Divisional chief 8.1 12
Head of family 7.0 13
Village chief 6.5 14
Tendana 0.3 15
Church leader 0.3 15
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lage chief was highly trusted, although in Nadowli the family heads
and tendana were recognised as most appropriate for settling land is-
sues. In the Asunafo district, however, the big chiefs were ranked low-
est, and the popularity of the district judge was confirmed by a top
ranking, above even the village chief. As might be expected there was a
difference between expressions of trust in response to a general opin-
ion question, and what people actually did when they had a dispute –
62 per cent overall saying they trusted a village chief to settle disputes
compared to 26 per cent of the sub-set who had experienced a dispute
saying they had used a traditional court. Nevertheless, the lower gener-
al trust expressed in chiefs in Asunafo compared with Kumasi (see Ta-
ble 6.5) was in fact reflected in the sub-set figures – only 23 per cent in
Asunafo had used a traditional court, compared to 40 per cent in Ku-
masi. In peri-urban Kumasi, chiefs have a more powerful and promi-
nent role but even here the paramount and big chiefs were not so
trusted. One explanation for these figures could be the involvement of
chiefs in land management allocation, and the politics of chieftaincy in
the Brong-Ahafo Region.
In Asunafo, there have been and continue to be long standing dis-
putes between the major chiefs of the Ahafo Traditional Council and
the Asantehene’s Kumasi ‘caretaker chiefs’, and between big paramount-
cies such as Mim and Kukuom (see Dunn and Robertson 1973).
Although the lands have all been vested in the government, ordinary
citizens are fearful of coming up against or being involved in any kind
of a dispute that might engage these ‘major players’. As regards the po-
sition of the many migrants in the area, since the crisis over the Busia
Government’s Aliens Expulsion Order of 1971 relations between hosts
and migrants have settled down and are relatively peaceful. But it is
clear that trust in the chiefs depends on a ‘virtuous circle’; it is main-
tained so long as relations are good and there are no major problems;
migrants are happy to acknowledge the rights and status of the allodial
owners. The new government of the NPP is perceived to be, and is in
fact, a direct heir to the Busia government of 1969-1972, and some
Table 6.5 ‘Trust a lot’ rankings by location
Location
‘Trust a lot’ Kumasi % / rank Asunafo % / rank Nadowli % / rank
Village chief 61.2/ 1 55.6/ 2 71.3/ 3
Head of family 52.7/ 2 47.7/ 3 87.1/ 1
Court judge 20.9/ 5 57.1/ 1 21.5/ 6
Unit Committee Chairman 37.8/ 3 27.4/ 4 39.2/ 5
Paramount chief 28.4/ 4 15.8/ 5 56.5/4
Tendana n/a n/a 84.7/ 2
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fears were aroused in many southern ‘Akan’ areas about the future po-
sition of migrants. Some of the chiefs interviewed in Asunafo (and
chiefs at government seminars on land management – see GTZ 2002)
referred to the new Constitution of 1992 as giving them the right to
turn all tenancies granted to strangers and foreigners into ‘leases’ –
something which the Lands Commission has been doing, even though
it is legally suspect. But migrants in the village focus groups all re-
garded their customary tenancies as giving them the land in perpetuity
and heritable by their heirs. They do not see this as threatened at the
moment, but this could change depending on the progress of the legal
reforms associated with the LAP. Hence the greater reluctance of non-
locals in the Asunafo area to use a chief’s court to resolve an actual dis-
pute (see below, Table 6.8).
Although people in Kumasi (as elsewhere in Ashanti) look to the
Asantehene to resolve these issues, the new Asantehene’s attempt to deal
with the land dispute problem in the region by ordering that all dis-
putes should be withdrawn from the court and sent to him for settle-
ment, has not so far produced many results (see above). In the peri-ur-
ban areas of Kumasi, there is continuing conflict over the role which
the chiefs play in the appropriation of village lands for sale as urban
plots. Where a Land or Plot Allocation Committee (as recommended
by the Asantehene) has been set up and works effectively, the commu-
nity (the customary landholders) can ensure that some of the capital
raised (and the plots) are retained for the benefit of the citizens them-
selves. But in many places this does not work – for instance, in one of
the case study villages in Kumasi, Esereso, the Land Allocation Com-
mittee collapsed after a dispute over the succession to the queenmother
post, and the queenmother herself was selling plots illicitly in the teeth
of resistance and opposition from other factions in the village.12 In
some villages (e.g. Appiadu) the chief is trusted; but the system is fra-
gile and accountability structures are generally not robust enough to
avert the constant danger of abuse, or rumours and suspicions of
abuse. This is strongly supported by comparative evidence from
Ubink’s linked studies of peri-urban villages in the Ejisu paramountcy
south of Kumasi (Ubink 2008, in press). She shows that in such situa-
tions, the chief is often regarded as having too much personal interest
to be trusted as an impartial judge of a local land case.
Even in Nadowli, where the respect for traditional institutions is still
apparently very high, the legitimacy of a chief’s court is not always suf-
ficient to ensure acceptance or enforcement of a decision. In one of the
case-study villages, Loho (on the northern border of Wa) a serious land
dispute with a neighbouring village, Charia, has been through various
stages of arbitration, beginning with elders and land chiefs, a Commit-
tee of Enquiry chaired by a chief of the Regional House of Chiefs (the
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Lambussie Kuoro) and finally the High Court, all of which found in fa-
vour of the Loho claim.13 Yet the Charia people continue to contest the
results, including the ‘wrath of the gods’ which was called down upon
them when they flouted the traditional ruling. The Loho people, how-
ever, claim the moral high ground in that they have refused to retaliate,
either with direct action or a new court case (Hammond 2003).
Another case involving urban land in Wa has been even more resis-
tant to resolution. Here, some land was acquired by the Ghana SSNIT
(the government Social Security and National Insurance Trust) for an
office building, generating significant financial returns for whoever
could establish their claim to be the ‘customary owners’. Again, the dis-
pute between rival traditional claimants (descendants of rival ‘settler’
lineages) has gone through every form of dispute resolution ending in
the Supreme Court. The faction which lost in the arbitration offered by
the Waala Traditional Council (the Kabanye) refused to accept the
chiefs’ verdict, went to court and won all appeals up to the Supreme
Court. The losing faction (the Danaayiri), feeling they had traditional
right on their side, broadcast on local radio after the Supreme Court’s
decision to announce that they had won, and were the true owners of
the land. There are political overtones to the case, in that the faction
which won in court (Kabanye) has long been associated with the for-
mer ruling party, Rawlings’ NDC, which is now in opposition. The los-
ing faction, although associated with a minor opposition party, the
PNC, engaged an NPP lawyer to fight their case, a man who subse-
quently became a Deputy Minister of Lands in the NPP government. It
is likely that they imagine that a connection with the governing party
may help to overturn all previous verdicts and they have submitted a
petition to Parliament.
Overall, in this area a professed respect for traditional norms is not
carried out in practice, primarily because of the chaotic legacy of the
de-vesting of northern lands in 1979.14 There is little or no agreement
on who owns particular parcels of land and an almost total absence of
historical records. Traditional norms quickly crumble in the face of the
growing marketisation of land, and factions defy all authority, whether
traditional or state, where there is the prospect of making some money
from a claimed right of land ownership.
The inclusiveness of different DSIs
Although traditional institutions such as chiefs’ courts are frequently
criticised for being gender biased (against women), the general trust
rankings showed very little difference in levels of trust between men
and women (Table 6.6). And not many significant differences emerged
by age or education, except that of the very small number of post-sec-
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ondary educated respondents (eight out of 676), only two (25 per cent)
said they trusted the village chief a lot. Only the origin of respondents
produced interesting differences in the extent to which they trusted
paramount chiefs and judges; migrants from a different district or re-
gion showed much less propensity to trust a paramount chief and were
more likely to trust a judge (Table 6.7). (The figures for foreigners refer
to only seven respondents, so they cannot be relied upon too heavily).
These small differences in attitudes to the traditional authorities
were once again confirmed more conclusively through analysis of the
sub-set of those who had experienced an actual dispute. Here, origin
was the most significant predictor of the choice of a dispute settlement
institution, rather than sex or education. Non-locals were only half as
likely to have used a traditional or chief’s court, and were much more
likely to have used arbitration by respected persons or to have sorted
out the issue through negotiation with the other party (Table 6.8).
Conclusion
How inclusive and legitimate are customary and informal local DSIs in
Ghana? The village level research shows that a lot of potential conflict,
particularly over boundaries and land use, is typically solved by very lo-
Table 6.6 ‘Trust a lot’ rankings by sex
Sex
‘Trust a lot’ Male % / rank Female % / rank
Village chief 60.7/ 2 63.9/ 1
Head of family 62.8/ 1 59.4/ 2
Court judge 39.0/ 3 30.6/ 4
Unit Committee Chairman 33.6/ 5 35.1/ 3
Paramount chief 34.1/ 4 29.5/ 5
Table 6.7 ‘Trust a lot’ selected rankings by origin
Origin
‘Trust a lot’ Locality % District % Region % Other Region % Foreign %
Court judge 31.2 29.3 27.5 57.4 100.0
Unit Committee Chairman 35.6 36 25.5 30.6 57.1
Paramount chief 34.7 41.3 21.6 22.2 0.0
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cal forms of conflict resolution involving family heads and village
chiefs or elders and other respected persons including elected opinion
leaders. These are trusted because they are not co-opted by, or asso-
ciated with, unpredictable external forces. Nevertheless, even these
community-based DSIs can suffer from many well-acknowledged pro-
blems, such as perfunctory or summary procedure, unequal power re-
lations, or ‘crony justice’ dominated by local power holders.
The research evidence also shows that if a case cannot be solved
peaceably at the local level there is certainly a thirst for a legitimate
authority (a trusted external arbiter) and some certainty – a need which
is often fulfilled by going to the state courts or institutions such as the
CHRAJ. But beyond the village level, the customary courts of the
superior chiefs are not necessarily more trusted or user friendly than
the state courts. Many, especially in the Asunafo District, clearly trusted
the court judges, particularly the District Magistrate, more than they
trusted the chiefs. This is partly because historically the chiefs have an
association with the colonial state, and are still regarded as part of the
political power hierarchy. Another reason, however, lies in the power
which chiefs have in local land allocation and management, and the
development of customary law in response to marketisation and urba-
nisation. Chiefs have been using their allodial claims to attempt to gain
control over the value of urban development land (and thus challeng-
ing the security of the ‘customary freeholds’ held by citizens of the poli-
tical community). In the cocoa areas, there is a growing fear that appar-
ently secure landholdings of migrant farmers could be converted to
‘leaseholds’ by chiefs citing the new laws. Yet the accountability mech-
anisms linking chiefs to their communities are fragile and frequently
ineffective. Thus chiefs can be accused of defining the rules for their
Table 6.8 Popular survey sub-set: choice of DSI by origin
Origin
Dispute Settlement Institution Local % Non-local % Total %
Not specified 11.7 16.3 13.1
Court 11.7 8.2 10.5
Traditional court 31.1 16.3 26.1
Family gathering 20.4 20.4 20.9
Police 0.0 2.0 0.7
Not resolved 1.9 2.0 2.0
Between concerned parties 7.8 14.3 9.8
Arbitration 14.6 20.4 16.3
CHRAJ 1.0 0.0 0.7
Total 100 100 100
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own benefit and of being ‘interested parties’ who cannot necessarily be
trusted to offer impartial justice in local land disputes.
Whether local and customary DSIs can be promoted as an ADR-type
solution to the crisis of land cases in Ghana depends very much on the
kind of power held by the chosen arbitrators, their role in the commu-
nity, and the kinds of procedures adopted. As noted above, ADR as de-
veloped in Europe or North America assumes that disputes are be-
tween individual parties and need the services of a ‘neutral mediator’.
But in Ghana, as in many other parts of West Africa, customary dis-
pute settlement ideally involves building the consensus of the whole re-
levant community, and the individuals in dispute are not seen as ab-
stract individuals but as members of groups – families, clans, age sets,
ethnicities – with a particular status and known position within the
community (both gender and age as well as wealth and office may be
relevant). Even if mediators are not chiefs or elders, they are not ex-
pected to be strangers or unknown to the parties, and therefore ‘impar-
tiality’ may be less valued than intimate knowledge of the circum-
stances of the case (cf. Grande 1999; Van Donge 1999). In the case of
a chief’s court, the chief’s decision should take account of the need to
reflect a broader agreement between the groups behind the disputing
parties, which will ensure social harmony and avoid feuding in the fu-
ture. In doing so he will be fully aware of the power, status, and social
position of those groups. This is because the effectiveness of the agree-
ment – its acceptance and enforcement – depends upon social sanc-
tions, such as shame, hostility, and social pressure on the parties. In-
deed, some scholars regard the ‘community harmony’ model itself as
idealised or even mythical, and suggest that community-based custom-
ary justice simply ‘reinforces local power relations’, including those re-
lated to gender (Khadiagala 2001).
Nor does the requirement for a balance of power and a non-coercive
mediator necessarily correspond to the reality of a community-based
customary adjudication, especially if the case is being heard by one of
the superior chiefs’ courts described above. These chiefs have high
authority and status, and the procedures are often very formal, even in-
timidating. As the history of the customary courts in Ghana indicates,
the idea that parties who come before a superior chief’s customary
court have equal bargaining power, or that the mediator or ‘judge’ is
somebody without coercive power over them, is not a necessary or rea-
listic element of the situation. And this is reflected quite strongly in
our survey-based evidence of popular perceptions of customary justice
institutions, which suggest that a state policy to bolster chiefs’ courts
as an ADR alternative to the state courts is fraught with many difficul-
ties and will not necessarily produce either a more popular or more
just form of land dispute settlement.
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Is there a more effective way in which the potential of local and cus-
tomary forms of land dispute resolution can be harnessed? The state
courts are clearly under enormous pressure, and even the state does
not possess the necessary legitimacy, as some of our cases from the
Upper West demonstrate. Perhaps one way to improve the form of jus-
tice offered, and to enhance the accountability of the chiefs, is to give
more formal recognition to the dispute resolution tribunals which
chiefs will be given with the new Customary Land Secretariats pro-
posed in the LAP. As customary law is already a fully recognised part
of the formal law of Ghana (as embodied in common law precedents)
then any DSIs empowered to administer it should be (as in colonial
times) part of the state court system and subjected to the normal rules
of public accountability. Otherwise the CLS tribunals will suffer from
the same problems as the existing chiefs’ customary courts, which can
apply whatever procedures and legal codes they choose without any re-
ference either to established norms of customary law or the require-
ments of ‘natural justice’ (let alone ADR principles). If a fuller training
in both customary law and in ADR procedures could be offered, it
might be possible to create a very local popular court system as has
been done in many other African countries. Any system which pur-
ports to offer ADR must somehow provide an informal but authorita-
tive and impartial dispute resolution system; the chiefs’ courts can only
provide that if they combine socially and culturally-rooted legitimacy
with more effective and respected procedures, while applying recog-
nised laws. It may be that the time has come to recognise that custom-
ary law has been formalised and can no longer be permitted to develop
spontaneously and randomly at local level, subject in practice to the
dictates of the most powerful interests in local society. According to the
Constitution, the National House of Chiefs has in any case been
charged with the duty to codify and ‘harmonize’ customary laws
throughout the nation. If undertaken seriously, such an enterprise
would at least have to confront the serious contradictions which have
emerged between ‘lawyer’s customary law’ and the reinterpretations
being created in chiefs’ tribunals and other DSIs, and deal with them
in a systematic and transparent manner.
Notes
1 Chiefs generally hold the ultimate or ‘allodial’ title to the land of the political commu-
nity over which they rule in their official capacity as occupants of the Stool (the
sacred symbol of their office, in the same way as the ‘Crown’ refers to the institution
of the British monarchy). The concept of ‘trustee’ (borrowed from English law) is
used to express the idea that the chief is a ‘fiduciary’ who has to manage the lands of
his state for the benefit of his political community and can only act with the consent
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of his councillors and his subjects (Constitution of Ghana, 1992, Articles 36(8) and
267(1); Woodman 1996:191, 200). Customary law is now recognised as an integral
part of the laws of Ghana in the 1992 Constitution, Article 11(2).
2 The most powerful chiefs from the Akan-speaking traditional states of Ghana are lo-
cated in the Eastern and Ashanti Regions. The ‘stool’ in Akan states is both a sacred
physical object representing the ancestors of a chief’s family, and a term used to refer
to the chief’s office (like ‘the Crown’ in the UK). The body of land law, which devel-
oped under British colonial rule, came to accept the principle that there is ‘no land
without an owner’ and therefore that all unused or ‘unallocated’ land in a particular
political community belonged ultimately to that community, and, insofar as it re-
mained within customary tenure, was managed by the chief – or stool – on their be-
half. This is the origin of the term ‘stool land’; the ambiguity of the concept remains
in the unspoken question: which community? The paramount chiefs eventually
claimed that title to all the lands of a state was vested in the paramount stool and
that all other customary rights were usufructory, but this is frequently contested by
subordinate chiefs, and chiefs generally have tried to blur the distinction between
stool lands meaning ‘all the unallocated lands of the community’, and lands belong-
ing to the stool family (see Crook 1986). Article 295 (1) of the 1992 Constitution de-
fines ‘stool lands’ as ‘any land or interest in or right over land controlled by a stool or
skin, the head of a particular community or the captain of a company for the benefit
of the subjects of the stool or the members of that community or company’.
3 This registration would greatly strengthen the claims of the chiefs as against those of
‘customary freeholders’ (indigenous community members who hold land through
their family membership and whose rights have not – so far – been reduced to the
leaseholds provided under Article 267(5) of the Constitution).
4 The Traditional Councils are based on the pre-colonial political entities which were
recognised and in many cases reorganised and even aggregated or ‘created’ by the
British during the colonial period.
5 See footnote 2.
6 One of the most significant examples is the contemporary claim by the chiefs that
the rights of customary freeholders are extinguished when land is needed for urban
development. As in colonial times, customary law as practised is a process of con-
stant negotiation and renegotiation amongst changing social interests; but the power
of the chiefs to define customary law lies not only in their de facto control over land
allocations, but also in the fact that the 1992 Constitution (Article 272) gives the Na-
tional and Regional Houses of Chiefs the power to interpret and codify customary
law.
7 The ratio decidendi is the rule of law emerging from the particular facts of a case and
the judgment given on them.
8 In pre-colonial times, use of the Oath could bring death to the one who used it
wrongly.
9 Defined as a non-trivial problem with the potential to become a ‘justiciable event’
(See Genn 1999).
10 Commission for Human Rights and Administrative Justice.
11 The Unit Committee is the lowest level of the District Assembly elected local govern-
ment system, created in 1989 as amended by the Local Government Act of 1993 and
Legislative Instrument (L.I.) 1589 of 1994. In theory based on population units of
around 500-1000 people instead of ‘villages’, they are partly nominated (one-third)
by the political boss of the District, the District Chief Executive, and partly elected.
They replaced the former Village Development Committees which formally incorpo-
rated both traditional authorities and local citizens. But they have never attracted
much electoral competition and in many areas exist on paper only – over 65 per cent
CUSTOMARY JUSTICE INSTITUTIONS AND LOCAL ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION 153
of the UCs were uncontested in the 1998 elections. But where they do function, they
tend to be composed of leading members of the community who are co-opted or self-
selected rather than elected and, depending on their political affiliation, may repre-
sent a counter-balancing force or even rival to the chief (see Crook 1999).
12 Queenmother is an official position in the Akan political hierarchy; she is head of
the royal matrilineage and one of the key ‘kingmakers’ in the selection of a chief.
13 The Lambussie Kuoro Committee of Enquiry into the Charia-Loho Dispute, Final Re-
port, 1 October 1995.
14 Under British rule, all land in the former Northern Territories was declared to be
‘public land’, vested in the Governor, who was empowered by the Northern Terri-
tories Land and Native Rights Ordinance 1927 to dispose of land ‘for the use and
common benefit of the African people’. Under the Ordinance, ‘existing titles’ had to
be proved to the Governor within three years. In practice, very little land was regis-
tered in this way and according to Lands Commission officials in Wa, no records
were kept of government land use and no attempt was ever made to map out land-
holdings. The low density of population and the lack of commercial exploitation of
land meant that land was simply not regarded as an issue, and traditional institutions
(unlike in southern Ghana) did not exercise strong control over land except infor-
mally at the local community level. A legacy of trouble was stored up, however,
through colonial indirect rule institutions which created chiefs who began to claim
Akan-like rights over land. The 1979 Constitution (Article 188) attempted to undo co-
lonial history by simply stating that all lands in the former Northern Territories
vested in the government were ‘de-vested’ and deemed to be returned to those who
had owned the land prior to the 1927 legislation. This provision was consolidated in
the 1992 Constitution, Article 257(3).
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7 Struggles for land in peri-urban Kumasi and
their effect on popular perceptions of chiefs and
chieftaincy
Janine Ubink
Introduction
In recent years land in peri-urban Ghana has become increasingly
commoditised as a result of the growing value of real estate and the ex-
pansion of urban residential areas. These new developments and the
changing values in land that they create result in attempts to redefine
land ownership and tenure and contestation of rights to land by citi-
zens, traditional authorities and the state. At the heart of these con-
testations lie the issues of control over land and the authority to con-
vert farmland to residential land and the entitlements to the proceeds
from this conversion. The rapid conversion of farmland to residential
land causes considerable unrest and distress in the peri-urban commu-
nities. Many families are losing their farmland and with that their jobs
and income base. Since chiefs play a central and often negative role in
the conversion of farmland, this could be expected to affect popular
perceptions of chiefs and their various functions, and as a consequence
have a bearing on the institution of chieftaincy. Especially, since claims
of an institution to define property are also claims to the institution’s
legitimacy itself (Lund 2002:14; Shipton 2002: xi).
This chapter examines the struggles and negotiations over land in
nine villages in peri-urban Kumasi1 and poses the question to what ex-
tent the commoditisation of land and the role of chiefs in this process
affects the way chiefs and chieftaincy are perceived by local citizens.
The first part focusses on how Ashanti chiefs try to legitimise their ac-
tions through appeal to customary law, and how community members
try to resist their chiefs’ actions and claims. It shows that the success
of local resistance against chiefs’ maladministration of land is often
very limited and that chiefs are making much personal profit from
communal land. Three factors explain this ‘local power balance’, which
lie respectively in the position of chiefs as guardians of stool land and
authorities in the field of customary law, the lack of traditional checks
and balances, and the government’s present ‘policy of non-interference’
with regard to chieftaincy matters. After a description of the local con-
testations of land rights, the second part of this chapter focusses on
the effects of current land management practices on popular percep-
tions of chiefs and chieftaincy. A number of fundamental questions
have been formulated to study this issue: How do people feel about the
chief’s role in land conversions? How does it influence their percep-
tions of other functions of the chief? What roles and tasks do they want
him to perform, and what are the limits to his powers? How do the ac-
tivities of chiefs relate to the tasks and functions of local government?
How do people assess chiefs’ performances? After studying these ques-
tions, this chapter concludes with some observations on the effects of
the performance of chiefs on the institution of chieftaincy. Data for this
research were gathered through participant observation, semi-struc-
tured interviews, and a survey, during a year of fieldwork in 2003-
2004.2
Struggles for land in peri-urban Kumasi, Ashanti
A royal attack on usufructuary rights?
In Ashanti, a large proportion of the land is so-called ‘stool land’,
which the Constitution describes as land vested in a stool3 – a custom-
ary community – on behalf of and in trust for the subjects of a stool in
accordance with customary law and usage.4 According to customary
law as represented in case law and textbooks, the ultimate or allodial
title of every portion of land is held in common by the members of a
community, and traditional authorities are regarded as custodians of
such land. Community members and families have so-called usufruc-
tuary interests in the land, which they have acquired by farming or
building on vacant communal land. These interests are heritable5 and
are extinguished only through abandonment, forfeiture6 or with con-
sent and concurrence of the interest holder. The usufructuary cannot
be deprived of any of the rights constituting the interest. Not even the
chief can lay an adverse claim to the land (Asante 1969:105-106; Dan-
quah 1928b:197-200, 206, 221; Ollennu 1962:29, 55-56; Ollennu 1967:
252-255; Pogucki 1962:180; Sarbah 1968:64-67; Woodman 1996:53,
66, 107).7
These customary rules date from the days when communities were
involved in subsistence farming in land-abundant areas, when not
land, but people were of value to chief and community. Now that mar-
ket production, population growth and urbanisation have enhanced the
economic value of land, many chiefs in peri-urban Kumasi claim that
these rules are outdated and need to be adjusted to modern circum-
stances. Two kinds of legitimising discourses were found among the
chiefs in the area. One group of chiefs argues that the conversion of
farmland into residential land cannot be avoided and that communal
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land that can be used in a more productive way should be brought back
into chiefly administration (cf. Kotey and Yeboah 2003:20). According
to the Beseasehene, ‘It is a law that when the town is growing and it
comes to your farm, you do not have any land. Because the land is for
the chief.’8 The Kontihene of the Ejisuhene agrees: ‘When the town
reaches the farm, people lose their rights.’9 ‘Only the chief can sell,’10
says the Kontihene of the Beseasehene. However he takes a more moder-
ate point of view: ‘You must compensate the farmer for his loss of live-
lihood if he approaches you with respect. How much? That depends
on when the farmer is satisfied. You don’t want trouble in the family.
It’s a process of negotiation.’11 The argument of this group of chiefs –
that communal land which can be used in a more productive way
should be brought back into chiefly administration – is only convin-
cing, however, when the proceeds of the conversion are used for com-
munity development such as infrastructure, investments in education
and alternative livelihood projects. That might ensure that the inhabi-
tants of the village would still be able to make a living after the loss of
their agricultural land. Although all interviewed chiefs acknowledged
that they have at least a moral obligation to use part of the stool land
revenue for compensation of the farmer and/or for community devel-
opment, the actual practices differ considerably and substantial
amounts of land revenue disappear in the coffers of the chiefs.
A second group of chiefs claims that their rights to administer the
land do not derive from their function as caretakers on behalf of the
community. Instead they assert that ‘land belongs to the royal family,
since it was members of the royal family who fought for the land’.12 As
leader of the royal family, the chief has administrative powers over the
land. According to these chiefs, the royal family had only given this
land out for farming purposes, to temporary caretakers, and can re-
claim it when its use is changed to residential. And since the people
were only temporary caretakers of the land, they have no right to com-
pensation, save for the crops on the land.13
At the heart of the struggles over the authority to convert land lies a
tension in the definition of what constitutes communal land and the
concepts of allodial and usufructuary rights that make up this defini-
tion. Now that there is hardly any vacant communal land left in peri-
urban Kumasi, the only way that chiefs can make money from the land
is to cancel out the usufructuary rights of the citizens. They therefore
attempt to transform usufructuary rights into permissive rights of ten-
ant-like character, based on the leniency of the chief instead of on the
communal ownership of the land. The consequences of this transfor-
mation are drastic for most people.14 In peri-urban Kumasi farming is
still a major occupation. In the eight villages surveyed, farming was
the main occupation of 31.8 per cent of the people, and an additional
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25.6 per cent farmed besides pursuing another occupation (N=242).15
However, this situation is rapidly changing. Of the people that were
either still farming themselves or whose family members in the village
were still farming (N=171), 58.5 per cent stated that they or their farm-
ing family members had less farmland than ten years ago. Most of this
lost farmland has been converted into residential land. Farmers and fa-
milies who lose their land without appropriate compensation become
poorer and in time lose the basis of their livelihood strategies. They are
no longer able to grow their own food and generate some income by
selling the surplus at the market. The loss of farmlands forces the
landless to try and change occupation from farming to trading and
other non-farm activities, such as working in the construction industry
and other related industries, to earn a living. Many of the poorly edu-
cated farmers also become jobless. Through lack of farmland food
prices rise in these communities, making life even harder for the poor.
Social stratification increases and social cohesiveness has been reported
to decline.16
Resisting the land appropriation
Villagers’ views with regard to the right to convert and sell land vary
widely, from acknowledging the chief’s right to sell the land to a full
denial of any such right. ‘The chief decides to sell land. Farmers can’t
say no, but they can negotiate a price. But the bulk of the money goes
to the chief, since he has full power’17 is one view. While others feel
that ‘(...) the chief cannot sell land without the family’s consent be-
cause someone is farming there now. The money will go to the farmer,
the chief only gets some of it.’18 Considering the severe effects on the
livelihoods of the people, it is understandable that many villagers un-
dertake some kind of action to resist the reallocation of their farmlands
or to influence the way the revenues are spent. All study villages wit-
nessed various kinds of on-going struggles and negotiations between
the land-owning chiefs and their people, ranging from direct confronta-
tions with the chief, to bringing in other people or agencies, to more
evasive techniques to ‘get around’ the chief.19
When tension about the chief’s land administration rose, commu-
nity members often first attempted to talk to the chief – either in pri-
vate or at public village meetings – to persuade him to let farmers and
families sell their own land with merely a signing fee paid to the chief,
or to ask him to allocate a larger part of the revenue to farmer, family,
and village. Such attempts were undertaken by a wide range of per-
sons, such as elders, royal family members, local government represen-
tatives, otherwise influential persons in the village, or one or more of
the farmers or families who were losing their farmland. In a number
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of villages, one of the popular solutions advocated to control adminis-
tration of stool land was the establishment of a Plot Allocation Com-
mittee. Such a committee should consist of representatives of the chief
and representatives of the village, often people from the Unit Commit-
tee (UC), the lowest level of local government in Ghana.20 The Plot Al-
location Committee should check concurrence of the site plan with the
planning scheme and sign all land allocation papers. The existence of
such a committee usually coincides with the transfer of a fixed portion
of the money to the community for development. However, popular at-
tempts to set up such committees have mostly been frustrated by the
chiefs (cf. Edusah and Simon 2001), and in some villages such as Be-
sease even by the villagers at large, who saw possibilities to sell their
own land and were not inclined to hand a portion of the revenue over
for community development. Angered by land sales by the chief or
frustrated with a lack of progress in negotiations, people occasionally
also took the law into their own hands. Several villages witnessed occa-
sions of outright violence against the chief, sometimes by one family,
as in the case of Besease, and sometimes by a big mob of villagers, as
in the case of Pekyi No. 2 where the chief was chased out of the village
with stones.
When direct interaction between chief and community did not have
the desired effect, communities sometimes tried to bring in influential
persons to reason with their chief. Often this person would be another
chief, for instance the chief from the place of origin, the paramount
chief or the Asantehene. Other encountered strategies were to bring in
certain agencies, such as the Environmental Protection Agency21 or the
Commission for Human Rights and Administrative Justice, or to seek
publicity through local radio stations. When more or less friendly nego-
tiations proved unsuccessful, some communities threatened with or ac-
tually tried to press for a destoolment of their chief by the paramount
chief, but this is a cumbersome and long process that is seen as a last
resort and not often carried through.
A third cluster of resistance techniques could be classified as strate-
gies to ‘get around’ the chief. Confronted with a lack of success in ne-
gotiations with the chief and therefore with the risk of losing their
land, farmers and families started to sell their own land before the
chief would do it. ‘If you are very persistent the chief cannot take your
land away. You can sell it and give part (of the money) to the chief. But
if you are unlucky the chief will take the land, and if you don’t fight it
you won’t get anything’.22 This was done either without informing the
chief at all, or by informing him only after the sale, when he was of-
fered a moderate fee for the signing of the allocation note. Another
way to deal with the problem without entering into direct struggle with
the chief was by aiming the anger at the buyer instead. In many in-
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stances farmers have physically prevented buyers from entering on
their new land, or destroyed the foundations of new-built structures, as
soon as the buyer had left the land (cf. Kasanga and Kotey 2001).
The actions of resistance against the maladministration of stool land
by the chief were often not successful. Before turning to the reasons
for this lack of success, let me warn for the ostensible contradiction be-
tween chief and community that might have been created by the brev-
ity of the description of actions of resistance as sketched above. Ob-
viously chiefs are in no way unrelated to or separate from the commu-
nity they live in. They form part of and have various linkages within
the community. A chief’s position within the community and his abil-
ity to build a coalition with his elders and other powerful people within
the community are crucial for creating room for manoeuvre with re-
gard to land administration.23
Traditional controls on chiefly administration
A number of the chiefs categorically rejected the suggestions and
claims of the people to adjust stool land administration and continued
to rule as they pleased. This poses the question as to how it is possible
that these chiefs cannot be steered clear from their devastating track.
Are there no checks and balances on their administration? A literature
survey of some of Ghana’s ‘grand old men’ in the field of customary
land tenure yields the following quotes: ‘(T)he occupant of the stool
can only bind the stool, i.e. the town or community, if he acts with the
consent and concurrence of the whole town or community represented
by the sub-chiefs, and the principal councillors from the various sec-
tions’ (Ollennu 1962:130).
Hereditary councillors,24 or elders as they are called in the lower
councils, and chiefs or sub-chiefs in the higher ones, are the
heads of houses, families, or towns who have been elected by
members of a house, family, or town to be their respective head,
patriarch, or chief. (…) They hold their offices in the pleasure
not of the Chief or head Chief, but by the sufferance of the peo-
ple who have elected them to the Council. (…) It is of utmost im-
portance, in view of our form of government, for the Chief, who
is always the President of his Council, to give due weight and
make full allowance of the expressed opinion of these council-
lors (Danquah 1928b:57).
‘The chief was bound by his oath to consult the elders on all matters,
and to obey their advice’ (Busia 1951:14). To supplement these authori-
tative but not too recent writers25 with a contemporary influential voice,
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I turn to Kasanga who, less specific but equally romantic, states that
‘there are reasonable checks at the local level on almost everybody’ (Ka-
sanga 2002:36).26
According to these writers traditional responsibility for village chiefs
thus rests on two pillars. The first pillar is made up of a council of el-
ders, selected by and representing all major factions of the commu-
nity, without whose consent the chief cannot make any decision. The
second pillar consists of the possibility to destool seriously malfunc-
tioning chiefs. Leaving aside whether traditional rule was ever as equi-
table and well-balanced as these authors claim – which has been con-
vincingly refuted in the extensive oeuvre of McCaskie27 – current per-
formance of chiefs in peri-urban Kumasi disabuses us of the idea that
the two pillars function effectively in present-day village practice and
suggests an erosion compared to their earlier functioning. To begin
with, in a number of case study villages, the council is fully or to a
large extent composed of elders from the royal family only, as is the
case in Kotwi. The Kotwi Stool was originally carved out of the Asam-
pong Stool, and the Kotwihene was like a sub-chief to the Asampon-
ghene and thus did not have his own sub-chiefs. Later the Kotwihene
was upgraded and he now swears his oath directly to the Asantehene.
Although he could now have sub-chiefs, he has not installed any. He
has continued to discuss village affairs with the elders from his fa-
mily, and when there is a public ceremony the Asamponghene will join
them with all his sub-chiefs. The absence of a council representing
the whole community was encountered in a number of the other case
study villages as well. Furthermore, the rule that elders hold their of-
fices not in the pleasure of the chief but to serve the family that has
elected them, also seems to be under strain. For instance in Nkoran-
sa, where the secretary of the chief explains that ‘it is not the rule that
a certain family always brings a sub-chief. It is the chief who picks
them. When one dies, he can choose a new one.’28 This is under-
pinned by the abundance of conflicts between elders and their own fa-
mily, who can no longer dismiss them when unsatisfied.29 Regardless
of the composition of the council, the chief often co-opts his elders by
sharing the benefits from land administration with them, removing
their incentives to effectively check the use of power and if necessary
stand up against the chief (cf. Abudulai 2002:83). ‘The sub-chiefs
support the chief’, says a UC-member of Tikrom, ‘because they get a
share of the money. When they argue with him, they won’t get any-
thing’.30 Even at the Asantehene’s Land Secretariat it is acknowledged
that ‘in many villages the elders connive with the chief’.31 And those
elders that are not co-opted are often simply ignored by the chief, as
is aptly illustrated by the following statement: ‘Beseasehene is a new
chief. He doesn’t mind the rules’, says his Kontrehene sub-chief, ‘I
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tried to talk to him, but he didn’t take my advice. If I wasn’t educated,
he would try to cheat me as well’.32
When a community wants to press destoolment charges against its
chief for maladministration of land, they have to bring a case to the
Traditional Council, made up of the paramount chief and his sub-
chiefs.33 A first hurdle is that destoolment charges cannot be voiced by
mere commoners, but only by the ‘kingmakers’, i.e. those sub-chiefs
and members of the royal family who can also make or enstool a chief
(Hayford 1970:36). As discussed above, these sub-chiefs are often co-
opted and therefore not likely to take the lead in actions against the
chief. And if they do dare take action against their chief, this is usually
only ‘after many years of wrongdoing. The chief will first be given the
benefit of the doubt’, says one of the sub-chiefs of the Ejisuhene and, to
explain why they have waited so long to start a destoolment case
against the latter, he adds: ‘The kingmakers have deposed the previous
Ejisuhene and installed this one, of whom they had high expectations.
They will now lose part of their legitimacy if they want to destool the
one they selected’.34 When the long duration of the destoolment pro-
cess is added to the period it takes for kingmakers to undertake action,
one can imagine that a chief can alienate a considerable amount of
stool land in those years and spend the proceeds as well. A second ob-
stacle lies in the fact that the paramount chief, who chairs the Tradi-
tional Council, is usually not disinterested in village land affairs, since
he often receives a share of the villages’ land revenues. The paramount
chief of Ejisu for instance favoured exactly those chiefs who alienated
large amounts of stool land. Furthermore, to mention a third hin-
drance, the members of the Traditional Council consist of direct collea-
gues of the chief-on-trial. Often the charges, such as selling farmland
and not using enough stool land revenue for community development,
are also items of contestation in the villages of the judging chiefs. Ob-
viously, their personal interest in such cases could stand in the way of
objective and impartial judgments.
The main customary checks and balances on chiefs – ruling in coun-
cil with the sub-chiefs and the possibility of destoolment – are thus not
very effective. One can add to this the fact that chiefly accountability is
extremely low. Through a lack of registration most land administration
is concealed. A good chief may account for his administration on his
own accord, but this is an exception rather than the rule. To ask a chief
to account is often considered a vote of no confidence and most people
will not dare to do that unless there are more than clear indications of
serious misrule by the chief. And even then, who is to bell the cat? The
chief is still a powerful figure in most villages and you are sure to
bring his wrath upon you by agitating against him. Moreover, most
people consider it the task of the royal family to take action against a
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chief. And if the royal family does not discharge itself of this task, how
can commoners be expected to take it upon themselves?35
The fact that the current customary system lacks effective checks
and balances and accountability is not surprising when the historical
development of the position of chiefs is taken into account. Without
sketching a pristine view of egalitarian, consensual pre-colonial socie-
ties, it is clear that the colonial regime removed many of the traditional
limitations to chiefs’ authority (Toulmin and Quan 2000b:10; Van Rou-
veroy van Nieuwaal 1987:11). For instance, the British government over-
rode the traditional rules of investiture and reserved for itself the right
to appoint and dismiss chiefs (Annor 1985; Busia 1951:105-106; Van
Rouveroy van Nieuwaal 1987:11). Where commoners tried to reassert
local checks and balances, a chief who was on friendly terms with the
British administrator could easily neutralise these commoners by
branding them malcontents and troublemakers (Kumado 1990-
1992:203). Thus whilst losing his sovereignty, the chief held increasing
powers over his subjects, because the local checks and balances were
removed or at least watered down by the colonial authorities. The Brit-
ish gave the chiefs strong rights in land, by accepting their claims that
according to customary law all land belonged to a customary commu-
nity with the chief as the administrator. However, they did not give the
chiefs free reign in all aspects. They regularly held them to account,
monitored the bye-laws they made, and intervened in local conflicts,
thereby to some extent compensating the lack of local checks and bal-
ances, at least in the field of land administration. After independence,
the pre-colonial local checks and balances and accountability structures
have not been furbished or rebuilt. A crucial question therefore is
whether the current government also effectuates some state constraints
on the administration of chiefs to compensate the lack of local checks
and balances.
Before turning towards the level of the government, it is worth con-
sidering briefly whether any regulation or change towards more equity
and community influence can be expected to come from within the tra-
ditional system. Some chiefs distribute land and land revenue fairly
over the community members and display serious commitment to de-
veloping their villages. Could these chiefs serve as a role model and
can they be expected to advise or correct their fellow chiefs? As we have
seen, at all levels of traditional leadership – from village level to the
Asantehene – both discourse and practice moves away from individual
rights of community members in stool land to almost unrestricted
rights of the chief to administer this land. It is important to realise that
there is no one-to-one relationship between development-oriented lead-
ership and willingness to abide by certain principles of good govern-
ance, such as accounting for administration and co-operating with a re-
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presentative Plot Allocation Committee. For instance the Jachiehene, a
chief who was vigorously developing his village, not only abolished the
local Plot Allocation Committee, but outright stated that ‘land in Jachie
belongs solely to the royal family’ and ‘a chief does not need to ac-
count, only if things go wrong’.36 Development projects may also be
used by chiefs to enhance their power. Some chiefs have started devel-
opment foundations to solicit funding for local projects, which can also
establish greater control over people and natural resources. E.g. the
Okyenhene uses his environmental foundation to attract funding, con-
trol forest-related livelihoods of youth and gain greater control over nat-
ural resources. The Asantehene attracts large funds, among others from
the World Bank, with his Education Fund. And the Juabenhene has es-
tablished an agribusiness oil palm project through which he attempts
to extend his claims on land. Most chiefs, including the development-
oriented ones, supported a rather extreme level of chiefly discretionary
powers. This usually made them unwilling to condemn the maladmin-
istration of chiefs in other villages, let alone call such chiefs to account.
Furthermore, chiefs are in general unwilling to interfere in other
chiefs’ businesses, with an appeal to the sacrosanct ‘internal village af-
fairs’.
Government’s policy of non-interference
In the media, government officials regularly and vehemently proclaim
that they will not ‘meddle in chieftaincy affairs’.37 Land administration
is the main area about which such ‘non-interference-statements’ are
made. These statements not only claim that the government should
not interfere in chieftaincy affairs, but also allege that it is unnecessary:
since chiefs do not rule alone but in council with their elders, and
since they can be destooled when they seriously malfunction, the local
arena can deal with its own problems. Despite frequent indications that
these local checks and balances are not very effective, the government
takes refuge behind them, denying the people an opportunity to com-
plain. Obviously, such state discourse provides chiefs with additional le-
gitimacy in the field of land administration, and communicates little
fear for stately control and ample room for manoeuvre.
The discourse described above is an example of what I call the gov-
ernment’s ‘policy of non-interference’. Another salient example can be
found in the wording, drafting process, and content of the National
Land Policy – the first comprehensive land policy ever formulated by
the Ghanaian government – and its implementing Land Administra-
tion Program (Ministry of Lands and Forestry 1999; World Bank
2003a). Although program and policy aim to tackle the current pro-
blems in land administration, both the role of chiefs in the administra-
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tion of stool land and the possible checks and balances the state can
put in place with regard to stool land administration, are not critically
examined. On the contrary, the role of chiefs as caretakers of stool land
is taken as a fixed point of departure for all changes with regard to cus-
tomary land administration. One might say that the policy of non-inter-
ference is currently so pervasive, that some problems and possible so-
lutions are not even open for public discussion. The present govern-
ment, unlike the colonial government, therefore does not keep ‘chiefly
landlordism’ in check.38
The government’s lack of enthusiasm to get involved in stool land
administration can largely be explained by two factors: the first factor
is the political power of chiefs, who are still regarded as strongly influ-
ential, and ‘who are still voter-brokers, especially in the rural areas’;39
the second factor is the current tendency to fill chieftaincy positions
with highly educated professionals, which fades the traditional distinc-
tion between state elite and chiefs, and creates new alliances between
these two groups.40 Nevertheless, there is an internal debate between
modernisers and neo-traditionalists within the government, which is
quite intense and highly sensitive. The modernisers, particularly in the
land agencies and the Land Administration Program staff, try to break
the silence around the maladministration of chiefs, but their efforts are
thwarted by their superiors. Altogether, it seems that there is currently
no political party willing to enter into any real battle, such as any land
reform would cause, with the chiefs.41
In Part 1 of this chapter we have seen that, despite fierce resistance
by the citizens, chiefs are the main beneficiaries of land conversions in
peri-urban Kumasi. Three explanatory factors emerge from the analy-
sis: 1) the position of chiefs as guardians of stool land and authorities
in the field of customary law offers strong opportunities to point to
custom to acquire and legitimate power over land; 2) the erosion of
customary checks and balances hinders the control of chiefly function-
ing; and 3) the government’s policy of non-interference gives additional
legitimacy to the chiefs, provides them with ample leeway to adminis-
ter land, and places the power to define customary law squarely in
their hands. Without clinging to a pristine view of traditional rule in
preceding periods, it seems safe to state that the democratic and parti-
cipatory level of traditional rule are currently minimal. The fragile bal-
ance between chiefs and people has been seriously disrupted. This has
given chiefs the power to abuse their prominent position as experts of
customary law and guardians of stool land and to overstretch the some-
what dynamic nature of customary law by manipulating it to suit their
needs and legitimise their claims.
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Popular perceptions of chiefs and chieftaincy
The often negative role of chiefs in the conversion of farmland poses
the questions to what extent and how chiefs’ dealings with land affect
people’s views on the other tasks and activities of chiefs, as well as peo-
ple’s attitude towards chiefs and chieftaincy in general. According to
the assemblyman of Esereso ‘now that the chief does not supply the fa-
milies with land they can speak disrespectfully of him in the village’.42
Along the same lines, the Kontrehene sub-chief of the Beseasehene states
that because of the maladministration of land by the Beseasehene ‘No
one recognises him as the chief. No one goes to him for dispute settle-
ment’.43 This same issue has been raised in other countries. Claassens,
analysing local land administration in South Africa, states that ‘(s)el-
ling land undermines the legitimacy and support base of traditional
leaders among community members’ (Claassens 2006:26). And Fisiy
says of Cameroon: ‘The rampant alienation of land by sale, especially
to strangers (Fulani graziers), is seen as egoistic and potentially rui-
nous to the institution’ (Fisiy 1992).
To study this issue in peri-urban Kumasi this chapter first analyses
how people feel about the land conversions by the chiefs. Then it turns
to other functions and activities of the chief and asks a number of
questions: What roles and tasks do the people want chiefs to perform,
and what are the limits to their powers? How do the activities of chiefs
relate to the tasks and functions of local government? How do people
assess the performance of chiefs, local government and chieftaincy?
The chapter then concludes with some observations on the effects of
the performance of chiefs on people’s perceptions of the institution of
chieftaincy.
Land administration
How do people in the villages regard the land conversions by the chief?
It has been put forward that people in the villages generally accept that
the development of residential plots is primarily the chief’s concern
(NRI and UST 1997:23). Others claim the opposite, i.e. that most peo-
ple in peri-urban Kumasi want to minimalise the role of the chief in
land administration (Van Leeuwen and Van Steekelenburg 1995:59). In
the current research, the chiefs’ claim that they can allocate farmland
to strangers for residential purposes was accepted by 56.1 per cent of
the respondents (Table 7.1).
Acceptance was high in the villages of Jachie, Tikrom and Ahenema
Kokoben. One might expect that this acceptance stems from the fact
that in these villages the chiefs are using the land and the revenue ac-
cruing from the conversions in the best interest of the community. In-
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deed, the Jachiehene for instance allowed members of the community
to buy residential land at a very low price. And the revenue generated
by leasing the remaining residential plots to outsiders was used for
community development. In the first four years of his reign, the Jachie-
hene had built a library, a school, and a palace, and had allocated part
of his land to a Technical School in exchange for scholarships. How-
ever, the same cannot be said for the chiefs of Tikrom and Ahenema
Kokoben. In these villages chiefs reallocated large amounts of farmland
without proper compensation and hardly any revenue was utilised for
community development.
The high percentage of people accepting the power of the chief to re-
allocate their farmland in the three villages can perhaps be understood
rather as an acceptance of the reality of daily life. For in all three vil-
lages the chiefs not only claimed the right to allocate their farmland to
strangers, but have also effectuated this right. In the other villages stu-
died, either not so much land was converted yet, or the people were
themselves highly involved in land allocations. For instance in Boankra
the stool has been vacant for many years due to a chieftaincy dispute
and families have been selling their land independent of the royal fa-
mily. In Brofoyeduru local farmers are converting and selling their
own land, after which they direct the buyer to the chief who will sign
the allocation papers for a moderate signing fee. Although most people
in the first three villages accepted that the chief converted farmland, in
both Tikrom and Ahenema Kokoben the chief’s right to spend the rev-
enues at will was challenged. There was a lot of individual and commu-
nal resistance against the way chiefs used the revenues and against
non-compliance of chiefs with planning schemes and environmental
rules.
Table 7.1 Who can allocate farmland to strangers for residential development?44
Name of village Village chief (%) Head of family (%) Farmer (%)
Jachie 100.0 0.0 0.0
Tikrom 91.3 4.3 4.3
Ahenema Kokoben 72.7 4.5 13.6
Adadeentem 53.8 15.4 26.9
Nkoranza 47.6 28.6 14.3
Kotwi 33.3 13.3 40.0
Boankra 33.3 40.7 22.2
Brofoyeduru 20.0 15.0 50.0
Total 56.1 13.5 24.0
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Local development projects
Table 7.2 displays what the respondents considered the main functions
of the chief. This table includes three tasks within the realm of local
government, i.e. ensuring community participation in development
(59.1 per cent), looking after the physical development of the town (50
per cent), and organising communal labour (27.7 per cent). Such activ-
ities often involve both the village chief and local government. The
case-study villages in peri-urban Kumasi each have their own Unit
Committee (UC)45 and every one to three villages elect a representative
for the District Assembly (DA). DAs exercise deliberative, legislative
and executive functions and supervise all other administrative authori-
ties in the district.46
The involvement of chiefs and local government in the same tasks
leads us to ask who the people in peri-urban Kumasi regard as the
most appropriate actor for various administrative tasks, including the
three tasks mentioned above. Table 7.3 shows whom the respondents
consider the most appropriate actors to perform certain tasks. For all
five tasks in Table 7.3 the chief is only considered the third or fourth
most appropriate actor. It is striking that for three of the main tasks of
the chief mentioned in Table 7.2 – ensuring community participation,
physical development of the town, and organisation of communal la-
bour – both the UC and the local assembly member are considered
more appropriate actors than the chief. ‘Communal labour in Besease
used to be arranged by the chief,’ says the queenmother of Besease,
‘but because of the dissatisfaction with the chief’s land administration,
nowadays when the gong is beaten, they use the names of the UC and
the assemblyman, not the chief’.47
In the survey, people were also asked to score the performance of
their chief, assembly member and UC on a 5-point scale (1 is very bad,
5 is very good), see Table 7.4. In total the assembly members score sig-
nificantly lower (2.85) than both the chiefs (3.52) and UCs (3.57). This
reflects the difficulty of their jobs. Despite the lack of remuneration as-
Table 7.2 What are the main functions of the chief?
Main functions of chief %
Dispute settlement 78.1
Ensuring community participation in development 59.1
Ensuring peace in the community 53.0
Looking after the physical development of the town 50.0
Land management 43.8
Organising communal labour 27.7
Celebrating traditional festivals 8.3
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sembly members are expected to serve not only in their own village but
in one or two other villages as well. In these villages people often com-
plain that the assembly member never visits them, or even that they
don’t know him/her, and that these members only care about their
own villages. In the four survey villages (N=120) where the assembly
member lived in the village, 98.35 per cent of the people knew their as-
sembly member, compared to 72.93 per cent in the four villages where
the assembly member did not live (N=122). In the first villages the per-
formance of the assembly members is assessed with an average of 3.37,
whereas in the last villages they score only 2.27. Furthermore the as-
sembly members are mainly judged on their success in obtaining de-
velopment projects from the DA, which itself is low on funds.
Table 7.3 Which actor(s) should perform certain tasks?
Tasks Unit
Committee
Assembly
member
District
Assembly
Chief Central
govt
Ensuring community
participation
59.1
(1)
36.0
(2)
1.2
(4)
15.7
(3)
0.4
(5)
Physical development of
the town
24.8
(2)
58.3
(1)
5.0
(5)
16.9
(3)
16.9
(3)
Organisation of
communal labour
87.6
(1)
18.6
(2)
0.4
(5)
7.0
(3)
0.8
(4)
Check concurrence with
building regulations and
planning schemes
33.9
(1)
25.2
(3)
31.4
(2)
7.0
(4)
1.7
(5)
Promotion of economic
development
27.3
(2)
43.0
(1)
12.4
(4)
20.7
(3)
9.9
(5)
Table 7.4 Performance assessments of chief, Unit Committee and District Assembly
member
Village Chief UC DA member
Jachie 4.72 4.07*** 3.65***
Nkoranza 4.17 3.54* 3.93
Kotwi 4.04 3.58 3.09*
Brofoyeduru 3.54 4.12* 1.96***
Adadeentem 2.97 4.00** 2.15
Tikrom 2.62 2.92 2.00*
Ahenema Kokoben 2.59 2.83 2.50
Boankra No chief 3.56 3.50
All villages 3.52 3.57 2.85*
* Difference with assessment performance chief is significant at the 0.05 level.
** Difference with assessment performance chief is significant at the 0.01 level.
*** Difference with assessment performance chief is significant at the 0.001 level.
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The average score for chiefs is 3.52, which signifies something in be-
tween average and good. In three villages the chiefs score under aver-
age, in four villages above. There is a strong correlation between their
score and their ‘style’ of land management and its effects in the local-
ity. In Ahenema Kokoben (2.59) and Tikrom (2.62) the chief has sold
much land, with little revenue for the community. In Adadeentmen
(2.97) the former chief sold a large tract of land very much against the
wishes of the people, which sharply contrasts with the new chief who
has not sold any land yet, but has already started building a primary
school from his own money.48 In Brofoyeduru (3.54) it is mainly the
people who are profiting from the land conversions by selling their
own land, a process which is being condoned by the chief. In Kotwi
(4.04) many farmers had already sold their land to commercial farmers
in the last decade. The current conversion of these lands therefore does
not take away local people’s livelihoods. Nkoranza (4.17) still has more
than sufficient agricultural land, as a result of which the people hardly
feel the effect of land sales by the chief. The Jachiehene (4.72) has con-
verted much farmland into residential land, but he shared both the
land and the profits with the community.
Despite this strong correlation, when asked about their overall per-
formance chiefs do not receive very bad assessments, even when in in-
terviews people expressed outright criticism about the way they mana-
ged the land. Should the relatively favourable assessment of chiefs then
be attributed to their performance in other fields?49 We have now dis-
cussed four of the main tasks of the chief mentioned in Table 7.2. With
regard to land administration, many villagers do not consider the
chiefs to play a very positive role. With regard to physical development
of the town, organising communal labour, and ensuring community
participation, we have seen that for these tasks local government is
now preferred over chiefly rule. The next sections will therefore discuss
the last three tasks mentioned: dispute settlement, ensuring peace in
the community and celebrating traditional festivals.
Law and order: Dispute settlement and ensuring peace
‘Dispute settlement’ ranks first as the main task of the chief (78.1 per
cent), and is closely connected to the third ranking ‘ensuring peace in
the community’ (53 per cent) (Table 7.2). When asked the hypothetical
question, whether they would go to the chief if they had a land pro-
blem, 76.4 per cent of the respondents answered in the affirmative. In-
depth interviews, however, showed that in cases where the chief is one
of the parties to the conflict – as is often the case when farmland is
converted to residential land – people do not consider the chief’s courts
an acceptable forum for settlement of the dispute.
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Of the people surveyed 10.4 per cent had at some date taken a dis-
pute to the chief,50 25.6 per cent had been witnesses in such a case.
These figures are difficult to read without knowledge of how many peo-
ple were involved in disputes, and how many went to other dispute set-
tlers. Crook et al. seem to be the only researchers providing empirical
data on such questions regarding the use of various dispute settlement
systems in Ghana (Crook et al. 2005). In a survey, they asked 677 peo-
ple whom they would most trust to settle any problem they might have
concerning their land. The people most frequently mentioned as
‘trusted a lot’ were, firstly village chiefs, second family heads and third
court judges, with UC Chairmen coming a close fourth (see Crook in
this volume, Table 6.3 on page 145). In peri-urban Kumasi, the UC
Chairmen ranked third, paramount chiefs fourth and court judges
fifth. The general trust rankings showed very little difference in levels
of trust between men and women, between various age groups, or be-
tween people with different levels of education. Only the origin of re-
spondents produced some interesting differences; migrants from a dif-
ferent district or region showed much less propensity to trust a para-
mount chief and were more likely to trust a judge (Crook et al.
2005:73-77).
A widely shared belief is put into words by Boafo-Arthur when he
states that ‘there are many instances, at the rural level, where societal
conflicts are referred, first and foremost, to the traditional ruler for ar-
bitration. In most cases, it is where the parties are not satisfied by the
judgment of the traditional arbitration system that the case is taken to
court’ (Boafo-Arthur 2001:10, cf. Schott 1980:125-6). Crook et al., how-
ever, come to a different conclusion. They show that from 153 respon-
dents that said they had personally experienced a land dispute, only
26.1 per cent had turned in the first instance to the chief, while 73.9
per cent had initially taken other roads to settle the issue: they turned
to their family or to the court, used arbitration by respected persons, or
had the issue sorted out through negotiation with the other party
(Crook et al. 2005:72). A division of respondents according to origin
demonstrated that non-locals were only half as likely as locals to have
used a chief’s court (16.3 per cent and 31.1 per cent respectively,
ibid.:78). Additionally, they demonstrate that out of 168 land case liti-
gants in Kumasi High Court, 52.2 per cent went straight to court, with-
out first employing any other dispute settlement mechanism (id.: 30).
It is clear from the data from Crook et al. that chiefs remain an im-
portant source of dispute settlement at the local level and enjoy high
levels of trust in that area. The position of Ashanti chiefs in dispute
settlement has even been somewhat enhanced by – and the role of
state courts has equally suffered from – an appeal by the Asantehene at
his inaugural meeting with the Kumasi Traditional Council in 1999 to
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the chiefs to withdraw cases pending in the state courts and in the
Houses of Chiefs and bring them to his court for settlement.51 Since
this appeal – which was followed by quite a number of people,
although numerous cases were also not withdrawn from state courts –
over 500 land, chieftaincy, criminal and civil cases have been settled in
the Asantehene’s traditional court (Boafo-Arthur 2003:147; Otumfuo
Osei Tutu II 2004). Crook et al., however, also demonstrate an ambigu-
ity. Whereas village chiefs are still cited by the general population as
most trusted persons for resolving a dispute, actual personal experi-
ences of dealings with a dispute showed a rather more varied picture.
Chiefs accounted for only a minority of dispute settlement institutions
resorted to, others being family heads, respected persons and opinion
leaders including elected local government representatives (Crook et al.
2005:89). Furthermore – and especially relevant for the popular per-
ception of chiefs’ functions as a result of their style of land manage-
ment – Crook et al. confirm the findings from our qualitative research
that the continuing conflict in peri-urban areas over the role which
chiefs play in the appropriation of village lands for sale as urban plots,
is an important difficulty surrounding the chiefs’ role. In such circum-
stances the chief may be regarded as having too much personal interest
to be trusted as an impartial judge of a local land case (id.: 74-75).
Traditional religion
In the literature, the person and function of chief are very much con-
nected to traditional religion (Busia 1951; Hagan 2003; Rattray 1969,
first published 1929; Ray 2003). According to Ray ‘the basis of the re-
spect accorded to the chief is not only that the chief derives his power
from the people, but also that the stools, skins and other symbols of of-
fice have a spiritual significance – the chief deriving his power from
the ancestors and mediating between the people and the ancestors’
(Ray 2003:7). Busia wrote in 1951 that ancestor-worship is the basis of
the chief’s authority as well as the sanction for morality in the commu-
nity. The belief that the ancestors were the custodians of the laws and
customs and that they punished those who infringed them with sick-
ness or misfortune acted as a check on commoners and chiefs alike
(Busia 1951:24; Fortes 1962:78).
Of the respondents only 0.8 per cent claimed traditional religion as
their faith, with 45.6 per cent orthodox Christians, 37.8 per cent charis-
matic Christians, and 6.6 per cent Muslims. Despite the variety of
‘new’ religions, some researchers claim that the chief’s role is ‘well-de-
fined and is embedded in local cosmological views, norms and values
which are respected by everyone in the particular society’ (emphasis added,
Ray and Van Rouveroy van Nieuwaal 1996:25). Others assume that in
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a society in which political and religious office are combined in the
chief, new religions are regarded as a challenge to traditional leader-
ship. These researchers look more critically at the effects of the chang-
ing religions and worldviews on chiefly rule. Asiama for instance
thinks that ‘the effect of education and European acculturation,
coupled with the departure of a majority of the people from the tradi-
tional African religion built on ancestral worship, have made people be-
lieve less in the divinity of the chiefs and the strength of their connec-
tions with the departed ancestors’ (Asiama 2003:13). According to Ha-
gan divergent faiths and world views not consonant with traditional
beliefs will lead either to the secularization of the institution or to the
narrowing of faith allegiance to the stool (Hagan 2003:7). Historical
evidence shows that in many places and for many years people have
been using conversion to free themselves of service to their chiefs, jus-
tifying their behaviour by claiming that they do not want to take part
in ‘fetish observances’ (Busia 1951:134; Hagan 2003:7).
Only 8.3 per cent of the respondents mentioned the celebration of
traditional festivals such as Akwasidae as a main task of the chief (Table
7.2). Some Christian charismatic churches agitate against such tradi-
tional religious practices. The pastor of the ‘Assemblies of God’ in Be-
sease explains his church’s stance towards chieftaincy and traditional
religion thus:
We teach that pouring libation and praying to dead people is
against the law of God. We preach against it in church. You
must separate from it to see God. We should tell Him all our
problems. Chiefs and heads of families who are born again re-
fuse to pour libation. They let one of their elders do it for them.
That is accepted by the church. The church does not agree with
the celebration of Akwasidae. But we can’t say they should abol-
ish it, everyone has its freedom of worship. We just don’t want
anything to do with that, but we don’t fight against it. We teach
our members not to get involved. But some of the members are
not properly committed, these might still pour libation. Chief-
taincy is still important for the people. Even in the bible there
are kings. They are very important to the nation, if there is no
chief, people will behave unruly. If there is a chief, people will
fear for punishment. We therefore do not preach against chief-
taincy as a function. Although the chief has a role to play in dis-
pute settlement, we teach the people not to go to non-Christians.
We will settle all issues in the church amicably. In that sense,
the church takes over part of the role of the chief.52
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The orthodox Christian churches, on the other hand, see no harm in
traditional practices such as pouring libation and celebrating Akwasi-
dae. Many Christians condone or partake in them.53 According to one
elder, ‘almost anybody will pour libation, to remember the ancestors.
To know they are remembered, you mention their names’.54 Celebra-
tion of the traditional festival of Akwasidae has changed a lot over the
last decades. ‘Akwasidae used to be celebrated by the whole town in the
open, first in Ejisu and then in Besease’, a chief narrates. ‘Libation
would be poured, a sheep or goat killed, and no one would go to the
farm that day. Now it is a closed ceremony, with only the chief and the
linguist present. This year one Akwasidae was not celebrated because it
fell on Easter Sunday.’55 The fetish priest used to dance and drum on
festive days. But since the priest died, they have been unable to find a
new one. ‘Christianity has made the shrine so low’, explained one of
the villagers.56
At the same time, when asked whether they would mind if the cele-
bration of the traditional festival of Akwasidae were to be cancelled 54.5
per cent of the people – and 60.6 per cent of the people that originated
from the survey villages – said yes.57 Two villagers’ views on traditional
religion are worth quoting: ‘If it were a public ceremony I would not
go because it is not the calling of the supreme God. It is fetish,’ says a
female charismatic Christian from Besease, ‘but it should not be can-
celled. We met our parents and grandparents doing that’.58 A woman
from a different charismatic church in Besease says: ‘Akwasidae should
not be taken out. It is custom (amanne). It should be there for the ones
who want it.’59 Some people thus refuse to actively partake in tradi-
tional religious practices. A chief recollects: ‘When my father and
mother opted to be Catholics, they cherished the church so much that
anything relating to custom was taboo for them.’60 This has also led
certain people to decline an offer to become chief, because of the inher-
ent necessity to pour libation and ‘feed the stools’.61 Some years back,
a chief declared in a radio interview that he no longer believed in the
sacred rituals of the stool room. He refused to pour libation to the an-
cestors, which he considered to be demonic. Because of these state-
ments, the chief was destooled before the Asantehene, the late Opoku
Ware II (Hagan 2003:7).
These data again present an ambiguous picture. Only 0.8 per cent of
the respondents claimed traditional religion as their faith. We may con-
clude, in line with Hagan, that this trend most likely leads to the nar-
rowing of faith allegiance to the stool (Hagan 2003:7). It might also
have its effect on other functions of the chief, such as dispute settle-
ment. It cannot be interpreted, however, as a rejection of all aspects of
traditional religion. Many Christians and Muslims still condone or ad-
here to facets of traditional religion and ancestor worship. And while
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only a small minority of the people mention the celebration of tradi-
tional festivals as a main task of the chief, a majority attaches impor-
tance to their continuation.
Popular assessments of chiefs and chieftaincy
We have seen that the assessment of village chiefs is correlated to their
‘style’ of land management. But despite very negative judgments on
chiefly performance in that area, chiefs’ overall performance assess-
ments are not overly negative; they range from a bit under average to
good. We have posed the question whether this could be attributed to
the performance of chiefs in other fields. If that were so, however, var-
iation in chiefly performance in these other fields would influence
their assessment, which does not square with the clear correlation be-
tween style of land management and performance assessment that we
found for peri-urban Kumasi. For an answer to this question of relative
positive assessments of chiefly functioning we should therefore look in
another direction, for which we need to make a distinction between the
institution of chieftaincy and the person of the chief.
In Table 7.5 the assessment of village chiefs is compared to the as-
sessment of the Asantehene and of the institution of chieftaincy. These
data display firstly that the assessment of chieftaincy shows a low cor-
relation62 to the assessment of the village chief and, secondly, that the
assessment of chieftaincy does not differ significantly per village. This
clearly shows that people’s opinions about chieftaincy hardly depend
on the performance of current village chiefs or, to put it differently, that
the way a chief governs barely reflects on the institution. A distinction
between the institution of chieftaincy and its incumbent has also been
described in political oratory among the Barolong boo Ratshidi on the
South Africa-Botswana borderland (Comaroff 1975)63 and for Sesotho
culture in South Africa (Oomen 2002:205). Unlike the data presented
here, Oomen’s data led to the conclusion that this ‘delinking’ of chief-
Table 7.5 Performance assessments of village chief, Asantehene and chieftaincy
Village Chief Asantehene Chieftaincy
Jachie 4.72 4.81 3.72
Nkoranza 4.17 4.82 3.33
Kotwi 4.04 4.93 3.80
Brofoyeduru 3.54 4.88 3.45
Adadeentem 2.97 4.93 3.57
Tikrom 2.62 4.66 3.30
Ahenema Kokoben 2.59 4.69 3.22
Boankra No chief 4.93 3.56
All villages 3.52 4.81 3.49
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taincy from individual chiefs in local political debate did not take place
in people’s assessments of chiefs and chieftaincy. Quite the reverse,
she shows a clear causal relationship between the way people feel
about their chief and their opinions on chieftaincy. As said earlier, in
peri-urban Kumasi this causal relationship is missing: the way people
feel about their chief seems not to influence their opinion on the insti-
tution of chieftaincy. Perhaps we could even turn the argument around
and suggest that respect for the institution of chieftaincy carries weight
in and contributes to the assessment of individual chiefs, which could
explain the fact that individual chiefs are assessed rather better than
was to be expected on the basis of their land practices. Respect for the
institution of chieftaincy, however, should not be confused with respect
for the person on the stool. As we have seen from the villagers in Be-
sease swearing and shouting at the chief during the village meeting to
install a Plot Allocation Committee, the latter does not always prevail.
In general, it was quite common during the fieldwork to hear villagers
talk in derogatory terms of their chiefs.
This dissimilarity between the Ashantis and the Sotho matches with
the fact that the institution of chieftaincy is highly debated in contem-
porary South Africa, whereas it is almost a fact of nature in Ashanti. In
peri-urban Kumasi dissatisfaction with local land administration and
anger towards a particular chief hardly seem to lead to discussions of
the desirability of the institution of chieftaincy. For the majority, chief-
taincy is a fact. According to a youngster: ‘The youth don’t respect the
chief as they used to. When they have a dispute they would sooner go
to the police or to court than to the chief. But chieftaincy has to be
there. It is not old fashioned.’64 It is almost unthinkable for a village
not to have a chief. Without a chief there is no village, for who will re-
present the community at traditional and cultural festivals and ceremo-
nies? ‘Chieftaincy is the culture of the people,’ explains the District
Chief Executive. ‘They feel an emptiness if there is no chief. They
think leadership is lacking, authority is no longer there. Especially on
festive occasions, people want to belong to a chief.’65 These utterances
see to the realms of culture and identity, to which Oomen (2002:223)
also points to explain people’s support for chieftaincy.66
Table 7.5 also shows a significant difference between the assessment
of the village chiefs and of the Asantehene.67 The assessment of the
Asantehene is strikingly high in all villages. This is understandable,
since it is felt that the prestige of the Asantehene reflects on the status
of Asante and the Ashantis. This has its bearing on the same issue of
representation. For you need a village chief to communicate with high-
er chiefs and with the Asantehene, who is highly revered and whose po-
sition is unquestionable.
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Conclusion
In this chapter we have looked at the effects of commoditisation of
land. In the first part, we have seen that the increasing value of land
leads many chiefs to convert agricultural land in use by their people to
residential land. This land is mainly allocated to outsiders and a con-
siderable part of the revenues generated does not flow back to the
farmers and communities. People are highly critical of the chiefs’ allo-
cations of land and seek various ways to resist them or share in the
proceeds. Due to the chiefs’ position as guardians of stool land and
authorities in the field of customary law, combined with the erosion of
customary checks and balances and a non-interfering government,
these attempts to resist are often not very successful. Many people in
peri-urban Kumasi have thus lost their land and witnessed severe ef-
fects on their livelihoods.
In the second part of this chapter we have discussed the seven main
functions of the chief as listed by the people (Table 7.2). We started
with a description of dealings with land in peri-urban Kumasi and saw
that many people are dissatisfied with this aspect of chiefly rule. For
three other functions mentioned as main tasks – physical development
of the town, communal labour and ensuring community participation
– the chief was regarded as only the third or fourth most appropriate
actor, behind the UC and the local assembly member. The last three
tasks, connected to law and order and traditional religion, showed a
stronger but also not unambiguous role for chiefs. Whereas village
chiefs are considered the most trusted persons for resolving a dispute,
chiefs accounted for only a minority of dispute settlement institutions
resorted to, and in peri-urban areas the continuing conflict over the
role that chiefs play in the appropriation of village lands for sale as ur-
ban plots seriously affects their ability to judge land cases. Most re-
spondents were Christians and Muslims, but this did not imply a total
rejection of all aspects of traditional religion or the role of chiefs in its
performance. Despite people’s aversion to the chiefs’ land practices, the
overall assessments of chiefs were not overly negative. It was explained
that this cannot be attributed to their performance in other fields. The
cases in peri-urban Kumasi lead to the conclusion that the perfor-
mance of chiefs barely reflects on the institution of chieftaincy. Rather,
the respect for the institution seems to carry weight in the assessment
of the individual chiefs.
The cases in peri-urban Kumasi show that the support for chief-
taincy is not based on high satisfaction with the way chiefs perform
their tasks. Reasons are rather found in the realms of culture and iden-
tity. This is an important lesson for African governments and interna-
tional policymakers, since it demonstrates that people’s support for the
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institution of chieftaincy does not necessarily go hand-in-hand with sa-
tisfaction regarding chiefly performance. People can simultaneously
support the institution of chieftaincy and be highly critical of the per-
formance of certain chiefs or certain tasks. Policymakers should criti-
cally assess chiefly rule – and popular perceptions of it – in various
fields, taking into account the performance of other actors in these
fields, including local government representatives. Based on such as-
sessments, governments should determine the desirability to recognise,
formalise, or enhance, in a ceremonial or more material form, the var-
ious functions of the chiefs. And if necessary they should place checks
and balances on the functioning of chiefs in general and regulate or
control certain fields in particular.
Notes
1 These nine villages housed a total of twelve landowning chiefs. My main village of
study was Besease, situated approximately twenty-three kilometres from Kumasi on
the road to Accra. Furthermore, I have studied four other villages on or near this road
– Jachie, Tikrom, Adadeentem, and Boankra – and four villages on the road to Obua-
si – Ahenema Kokoben, Kotwi, Brofoyeduru, and Nkoransa. All villages are at a range
of ten to forty kilometres from Kumasi.
2 To protect the identity of local informants, names of interviewees are not given. They
are identified as villager, Unit Committee member, elder etc.
3 The customary community is called ‘stool’ in reference to the carved wooden stool
which is believed to contain the souls of the ancestors, and is a traditional symbol of
chieftainship.
4 See articles 36(8) and 267(1) of the 1992 Constitution.
5 Under Ashanti customary law individual property is inherited by the matrilineal fa-
mily. The usufructuary title thus becomes family property after the death of the usu-
fructuary.
6 Forfeiture results from denial of the landlord’s title.
7 For a description of case law see Ubink 2002-2004.
8 Interview, 11 May 2003.
9 Interview, 27 May 2003.
10 Although stool land is rather leased than sold – the Constitution prohibits the sale of
customary land – nearly everyone speaks of the ‘selling’ of land and many people,
‘sellers’ as well as ‘buyers’, seem to regard it as a definitive transfer.
11 Interview, 1 July 2003.
12 Interview former Akyeamehene sub-chief of Tikromhene, 7 January 2004; Cf. Rath-
bone 1996: 511.
13 Although the claim that the allodial title to stool land lies with the royal family has
been pushed by royal families in Ashanti since the dynastic civil wars of the 1880s,
the argument that the indigenous farmers therefore have no rights in the land is not
supported by history. For instance, when cocoa became a valuable cash crop in Gha-
na, many chiefs started to levy immigrant cocoa growers with taxes, but refrained
from or were unsuccessful in imposing such a tax on indigenous farmers, because
these were considered to have an inherent right to farm the land. See for literature
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on Ghanaian history e.g. Firmin-Sellers 1995; Hill 1963; McCaskie 1995; 2000a; b;
Rathbone 1996; Wilks 1966; 1975; 1993.
14 See for literature on the conversion and its consequences in peri-urban Kumasi Berry
2002; Edusah and Simon 2001; Hammond 2005; Kasanga and Kotey 2001; Kasanga
and Woodman 2004; Kenton 1999. For other peri-urban areas of Ghana, see for in-
stance Abudulai 2002; DFID 2001; Gough and Yankson 2000; Kasanga et al. 1996;
Maxwell et al. 1998; NRI and UST 1997; Alden Wily and Hammond 2001.
15 The number of people still depending wholly or partly on farming varied widely be-
tween the villages, depending mainly on the distance to Kumasi. For instance in the
village closest to Kumasi, Ahenema Kokoben, the population has increased from 302
in 1984 to 3400 in 2000 (GSS 2002) and farming has lost its importance.
16 First, the influx of strangers into the villages – often civil servants, people with other
formal jobs or rich business people – has significantly changed the social stratifica-
tion of peri-urban communities. Second, more villagers leave early in the morning to
work in the city, returning late in the evening. This new lifestyle allows less social in-
teraction among the people and therefore the strong traditional bonds associated with
rural settlements are gradually breaking down (Edusah and Simon 2001).
17 Interview villager Besease, 19 May 2005.
18 Interview villager Besease, 16 May 2003.
19 In the nine case study villages none of these cases had been taken to court in the re-
cent past.
20 The case-study villages in peri-urban Kumasi each have their own UC. UCs are meant
to function as the base structure of Ghana’s local government system. They perform
roles such as public education, organisation of communal labour, revenue generation,
and registration of marriages, births and deaths. The first UC elections were held in
1998. UCs consist of not more than fifteen persons, of whom ten are elected in non-
partisan elections and five are government appointees. These appointments are made
after consultation with traditional authorities and other interest groups. The UCs via-
bility has been questioned on the basis of lack of financial and administrative backup
(Ayee 1999; Crook 1991a; IBIS 1998; NCCE 1998; USAID 2003:30-31).
21 This happened when the chief was mining sand and thereby degrading farmland
close to streams. The Environmental Protection Agency, however, lacks the power to
prosecute. That power lies with the District Assembly that hardly ever acts upon it.
22 Interview villager Besease, 27 August 2003.
23 See for a more elaborate description of customary land administration in peri-urban
Kumasi, Ubink 2008, in press.
24 The position of both chiefs and councillors is hereditary in the sense that it has to be
filled by a person from a certain, in the Ashanti Region matrilinear, family. Within
such a family, there are usually a number of people eligible to fill the position, of
which the family will choose the most suitable candidate. Besides hereditary council-
lors, a chief can also appoint a number of ‘non-hereditary’ councillors, on the basis
of their personal merit. When such a councillor dies, the position disappears and the
family will thus not be permitted to select a successor. See for a more elaborate dis-
cussion of election of chiefs and sub-chiefs amongst others Busia 1951; Danquah
1928b; Hayford 1970; Kofi-Sackey 1983; Kumado 1990-1992; Obeng 1988; Sarbah
1968.
25 See also Hayford 1970 ; Pogucki 1962: 66, 87.
26 See also Kasanga and Kotey 2001:31.
27 Including McCaskie 1992; 1995; 2000a.
28 Interview, 28 October 2003.
29 Interview UC member Tikrom, 26 June 2003. See also Abudulai 1996; Kasanga
1996.
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30 Interview, 26 June 2003.
31 Interview Asantehene’s Land Secretariat, 2 July 2003.
32 Interview Kontrehene sub-chief Besease, 1 July 2003.
33 Section 15 of the Chieftaincy Act, 1971 (Act 370), confers exclusive jurisdiction in any
‘cause or matter affecting chieftaincy’ – as defined at section 117 of the Courts Act,
1993 (Act 459), i.e. an action concerned with the nomination, appointment, election
of a chief or destoolment – to the Traditional Council or, if a paramount chief is in-
volved, to the Regional House of Chiefs. From such a case an appeal lies to the Re-
gional House of Chiefs, then to the National House of Chiefs and finally even to the
Supreme Court. This means that one cannot take such cases to the regular state
courts, only to the Supreme Court in last instance. It must however be noted that the
courts have not allowed for such a broad interpretation of the words ‘cause or matter
affecting chieftaincy’ that the entire functioning of Traditional Councils falls outside
their scope. For instance, land cases that are not concerned with the nomination, ap-
pointment, election or destoolment of a chief can be taken to the state courts.
34 Interview Kontrehene sub-chief of Ejisuhene, 27 May 2003.
35 The only kind of functioning accountability is what I call ‘end-term-accountability’.
During destoolment procedures, a chief will have to account for all stool revenue.
However, by then most of the money is usually spent and very hard to recover.
36 Interview, 29 June 2003.
37 See a.o. Daily Graphic 25 August 2003:3; Ghanaian Times 5 August, 2003:1 and 25
August, 2003:3. These statements are sometimes made in reaction to chieftaincy dis-
putes, for which the law explicitly declares the government has no jurisdiction (sec-
tion 15, Chieftaincy Act, 1971 (Act 370)), but also more in general, expressing that the
government will not interfere in chiefly administration.
38 Another example is found in the unwillingness of the political establishment to bring
before the court the question whether ‘drink money’ is stool land revenue in the
sense of the OASL Act. In line with the historical practice to bring a bottle of
schnapps when requesting a chief for land, chiefs claim that ‘drink money’ constitu-
tes a mere symbolic gift to show allegiance to the chief. Since this ‘drink money’ cur-
rently equals the marker price for land, many officials suggest it amounts to stool
land revenue in the sense of the OASL Act. When the District Chief Executive of Eji-
su-Juaben district wanted to go to court over a case of approximately 300,000 Euro
of ‘drink-money’, he was stopped by the government. See Ubink and Quan 2008.
39 Interview Ejisu-Juaben District Assembly, 12 January 2004. Chiefs are said to be
especially influential in the Ashanti Region with its hierarchical chiefly structure with
the Asantehene at the top.
40 Additionally, it could be argued that the rampant irregularities and mismanagement
by state institutions in procedures of compulsory acquisition of land do not give the
state a strong moral position from which to judge the quality of chiefly land adminis-
tration, see Daily Graphic 22 August 2002:17; Kotey 1996. Furthermore, when the
state wants to acquire land itself, a good relationship with chiefs is useful, and the
payment will be lower when only the chief has to be redeemed, instead of the whole
community.
41 The current mildly favourable climate for chieftaincy has even rekindled discussions
on the creation of a second chamber of parliament made up of chiefs, and on
whether chiefs should again have their own representatives on District Assemblies.
42 Interview, 10 April 2003.
43 Interview, 1 July 2003.
44 Only the three most quoted categories are represented in this table.
45 See note 20. UCs have no official role with regard to land management.
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46 The legislative instruments setting up each DA provide a very specific list of up to
eighty-six particular duties. Of its members 70 percent are elected, on non-partisan
basis, but the District Chief Executive – the single most powerful local government
position that dominates district level government – and the other 30 per cent of the
DA members are appointed by the President in consultation with traditional authori-
ties and other interest groups. With regard to land management, the making of bye-
laws with respect to building, sanitation and the environment, the preparation and
approval of planning schemes, the granting of building permits, and the enforce-
ment of regulations and sanctions for non-compliance all rest with the DA (Kasanga
and Kotey 2001:9).
47 Interview, 29 May 2003.
48 Although the people of Adadeentem have elected this chief, the Ejisuhene, the para-
mount chief of the area, has refused to enstool him, favouring a different chief-elect
with whom he had already been cooperating under the former chief.
49 It has also been suggested that the traditional respect for chieftaincy makes it diffi-
cult to grade chiefs with an unsatisfactory mark. This argument seems to be brought
down, however, by the fact that during interviews and participant observations severe
criticism of the chief was freely and frequently voiced.
50 Of the 25 disputes, 13 (52 per cent) concerned land.
51 Although this is an understandable and sensible appeal considering the enormous
backlogs in state courts, this move is also a highly political one in which the Asante-
hene reclaims the traditional trias politica of legislator, administrator and judge.
52 Interview, 12 September 2003.
53 With religion being such an important sphere of life in the villages, some of the reli-
gious leaders take an active role in the personal affairs of their followers. This was
mainly confined to counseling and dispute settling in the field of family matters and
witchcraft. What was not encountered in the case study villages was that religious lea-
ders took an active role in opposing the chief when his rule brought hardship to the
people. Even in Besease, where the assembly member was also minister in one of
the twenty three local churches, this merely resulted in regular get-togethers of all re-
ligious leaders to pray for the welfare of the village.
54 Interview elder of the Kontrehene of Ejisuhene, Besease, 7 May 2003.
55 Interview Kontrehene of Ejisuhene, Besease, 27 May 2003.
56 Personal communication villager Besease, 12 May 2003.
57 In answer to this question 57.3 per cent of the charismatic Christians said yes, 51.6
per cent of the orthodox Christians, 31.3 of the Muslims and 66.7 per cent of people
with ‘no religion’.
58 Interview villager Besease, 27 August 2003.
59 Interview villager Besease, 26 August 2003.
60 Interview Kontrehene of Ejisuhene, Besease, 27 May 2003.
61 Personal communication researcher Institute for Land Management and Develop-
ment, Kumasi, 15 April 2003.
62 The correlation is 0.357, significant at the 0.01 level.
63 Comaroff describes that the people use a formal code to praise the qualities of the in-
stitution of chieftaincy in contrast with an evaluative code – which can be highly criti-
cal – when they speak about a particular chief.
64 Interview youth Besease, 15 June 2003.
65 Interview District Chief Executive Ejisu-Juaben, 9 September 2003.
66 Oomen in her research (at 219-222) also points to the role of chiefs as ‘portals of the
government’ and to the lack of alternatives for chiefly rule, but both these reasons
were hardly mentioned in peri-urban Kumasi.
67 Significant at the 0.001 level.
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8 Risks and opportunities of state intervention in
customary land management: Emergent findings
from the Land Administration Project Ghana
Julian Quan, Janine Ubink and Adarkwah Antwi*
Introduction
A key element in the new policy consensus on land tenure reform in
sub-Saharan Africa is that in order to provide tenure security to ordin-
ary land users, land law and formal land administration arrangements
need to give recognition to the range of customary rights and arrange-
ments under which people access and manage land. In order to do
this, land administration – the process of recording and validating land
rights and land transactions – needs to become more decentralised so
as to be more accessible to the people, and to facilitate the gradual doc-
umentation of customary rights and management arrangements at a
variety of levels (Deininger 2003; Quan and Toulmin 2005; Toulmin
and Quan 2000b; World Bank 2003b). Increasingly, development
agencies believe that these decentralised approaches should recognise
and enable the registration of customary land rights and engage di-
rectly or indirectly with customary institutions and authorities, where
they play a significant role in the control and regulation of land affairs.
Ghana is characterised by a very high incidence of disputes sur-
rounding customary land. These disputes are on the one hand caused
by the increasing monetisation of customary transactions, resulting in
contestations and renegotiations of customary tenure and a concentra-
tion of control of economic benefits flowing from land in the hands of
traditional authorities. On the other hand, the way is paved for these
disputes by the failure of formal land law and land administration and
tenure systems to regulate the diversity and dynamics of customary
land rights and transactions. This has now been clearly recognised by
the government (Ministry of Lands and Forestry 1999) and its develop-
ment partners. This is despite a colonial legacy of an extensive land ad-
ministration infrastructure and the substantial interpenetration of for-
mal land law and customary principles and practice that developed dur-
ing the colonial period – both relatively unusual for sub-Saharan Africa.
In view of the deficiencies of existing formal institutions in manag-
ing customary land rights, and with the aim of facilitating access to
land for agricultural, business, and urban development, Ghana has em-
barked upon a Land Administration Project (LAP). This long-term pro-
ject with multi-donor support is intended to reform land institutions
and develop land policy so as to provide greater certainty of land rights
for ordinary land users and enable greater discipline and efficiency in
the land market. The project includes a specific component to pilot the
establishment of Customary Land Secretariats (CLSs) under the aegis
of traditional authorities. This component is supported by DFID and
managed by the Ministry of Lands, Forestry and Mines (MLFM).1
In this paper we first set out the background to customary land man-
agement in Ghana today, along with the problems involved. We then
summarise the main features of the Ghana LAP and the on-going
DFID project to support the pilot introduction of CLSs. Next we consid-
er critiques of the policy of supporting management of land by custom-
ary institutions in Ghana, and the evidence and risks emerging from
implementation of the CLS pilot programme in a political-economic
context. We conclude by offering some pointers as to a way forward to
mitigate the risks.
The nature of landholding in Ghana
In Ghana the customary sector holds around 80 per cent of the land
(Antwi and Adams 2003, Kasanga and Kotey 2001). This sector thus
provides land for the residential and other economic activities of most
of Ghana’s citizens. Historically, customary authorities, essentially
chiefs, sub-chiefs, family heads, and councils of elders responsible for
decision-making have been understood to manage land and make land
allocation decisions on behalf of their communities. In some regions,
colonial indirect rule through chieftaincy institutions provided opportu-
nities for powerful chiefs to centralise political control, including con-
trol over land through the institutions of the paramount ‘stool’ or ‘skin’
which came to predominate across the territories in which those parti-
cular chiefs were regarded as the highest customary authority. In Ku-
masi (Ashanti Region) and Akyem Abuakua (Eastern Region), the colo-
nial government supported paramount chiefs to establish secretariats
to facilitate formalised land allocations. The colonial government, how-
ever, also removed control of large areas of land from the chiefs, nota-
bly in urban areas, by vesting rights in the President. This has never
been reversed – the land remains administered directly by the state –
and although the 1999 National Land Policy provides for compensa-
tion to be paid or land to be de-vested, these lands are still the subject
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of considerable tensions between the state and traditional authorities
(Kasanga and Kotey 2001).
Post-independence governments under Nkrumah and subsequent
presidents have introduced legislative measures that have eroded the
established legislative and judicial functions of chiefs, as well as their
powers to manage the development of land and to collect land reven-
ues. One of the first measures after independence was the introduction
of a stool land account. Aware that land transactions in the form of
land rentals to outsiders, together with forest and mineral resources,
represent considerable sources of revenue to customary authorities, the
state established an infrastructure for revenue collection. This revenue
collection is currently being done by the institution of the Office of the
Administrator of Stool Lands (OASL), which redistributes revenues col-
lected from any given stool amongst District Assemblies, the custom-
ary authority who issued the lease, the stool, and the OASL itself.2 This
control of customary land revenues by the state has fuelled resentment
amongst traditional leaders who resist disclosure of the greater propor-
tion of revenues accruing from sales of customary land. In areas where
market demand for land has led to rising land values, even though
ground rents remain relatively low, chiefs have converted traditional ri-
tual obligations of the lessee once paid in kind and now in money
(‘drinks money’) into a fee which is in effect a free market purchase
price of the land lease (Edusah and Simon 2001; Firmin-Sellers 1996;
Kasanga and Kotey 2001; Ubink 2007 and 2008b). Especially in urban
areas the myth of ‘drinks money’ obscures the disposal of land for pri-
vate gain which can involve dispossession of subjects’ land rights (see
Brobby 1991 for other strategies for dispossessing subjects of their
rights). This fee is generally not disclosed and continues to be repre-
sented by chiefs as a ritual obligation rather than a capital gain from
disposal of land. Declaration of the purchase price would require that
OASL collects and redistributes it, in effect leading to the chief losing a
large percentage of the money.3 To date the revenues which are col-
lected and distributed by OASL itself have also never been publicly dis-
closed, and so the use of land revenues received by all parties is not
transparent, although at least they are now reported to parliament.
Although there are indications that chiefs may be grateful for the re-
ceipt of some revenues which they themselves would be unable to col-
lect, there is also resentment and suspicion regarding the use of land
revenues by District Assemblies, which chiefs tend to regard as rival
political authorities.
In some regions of Ghana, land is still under the control of extended
families or lineages, where family heads and councils of elders, as op-
posed to the stools themselves have asserted their rights to allocate
land and collect land revenues. In these cases, the Constitution does
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not require the collection and management of revenues by the OASL,
and ground rents can be collected directly by the landholding family.
Prior to the centralisation of stools under paramount chiefs encouraged
by colonial government a similar system existed in other regions:
although families might hold political allegiance to a higher chief, that
chief would not have control over land allocation. Today this can lead
to situations of disputed and ambiguous authority over land allocation
and the right to control land revenues. Where land allocation is con-
trolled by stools, and land is scarce or of high value, there are likely to
be struggles between chiefs, sub-chiefs, family heads and farmers for
the rights to dispose of land, to convert it to non-agricultural use and
to control land revenues. On the other hand there may also be cases in
which chiefs may allow family heads to allocate land and collect land
rents (circumventing the requirement for land revenues to be collected
and distributed by OASL, which applies only to land allocations man-
aged centrally by the stool itself rather than land owning families) and
also retain shares of ‘drinks money’, enabling a greater proportion of
land revenues to remain within the community. Nevertheless the rights
and entitlements of ordinary land users to remain on the land or to
gain compensation or shares of land revenues remain opaque and sub-
ject to widely varying locally negotiated formulae.
In rural areas, labour migration (broadly from North to South and
from East to West) into more productive forest belt areas suitable for
cocoa and high value horticultural production has led to the established
practices of sharecropping and land rentals by migrants from indigen-
ous landholders as a means to access land. In some of these areas such
as Wassa, Kyebi, Sandema, and Dormaa, contractual agreements be-
tween landholding community members and settlers seem to have oc-
curred primarily without any involvement of the stool. In many cases
landholders appear to have transacted quasi-freehold rights via, for in-
stance, sharecropping arrangements leading to what have been under-
stood to be very secure tenure arrangements for the tenants, equivalent
to tenancies or leases held in perpetuity and subject to payment of
agreed production shares and/or provision of labour. The stool’s invol-
vement was only invoked when documentary evidence of the arrange-
ment was required. In other areas, traditional authorities themselves
have transacted vast amounts of the land to migrant farmers. As sup-
plies of land have become exhausted, and indigenous populations have
grown, the customary contracts and the nature of the secondary rights
so created are subject to negotiation and interpretation. The rights of
migrants have become re-interpreted and subject to contestation and
some political tension between ‘stranger’ farmers and indigenous land-
holders or customary chiefs, as each claim the equivalent of freehold
rights, and land owning groups seek to rescind oral contracts, which
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may have been entered into generations ago, or convert them into for-
mal leaseholds. In this context, land relations and land access have be-
come increasingly monetised, and land scarcity has been a source of
tension, both between indigenous landholding groups and migrants
and between generations (see Amanor 2006; Boni 2006).
The above introduces the major contestations and struggles over
rights and prerogatives within customary land tenure in contemporary
Ghana. This context helps explain the overlapping and conflicting allo-
cations of land by different authorities and individuals, tensions over
access to land between landholding groups and long established te-
nants, and sales by customary authorities of land occupied and used by
members of landholding communities. In addition to overt disputes
and litigations, these problems have created widespread tenure insecur-
ity and difficulties in establishing uncontested access to land, especially
in peri-urban areas, creating problems for investment in landed prop-
erty and thus for economic development in Ghana.
Underlying this state of affairs is a general absence of effective prac-
tical administrative links between rights established through customary
rules and informal transactions, and the formal governmental land ad-
ministration system. Ghana operates a dual land rights regime, but the
link between administration of interests in land created through cus-
tomary practice and formal titles to landed property is tenuous to non-
existent. This problem is recognised by the government, which aims to
create such a link with the LAP. In recent decades leading chiefs have
consistently campaigned to reverse any measures that eroded their
functions and power. Since the present NPP government under Presi-
dent Kufuor is politically committed to the introduction of CLSs and is
broadly pro-chieftaincy in its orientation, powerful chiefs have seen in
LAP an opportunity to restore and extend their political and economic
control over land.
The aims of LAP-CLS
The goal of the LAP is to lay the foundation for an accountable, harmo-
nious and transparent customary land administration system from the
bottom up which will then form the bedrock for an enhanced formal
land administration in Ghana (World Bank 2003a). LAP is conceived
of as a long term project (government documents refer to a 25-year
planning horizon, and the World Bank has adopted a three phase, 15-
year funding framework). Under the LAP the medium to long-term
plan is that the government should divest itself of direct responsibility
for the management of stool lands. This should proceed incrementally,
on the basis of the satisfaction of certain criteria, including the setting
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up of Customary Land Secretariats (CLSs) with appropriate governance
structures to assure institutionalised community-level participation and
accountability in the use of stool land and the revenue it generates. De-
spite this intention, the government’s clear political choice at the incep-
tion of LAP was that CLSs should fall under the aegis of traditional
authorities, rather than seeking to develop more community based ap-
proaches to the management of customary land. Placing CLSs directly
under the chiefs ignores a reality in which the notion of the ‘custom-
ary’ powers and rights of chiefs is loaded with political inventions and
is used to endorse the roles that chiefs were accorded in land adminis-
tration in the colonial period, as if this were a timeless principle of cus-
tomary tenure (Amanor 2005: 110-111). In its first phase (2004-2008)
LAP has, however, adopted a pilot approach to the implementation of
technical and institutional innovations, including CLSs, through which
major blunders that might have lasting negative impacts on land ad-
ministration in Ghana could be avoided.
The DFID CLS project document sets out four principal outputs
sought for this component of LAP (DFID/Toulmin et al. 2004):
L CLSs established and/or strengthened in pilot areas, in partner-
ship with government land sector agencies;
L Improved quality of records and accessibility of information at
CLS level on land use and holdings, land transactions and avail-
ability, and associated financial and cadastral records;
L Improved CLS accountability, in line with the Constitutional pro-
visions, in a way that protects the rights of all landholders within
their communities, recognises the community interest in land
management, and provides an effective interface with democratic
local and national government;
L Better informed policy development. The implementation of the
National Land Policy by way of the LAP will involve further pol-
icy development in order to realise its key goals. The information
that this component generates, in relation to CLSs, will be ac-
tively managed in order to ensure that the process can be devel-
oped in the light of the best possible knowledge.
Early results of pilot CLSs
At the time of writing, pilot CLSs have been established in all ten ad-
ministrative regions of Ghana, and a further ten pilots have been iden-
tified. Following discussions with Regional Houses of Chiefs proposals
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for CLSs, and interest and willingness to support their establishment
and to meet their recurrent costs have been expressed by other chief-
taincies, in particular within the Ashanti Region.
Of the first ten pilot CLSs, Gbawe (Greater Accra) and Kumasi (Asan-
tehene’s land secretariat in Ashanti Region) were pre-existing, and in-
tended to benefit from support under LAP. An additional four pilots
were inaugurated in 2005: in Wassa Emenfi (Western Region); Kyebi
(Eastern Region);4 Tabiase (Upper East Region); and Tamale (Northern
Region). In early 2006 a further four CLSs were inaugurated: Odu-
pong Kpehe (Kasoa in Central Region); Dormaa Ahenkro (Brong Ahafo
Region); Sandema (Upper East Region); and Kete Krachie (Volta Re-
gion). The first group of CLSs were established according to political
criteria, including provision of support to powerful, politically influen-
tial chiefs, and achievement of an overall regional balance, so as to
avoid concentrating CLS resources in the hands of particular groups.
Based on past history of government interventions, chiefs were initi-
ally suspicious of government’s proposals to introduce CLSs. The
World Bank‘s natural resource management specialist for Ghana noted
that ‘at first, chiefs were afraid that the government would take away
their land’. However, these fears were soon dispelled. ‘We reacted
quickly and got their support. Now they like the project because we do
not prescribe anything’.5 At the inception of LAP, and prior to recruit-
ment of dedicated CLS development personnel, the government pre-
sented CLSs to traditional leaders as packages of equipment and tech-
nical support to help resource and improve the efficiency of their exist-
ing land management practices and has been reluctant to impose
requirements of equity and accountability, or to otherwise interfere
with how chiefs manage and dispose of land. According to a former
DFID Ghana rural livelihoods advisor, in conveying this message,
‘LAPU (the LAP Unit at the MLFM) has done more wrong than right
in its first year of the CLS project. Chiefs are now asking for their
money and package’. The approach taken has led to expectations that
government and donors will assume responsibility for meeting CLS
salary costs and other recurrent expenditures.6
Gbawe in Greater Accra is generally regarded as the paradigm of
CLS good practice (Kasanga and Kotey 2001). It is a fully functioning
CLS avant la lettre which was installed by the Gbawe elders prior to
LAP, and provided a source of inspiration for the design of the CLS
component of LAP. In Gbawe, LAP is working to help consolidate bet-
ter rent collection systems, improved land and financial records, in-
cluding published accounts, the provision of secure, registered rights
to settlers, and the use of land revenues to support community facil-
ities. The existence of an organised land allocation system, which facili-
tates settlers’ access to documented land rights, alongside investments
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in local infrastructure undertaken by the land owners, are reflected in
a high level of demand for residential plots. In 2005 the family elders
explained compensation arrangements for farmers who lose agricultur-
al land, including the provision of a residential plot, new farm land
where available, and entitlement to the proceeds of sale of an addi-
tional residential plot.7 The elders noted that a number of displaced
farmers were able to use compensation money to invest in more inten-
sive snail, mushroom, and poultry production ventures. Within a year,
however, the family head pointed out that no more agricultural land
was available, having been lost to residential development including
encroachment by neighbouring groups, and that Gbawe was ‘engulfed
by Accra.’ The development of the CLS was cited by the elders as an
important factor stimulating the demand for residential land in Gbawe,
leading to increased income for the family, as well as resources for in-
vestment in community infrastructure. Examples of new community
investment underway since the previous year include the construction
of a police station, a youth employment project, plans to improve sani-
tation, street lighting, and the provision of public toilet facilities.8 The
CLS does not, however, record or disclose payments of ‘drinks money’
to the family head, which, as noted earlier, constitutes the greater part
of all land revenues. Despite this sizeable limitation, the Gbawe CLS
provides an example of progressive practice in land management as a
spontaneous innovation by customary authorities.
In contrast, in other pilot CLSs linked to large and powerful stools,
the orientation of traditional authorities has been to use the CLS to
consolidate the centralised control of the stool over leasehold transac-
tions. In Kyebi the paramount chief is concerned with reining in local
chiefs who transact in land without authorisation and without account-
ing fully to the paramount stool. The Okyenhene, or Kyebi paramount
chief, has adopted a system whereby ‘caretaker chiefs’ are responsible
to the paramount chief for documenting and authorising land transac-
tions. In this manner, he seeks to control any local land transactions
involving commercial investment such as development of plantation
crops and residential land, including the conversion to new uses of co-
coa plantations established by tenant farmers under long standing
sharecropping arrangements with local families. The ‘drinks money’ is
then divided between the local chiefs and the Okyenhene. 5 per cent is
intended to go to the land user who has sought to dispose of the land
or has been required to give it up, but the use to which the money is
put by the chiefs is not disclosed.9 In Kumasi the Asantehene’s Land Se-
cretariat has operated since colonial times a system for administering
and registering land transactions in the Kumasi traditional council area
– also involving ‘caretaker chiefs’ – which has facilitated the stool’s cen-
tralised collection and management of ‘drinks money’.10 In both Kuma-
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si and Kyebi, the LAP has been perceived as an opportunity for the tra-
ditional authorities to regain the official support and authority over
land they formerly enjoyed under British control. In both of these cases
the expectations expressed by CLS staff appointed by the chiefs and
members of their traditional councils were that government would pro-
vide financial, technical, and material support to facilitate sales of resi-
dential plots to outsiders and improve centralised control of land reven-
ues on behalf of the stool. In Kyebi, the response of the LAP-CLS facili-
tator team was to organise systematic inventories of existing land
occupation so as to document the land claims of indigenous land
users, tenant farmers, and urban settlers. This exercise may in turn
provide a basis for eventual formal registration of land rights and more
orderly processes of land use change in which the tenure rights of all
are respected. In Kumasi, LAP has not yet reached an agreement with
the traditional authorities about how to work with the Asantehene’s
CLS, and no concrete actions have been taken, apart from the initial
supply of computer equipment and furniture.
In Wassa Emenfi in Western Region, government’s proposal to es-
tablish a CLS was welcomed by the chief. This is a predominantly rural
area with a high incidence of migrant sharecropping principally for co-
coa, where access to land is now becoming more competitive, resulting
in tension and disputes between indigenous and migrant groups. At
first the Stool’s objectives in developing a CLS were not clear, but it
soon became evident that the CLS was seen by senior members of the
landholding community as a way of seeking to maximise land availabil-
ity for profitable leasehold disposals to outsiders and, by changing ex-
isting tenure arrangements, to strengthen the claims of stool members
on lands held by outsiders. A first proposal of the local CLS coordina-
tor, appointed by the chief, was to use the CLS to convert the secure
tenure arrangements of migrants created through long-established oral
and sometimes written sharecropping contracts with landholding fa-
milies, arguably equivalent to land purchases (Alden Wily and Ham-
mond 2001; Amanor and Diderutuah 2001), into fixed term leaseholds
subject to rent collection and eventual discretionary renewal by the
CLS.11 LAP project staff disabused the CLS of the legitimacy and legal-
ity of such a move. The principles under which LAP operated, with the
support of the donors, were to encourage CLSs to document, without
discrimination, the full range of land claims on the ground, including
the established customary rights of both indigenes, which become vul-
nerable when chiefs sell their land, and tenants, who are vulnerable
where indigenous groups try to repossess their land. Following dialo-
gue with the Wassa chief and sub-chiefs, and a public ‘durbar’, it was
agreed that the CLS should seek to document land rights and support
the management of land transactions in the interests of all land users,
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and the CLS is now registering indigenes’ land rights, which should be
followed by the registration of migrants. However, as the inventory of
land occupation proceeded (a process coordinated by LAP project staff
as a pilot CLS activity), in at least one case LAP enumerators and visit-
ing evaluators were directed firmly away from migrant cocoa farmer
settlements by local sub-chiefs, apparently because of sensitivities sur-
rounding the competing land claims of indigenous and migrant
groups.
Elsewhere, pilot CLSs have been inaugurated in areas where custom-
ary political and land management systems are less centralised. In Kate
Krache in Volta Region a number of land-owning families have come
together to establish a CLS. In parts of Upper East, including in peri-
urban areas of Bolgatanga, the regional capital, where the customary
jurisdiction of traditional land priests (Tindana or Tendamba) over land
allocation is frequently now disputed by chiefs (Hammond 2003), the
establishment of CLSs has been regarded as a non-starter by the minis-
try. However at a recent LAP implementation support mission held by
government and donors, it was recognised that the pilot CLS process
may in fact provide opportunities to address these issues.
In response to lessons learned in the establishment of the first CLSs,
the CLS pilot programme has now moved from a supply-led approach,
with pilot sites selected by government to receive packages of equip-
ment and technical support to a demand-led approach, whereby the po-
tential benefits of CLSs are explained to traditional authorities, which
are encouraged to make proposals and indicate how they will assist
CLSs. Three key principles have been established as criteria for decid-
ing whether or not the LAP can provide support:
L CLSs should undertake fully inclusive documentation of land oc-
cupation and forms of tenure in traditional areas not confined to
leasehold transactions – usually traditional authorities’ and often
government’s main concern because these generate revenue for
the stool and for the chiefs themselves and supply land for in-
vestment, residential and commercial use, and for urban devel-
opment. This measure encourages CLSs to address the needs of
all types of land users and provides them with a minimum level
of security for existing land users;
L CLSs should link with existing customary institutions such as
land allocation committees and dispute resolution by councils of
elders. Traditional authorities should be willing to expand these
to make them more effective and representative, for instance by
inclusion of land professionals, women, and of District Assembly
and land users’ representatives;
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L Traditional authorities should be willing to provide premises for
the CLS to operate and to meet its recurrent costs (including
maintenance of equipment and payment of staff); this ensures a
sense of ownership of CLSs by chiefs and landholding groups
and a minimum degree of sustainability.
The programme remains at too early a stage to provide systematic evi-
dence of the effectiveness of establishing CLSs as a policy intervention.
Nevertheless, following the three years since the first pilot CLS was es-
tablished, indications of outcomes, challenges, and risks can be ob-
served. Rather than simply making casual observations about the per-
formance, potential, and risks of CLS establishment, we discuss these
in Section 3 from a political-economic perspective. First, however, we
consider critiques of approaches to land reform based on customary
practice and authority.
Critiques of customary land administration reform
Customary land rights are not the products of immutable customary
‘law’ but rather the outcomes of negotiations and implicit agreements
embedded in social relations of family, kinship, and community (Berry
1993). The renewed policy emphasis on the importance of recognising
and supporting customary tenure systems is subject to critique because
these social relations are inherently unequal, involving power relations
between ordinary land users and customary authorities. Chiefs’ powers
and opportunities to redefine customary ‘law’ in their own interests
may be increased by seeking to formalise or promote the customary te-
nure systems over which they exert significant influence and control.
Under growing demographic pressure, market development, and land
scarcity, the phenomenon of local elites using their power to privatise,
enclose, and dispose of land previously held in reserve for community
use has been identified in a variety of African countries (see for in-
stance Alden Wily 2003; Woodhouse 2003).
In the case of Ghana specifically, the approach adopted to CLS devel-
opment by LAP, which places a strengthened customary land manage-
ment institution under the control and authority of the traditional
chief, is criticised on the grounds that customary authorities in many
cases do not manage lands in the interests of their ‘subjects’ or of other
customary rights holders, because of the opportunities to generate rev-
enues from sales and transactions in land. These critiques (for instance
Amanor 2001:32-40 and 2005, Lentz 2006b, Maxwell et al. 1998;
Ubink 2008a) draw on anthropological and historical analysis of the
nature of customary rights which has questioned the long standing as-
sumption that within customary tenure systems, an individual’s rights
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are clearly defined by the individual’s place and status within the kin-
ship group. Investigation has revealed that in practice, land rights are
negotiable, kinship relations can be manipulated by the actors con-
cerned, and customary institutional rules can be ambiguous, so that in-
dividuals’ rights to resources pertaining to the group are not given,
once and for all (Berry 1993, Chauveau et al. 2006). In addition there
is empirical evidence of contestation of land interests and transactions
between customary authorities and land users (see for instance Ama-
nor 2006, Ubink 2007 and 2008b). Customary land management can
also discriminate against female landholders (Tsikata 2003), and some
analysts directly criticise the attempts by LAP to reach an accommoda-
tion with the chiefs and argue for the replacement of customary land
management by more democratic land administration systems under
the control of district authorities (Whitehead and Tsikata 2003). More-
over the CLS approach can also be perceived as in direct alignment
with a neo-liberal economic agenda which actively promotes privatisa-
tion of land rights and the emergence of free land markets (Amanor
2005). Some writers counsel that the conflict and contestation inherent
in the re-interpretation and re-articulation of customary land in order
to support the interest of competing land claimants is essentially insol-
uble by administrative means (Lentz 2006b), and that attempts to in-
stitute an equitable framework for customary land administration via
state and/or donor intervention are likely to be futile. Although these
critiques may suggest that it is better to do nothing than to do some-
thing, which risks strengthening the hand of traditional authorities,
they are otherwise silent on how policy ought to address customary
land tenure problems, even where existing policies and practices contri-
bute to problems of insecurity, conflict, loss of land rights, and poverty.
Political economy of customary land administration
There is considerable diversity in customary tenure practices and land
management arrangements in Ghana, and the choice of pilot CLSs so
far reflects this. CLSs operate in a context in which the traditional poli-
tical regimes governing customary territories interact with the formal
economy and polity, as well as with society at large. The same forces
that impinge on the economics and politics of agents and organisations
in the broader economy therefore also interact with the traditional re-
gimes and have a bearing on the success or otherwise of CLS opera-
tions. Of particular interest is any potential re-alignment (real or per-
ceived) of power relations among chiefs, their subjects (the possessory
land rights owners within the landholding group, traditionally subject
to the moral and political authority of the stool) and the government
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bureaucracy, together with the changing pattern of economic incentives
these realignments may present. It is therefore pertinent to discuss the
emerging evidence from the CLS pilots within a theoretical framework
of the changing political economic relations and incentives between
state, chiefs, and citizenry, as well as the political interests driving pat-
terns and styles of CLS establishment. In this section we discuss in
turn: how the design of CLSs could enhance the tenure security of
smallholder farmers and tenants; the interests of traditional authorities
in a customary land management system that lacks transparency; the
interests within government bureaucracy in resisting the transfer of re-
sponsibility to customary authorities; the impact of donor strategies for
aid delivery on LAP; and moral hazards inherent in the CLS experi-
ment. We go on in Section 4 to summarise the risks and challenges
for CLSs and consider possible ways forward.
CLSs, land markets and tenure security
With the establishment of CLSs the LAP aims to enhance certainty of
land rights for ordinary land users and enable greater discipline and ef-
ficiency in the land market. It is frequently argued that allowing mar-
kets to develop in peasant land rights creates landlessness and, rather
than reducing poverty, may entrench it. This view is contrary to the
conventional wisdom of neo-classical economics that enabling trade
(including trading in land rights) extends opportunities, creates growth
and, in the end, reduces poverty. Both lines of arguments appear to
have some empirical support from experiences in various parts of the
developing world. We argue that establishing CLSs to support land
rights transactions amongst land users themselves makes sense for
two reasons. First, land rights transactions are a reality in the land sec-
tor in Ghana. There is no way of stopping them with policy. In fact
they provide the principle means of land delivery in expanding urban
areas and for rural migrants seeking farming opportunities, and in-
creasingly, for the younger generation in general. Greater transparency
and efficiency will therefore be beneficial to all land users. Second,
CLSs provide an opportunity to combine the registration of newly
transacted rights (the initial priority of the chiefs, in order to facilitate
leasehold allocations and the generation of land revenues) with the re-
gistration of existing rights. Considering the current insecure position
of many smallholders in Ghana facing risks of losing land and liveli-
hoods as a result of land disposals by chiefs, this can considerably en-
hance their tenure security.
For CLSs to develop along the lines originally envisaged – to provide
greater equity, fairness, and transparency – they must provide better se-
curity of tenure for small land owners against the actions of powerful
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chiefs and elders. In order to do so they would need to evolve simple
and cost-effective land rights documentation practices suitably attuned
to the interests held by ordinary members of landholding communities
and by tenants who have acquired rights from those communities. If
this can be done effectively it would obviate the excessively high cost
and complex system of title documentation processes which the CLS
Project Memorandum (DFID/Toulmin et al. 2004) views as a barrier
preventing many customary land users from obtaining documented
land rights. Given secure documentation of land rights, land markets
could indeed perform more efficiently and operate in the interests of
the diversity of land users themselves and promote broader develop-
ment.
The implication here is therefore simple: when chiefs get involved in
transactions of land rights, they should do so in a fiduciary capacity
(see also Ollennu 1962) as recognised in the Constitution and in a his-
torical understanding of customary principles. The relevant issue
which policy should address is therefore the extent to which the CLSs,
or any alternative solutions for that matter, would align the interests of
chiefs with those of their subjects and the broader range of land users
concerning land transactions. Efficiency gains that emanate from trad-
ing land rights predicted by neo-classical economics will occur only if
the CLS as an institution is designed to ensure that members of land-
holding communities are principal rather than subordinate benefici-
aries of land transactions.
Suggestions for the replacement of customary land management by
more democratic land administration systems under the control of dis-
trict authorities (e.g. Whitehead and Tsikata 2003) implicitly assume
that the interests of the key personnel at the district authorities would
coincide with those of land users, whereas the interests of the chiefs
would not. The cavalier attitude with which District Chief Executives
(DCEs) are reported to handle finances of the District Assemblies sug-
gests that such a solution is likely to end up only replacing a vampire
stool occupier (who happens to be a royal from the land owning com-
munity) with corrupt bureaucrats or politicians who might not even be
members of the land owning community. Although it has not been a
priority in practice, a central issue for LAP to deal with is how the
CLSs are to be organised institutionally so as to promote the land
rights of subjects (smallholder farmers and urban residents) against
the stool and ensure that the opposite does not happen. The precise in-
stitutional arrangements for the management of CLSs are particularly
important given government’s choice that they should fall under the
aegis of traditional authorities.
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Chiefs, family heads and rights in land
As CLSs fall under the aegis of traditional authorities, we should con-
sider the incentive structure of the representatives of the customary es-
tablishments – chiefs, family heads, and their councils of elders. In var-
ious cases, the chiefs and elders of certain communities have coalesced
into an interest group that is vehemently defending and sometimes re-
interpreting customary land law to support the current opaque, some-
times inequitable, and somewhat convoluted system of customary land
administration. The chiefs’ administrative role in land rights transac-
tions enables them to appropriate subjects’ interests in land for purely
economic motives in ways that customary rules and principles, other-
wise interpreted, would not make possible. The LAP-CLS objectives of
delivering accountable and equitable land administration run counter
to those of these established interest groups, whose resistance to the
development of more accountable and representative CLSs as envi-
saged by LAP is therefore predictable. Ubink’s (2007 and 2008a) find-
ings of contestation of land interests and transactions between custom-
ary authorities and land users and between different levels of tradi-
tional hierarchies for command of proceeds from land rights
transactions provides evidence of this power-game being played out in
practice (see also Abudulai 2002; Alden Wily and Hammond 2001).
These circumstances are a consequence of the hierarchical power rela-
tions within customary land administration structures.
The establishment of CLSs, and the opportunities this provides for
centralising the management of land transactions and the recording
and formal documentation of land rights this entails can be observed
to create a number of risks, as these processes become subject to the
interests of chiefs and land owning families in a number of ways.
Firstly, they may seek to use the CLS to convert secure long standing
tenancy arrangements to short term leases, eroding the rights of the
tenants and raising the spectre of repossession by the landholding
group. Alternatively by concentrating on facilitating and documenting
new land transactions, and failing to document the rights of indigen-
ous landholders in a context of growing land scarcity, the CLS may be-
come an instrument for land disposals by the local elite, fuelling re-
sentment between traditional authorities and farmers as well as be-
tween the landholding group and newcomers acquiring land through
the CLS.
Land users, chiefs, and the bureaucracy
The opacity and complexity of customary land transactions results at
least in part from the opportunities for chiefs and family heads to
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make substantial untaxed profits from land disposals, but this takes
place in a context without effective links between formal land and cus-
tomary land administration arrangements. In fact the behaviour of gov-
ernment land sector agencies (LSAs) in relation to the management of
customary land is in line with that predicted by economic analysis of
bureaucracies’ disposition to centralise decision-making. The current
system creates incentives for key staff to build empires to maximise in-
come and power and to operate administrative systems represented as
indispensable which enable officials to extract rents from processes
such as deeds registration (Niskanen 1975 and 1994). These rents arise
both officially, in the form of stipulated fees, and unofficially, in the
form of bribes to ensure that applications and transactions are actually
processed, while in fact adding no value to the services provided. We
find evidence of this in the need for the Lands Commission’s consent
and/or concurrence of certain customary land transactions and the ob-
vious lack of effective links between actual customary land transactions
and formal administrative requirements.
In this context it is no accident that government bureaucracies – de-
spite expert legal views to the contrary12 – have insisted on an interpre-
tation of article 267(5) of the 1992 Constitution in a manner that re-
quires them to process all stool land transactions as leaseholds, when
in fact freehold or quasi-freehold transactions tend to predominate.
The treatment of all customary transactions as equivalent to leasehold
transactions plays into the hands of centralising chiefs who assert their
rights to dispose of land while also creating sources of revenue for the
Office of the Administrator of Stool Lands (OASL) and for District As-
semblies, who receive the greatest share of the money collected by the
OASL. At the same time, government’s failure to allow registration of
customary freeholds denies members of landholding groups the oppor-
tunities to document and secure their rights, and downgrades long es-
tablished land sharing arrangements between landholding groups and
outsiders, effectively making large numbers of land users tenants on
their own lands. Although there are those in government and within
LSAs who seek to modernise the agencies’ roles, there is as yet no
forthright attempt to do so as a result of vested interests which have de-
veloped on all sides.
One can therefore expect the bureaucracy to attempt to employ all
sorts of tactics to ensure that the LAP-CLS intervention does not upset
this power game. Indeed with landholding community subjects – the
possessory land rights owners – and land users so dispersed and lacking
a combined force to counterbalance chiefly interest groups on the one
hand, and the bureaucrats on the other, it is tempting to accept argu-
ments about the futility of the CLS idea. Given time, the LAP-CLS pro-
ject should however, be able to provide fuller evidence regarding this.
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LAP and the harmonisation of development aid
An important contextual feature of the LAP is the move within devel-
opment aid towards the harmonisation of donor strategies and inter-
ventions.13 As a result of this move, the contemporary development ar-
chitecture emphasises direct budget support linked to the objectives of
Poverty Reduction Strategy Programs. In countries which are consid-
ered not to qualify for medium term budget support, or as in Ghana –
which does qualify, but where specific sectors such as land are not
priorities for support through the national budget though they stand in
need of substantial support and reform – sector wide support can be
provided through pooled donor contributions for common pro-
grammes of action. LAP is the channel for multi-donor support to the
land sector, to effect a complex programme of implementation and in-
stitutional change. This, however, is problematic because the process is
managed directly by MLFM as the beneficiary institution, and the var-
ious Land Sector Agencies are expected to utilise the resources to re-
form themselves, build their capacity for new ways of doing business,
and moreover, the ministry is to pilot and develop the policy and insti-
tutional framework for CLSs as new institutions intended to relieve
government of direct responsibility for the management of customary
land.
Under the approach agreed by government and donors, donor sup-
port is provided directly to government structures to implement agreed
programme objectives. This approach – generally referred to as ‘main-
streaming’ – is, quite properly, intended to ensure knowledge transfer
and prevent the tendency of project outcomes to gradually dissipate
when the project is over and the project staff have left. However gov-
ernment bureaucracy is inherently resistant to change, and main-
streaming is regarded by MLFM and land sector agency staff as a me-
chanism to bring additional resources into MLFM and land sector
agencies to conduct business as usual. This reduces the incentives of
staff to implement change, since they are expected to incorporate the
project in their ‘mainstream’ activities at existing salary levels. This is
something which they are extremely stretched in doing, particularly in
view of the innovative character of many of LAP activities. To compli-
cate matters further, mainstreaming subjects LAP activities to the mo-
tives of politicians, whose goals can be expected to include the use of
project resources to legitimate their authority and to maximise votes,
without necessarily having regard for objectives of equity and/or effi-
ciency (see Tullock 1976).
In sum, the practice of mainstreaming, at least in regard to the es-
tablishment of CLSs, enhances the ability of the land sector agencies to
preserve the status quo and encourages a reluctance to bring about in-
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stitutional change which could lead to job losses or override vested in-
terests by removing rent-seeking opportunities. Institutional change, in
other words can jeopardise populist political agendas to maximise votes
if it undermines vested interests of traditional authorities, public sector
trade unions, or professional associations in the existing institutional
arrangements. For example, the initial top-down selection of the first
CLS pilot locations was motivated by political considerations to appease
powerful chiefs while being seen to be even handed by distributing
support for CLSs across the ten regions. This ‘supply driven’ approach
has proved inimical to the establishment of pilot CLSs as laboratories
for lesson learning on how to improve equity, transparency, and ac-
countability in the management of customary land. During the early
years of LAP, this has held back the development of CLS models that
are more demand driven, community based, or problem-centred, fo-
cussed on resolving land management problems, reducing disputes, fa-
cilitating market transactions amongst land rights holders, and gener-
ating revenues for community use.
The cumbersome system of procurement of goods and services prac-
ticed in MLFM presents another problem deriving from mainstream-
ing and frustrating the piloting of a series of technical and institutional
innovations including CLSs as a basis for lesson learning to guide fu-
ture strategy in the land sector. This has delayed progress and fru-
strated efficient decision-making required for the implementation of
an innovative project. Although the problems are frequently blamed on
the Procurement Act itself, as well as government procurement sys-
tems, it functions to the benefit of key managers, as it allows them to
maintain direct control of procurement and enables political influence
over the award of contracts and the selection of staff.
Moral hazards and CLS sustainability
There is also the potential problem, which economists often describe as
‘moral hazard’, of raising expectations that the state will provide on-
going support to CLSs, leading to a dependency culture amongst tradi-
tional leaders. The moral hazard is the possibility that traditional autho-
rities, after being supported with equipment and necessary training for
efficient operation of CLSs, employ the supplied resources with less
care, diligence, and efficiency than they would have done if they had
spent their own monies to acquire the resources. For example, there
have been expectations that the government would organise repair of
photocopiers supplied to Wassa and Tamale CLSs. This implies a per-
ception of CLSs as a state or donor initiative, rather than something
owned by the customary authority or by the community. There may
also, however, be general problems of affordability or access to technical
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support services, in which case the appropriateness of a pre-conceived
package of CLS equipment must be questioned. There are many exam-
ples of chiefs and village land committees investing in simple ledgers
and manual filing systems as a means of keeping land records, and
some CLSs, notably Gbawe, have established their own offices and
bought computer equipment and hired staff without outside support.
The willingness of customary authorities to pay CLS staff salaries
provides a key indicator of CLS ownership and sustainability. Although
all of the pilot CLSs have identified at least part-time staff, these are of-
ten friends or family members of chiefs, whose limited basic skills edu-
cation makes them unsuitable for further training and professional
roles. Inability or unwillingness of customary authorities to pay to re-
tain staff is emerging as a common constraint to CLS development. In
cases where land market activity and land revenues are low the estab-
lishment of a full-blown CLS may not be justified or affordable; on the
other hand in cases where the land market is more active, it is clear
that chiefs are not yet sufficiently convinced of the value of a CLS to
commit additional resources (even though their incomes may derive in
large part from ‘drinks money’), for which the ‘upkeep of the stool’ and
their personal income are always competing priorities. One option here
may be to develop greater cooperation with the OASL and use part of
the share of land revenues it retains to support salaries of CLS staff.14
Another main question regarding sustainability is whether CLSs will
be able to self-finance comprehensive exercises to document existing
landholding and established customary rights, both of indigenes and of
‘strangers’ or tenants. This is being done in two of the pilots – Wassa
and Kyebi –, though initiated by the CLS component of LAP and orga-
nised with project resources rather than by the customary land owners
themselves. The CLS programme has learnt lessons from the approach
it has adopted and is now seeking to extend and replicate these initia-
tives using simpler, manual systems; however, the compilation of such
inventories is nevertheless likely to prove time consuming and to re-
quire LAP or MLFM to meet the costs involved (transport, manage-
ment, trained personnel, and incentives for local traditional authorities
and key informants to collaborate).
Without clear incentives for ownership of CLSs, not only by tradi-
tional authorities but by landholding communities as a whole, there
are risks that equipment and resources continue to be inefficiently em-
ployed, with the result that CLSs never grow beyond their embryonic
stage and continuously need funding from the Ghana government
and/or donors. Concentrating project resources on a limited number of
CLSs may allow them to do a more comprehensive job, but this ap-
proach would prove impossible to replicate and would prevent the de-
velopment of any real ownership of CLSs by traditional authorities and
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local communities. The situation points to the need for state-traditional
authority and civil society partnerships to develop CLSs as institutions
which can bring benefits all round: to land users in simplifying land
access and improving security, to traditional authorities in exercising
legitimate fiduciary roles, and to the state as a means of improving
land management generally. This would also provide a firmer basis for
CLS accountability and eventual development of a reformed regulatory
and institutional framework for customary land management within
which CLSs have a clear role to play.
Challenges and ways forward
In this paper, we have discussed the involvement of traditional authori-
ties in customary land management and their attempts to appropriate
the interests of smallholder farmers. An important contextual feature
of this behaviour is the absence of adequate checks and balances on
the behaviour of the chiefs in managing and disposing of land (see
Abudulai 2002:83; Ubink 2007). Existing checks and balances within
the customary system are confined to the roles of traditional councils,
with whom chiefs are supposed to consult, or to the threat of destool-
ment of the chief. In either case challenges to chiefly authority require
the collaboration of the hierarchy of chiefs, elders, queenmothers and
other notables, yet the indications are that in those areas where the
land market is most active and land users are most vulnerable to dis-
possession, these groups have common incentives – the maximisation
of private gain accruing to chiefly and land owning families – and tend
to act together. The issue is an absence of remedies for individuals and
communities aggrieved by the actions of traditional elites.
The risks that the CLSs may be used by the occupiers of stools/skins
to further tendencies of dispossessing their subjects of lands are real
and have the potential of capturing and exploiting the good intentions
of the LAP CLS component. However there is at present no alternative
model backed by official Land Sector Agencies for establishing CLSs
under District Assemblies. In view of frequent tensions between chiefs
and District Assemblies such an approach may prove difficult politi-
cally, and there are no guarantees that it would offer a better alternative
for ordinary land users than the present approach to CLSs. There is a
significant risk that the government may not commit fully to building
equity and accountability in customary land management arrange-
ments. If the state were to press ahead with creation of CLSs as unre-
gulated estate agencies run by chiefs and landholding families, the
CLS experiment in improving governance and equity in land matters
would be a failure. Empowerment of chiefs through resourcing CLSs
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without progressing appropriate checks and balances could acquire a
longer term political momentum of its own. In response to this pro-
blem LAP began in 2008 to encourage pilot CLSs to develop better ac-
countability by including independent community members and repre-
sentatives of District Assemblies on land committees which supervise
CLS operations.
Another possible course of action in seeking to improve accountabil-
ity in customary land management would be to change the formal ar-
rangements and the balance of power and incentives between the state
and customary authorities in control of land and land revenues by
changing the mandate and redesigning the operations of the OASL.
However in the short to medium term, government is unlikely to risk
antagonising the chiefs by requiring public disclosure of land revenues
and accountability in their use, in order to secure the votes that the
chiefs command. Yet there is also an opportunity for the state to lead
by example in seeking to strengthen accountability: since lack of trans-
parency in the use of land revenues by the state is a significant com-
plaint of the chiefs, a first step would be the public disclosure by the
government of the land revenues collected and distributed by OASL
from each customary authority and of the uses made of these monies
by District Assemblies and by OASL itself. Disclosure of this informa-
tion be likely to strengthen public demands for accountability in the
use of land revenues by both chiefs and state. It would also give an
idea of the level of resources generated from land sales and rentals in
specific areas, and in which traditional authorities the operation of a
CLS should ultimately be sustainable – through funding by the stools
themselves, by OASL (who might for instance provide training or sec-
ond part time staff), by District Assemblies, or some combination of
these in a partnership arrangement.
The possibility that NGOs and civil society groups might play a more
active role in CLS development and advocacy in challenging land man-
agement by both state and customary chiefs is often invoked by both
government and donors. The state of development of civil society as a
whole in Ghana remains weak, in part because of historical tendencies
for emergent community and youth organisations to be co-opted, either
by the chiefs themselves or by the state (Amanor 2001: 112-113), and be-
cause the predominantly centralist orientation of post-independence
governments has restricted the emergence of a strong civil society. In
2007 LAP created a small grants fund intended to support engagement
of civil society with LAP activities at local level, including the develop-
ment of pilot CLSs, although at the time of writing, little progress had
been made.
In sum, analysis undertaken for donor agencies has concluded that a
variety of models of customary land management are possible and
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merit experimentation, which do not involve the direct control of land
administration by powerful chiefs, and that an enabling and regulatory
framework for the development of customary land administration will
eventually be required. This however would call for a more diversified
approach to CLSs than has been adopted so far, in order to identify
what CLS models are feasible, equitable, and sustainable. This in turn
is likely to involve a closer linkage in LAP between the reform of the
LSAs and the development of CLSs to overcome the present situation
in which these are parallel streams of activity supported by different
donors within the loosely coordinated but poorly integrated framework
that LAP presently provides.
If LAP can in fact maintain flexibility to develop alternative ap-
proaches to CLS development and to redirect efforts to address the
wider policy and governance issues in customary land management
both within government and more widely, there may be grounds for a
longer term donor engagement with the CLS process. A decision to
promulgate the Attorney General’s ruling on the validity of customary
freeholds and an active programme to adjudicate and register custom-
ary freehold or quasi freehold interests in land could potentially have a
major impact in improving tenure security and certainty in land access
for both smallholders and investors. This is something in which CLSs
would need to play a major role.
To summarise the challenges, they include:
L Balancing quantity and quality in CLS establishment: the need to
ensure an in-depth understanding of the implications of differ-
ent approaches to CLSs in different contexts, as opposed to a fo-
cus on numbers of CLSs established through the model of equip-
ment supplied to cooperative chiefs;
L Strengthening collaboration with chiefs while maintaining a fo-
cus on transparency, accountability, and equity in land access.
Although action can be taken at local level, this is likely to in-
volve efforts to achieve a wider political settlement between
chiefs and the state, involving the return of vested lands, greater
collaboration between CLSs and the LSAs (in particular the
OASL), better democratic accountability on all sides in return for
greater control of land revenues by the CLSs, and potentially a
professional training and staffing scheme for CLSs supported by
government;
L Developing civil society and professional engagement in the es-
tablishment of CLSs locally and nationally;
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L Fostering greater collaboration between customary authorities,
CLSs, local communities, and local government, through joint
engagement in land use planning schemes for urban land deliv-
ery, investing land revenues in community services and provid-
ing land for local economic development through, for instance,
high value horticultural projects and other investment schemes.
Once again this will require specific initiatives by LAP to bring
together separate actions supported by different donors (a land
use planning component supported by the Nordic Development
Fund (NDF) and CLSs supported by DFID) and with other actors
such as the US based Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC)
/ Millennium Development Account (MiDA) which is seeking to
link securing land rights with agricultural development;
L Building up knowledge of existing customary land management
practices to inform CLS piloting, along with the associated policy
and subsequent legislative development. This is also likely to re-
quire better integration of parallel streams of activity within the
LAP framework. One priority would be to link more closely the
CLS development process with the ‘ascertainment’ of customary
law and negotiations with Regional and National Houses of
Chiefs supported by GTZ. This will also involve fuller empirical
documentation of tenure dynamics and land management prac-
tices and issues in CLS catchment areas to ensure that the
Houses of Chiefs are not able to represent and re-articulate cus-
tom and advocate the oversimplification and premature codifica-
tion of customary ‘law’ to suit their own political and economic
interests. These processes should also be linked to area and re-
gion specific public debate about acceptable principles and inter-
pretations of customary law efforts, and to efforts to develop a
proper legislative framework for customary land and for CLSs.
This should include recognition of the validity of customary free-
hold, clarification of its modalities and the roles of different land
authorities and decision-makers in different parts of Ghana with-
in different customary traditions, and arrangements for adjudi-
cating the nature and strength of the rights held by different
land users, including both members of stools and landholding
families, as well as their lessees and tenants.
Meeting these challenges, however, requires a relatively sophisticated
strategic approach by government, and the full cooperation of the dif-
ferent development partners. There are already significant problems
with the delivery of the LAP through the existing ‘mainstreamed’ im-
plementation mechanisms, which may compromise the emergence of
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an effective policy, legal, and institutional framework in which decen-
tralised land management systems can develop. Despite government’s
commitment to working with customary chiefs, and the commitment
of key officials to the programme, the MLFM presently lacks the capa-
city to implement a complex programme, and to procure and manage
the wide range of technical input required. The MLFM is a difficult in-
stitutional context in which to implement a multi donor programme
aiming to deliver assistance through sector budgetary support, and in
which to undertake institutional reform of the land sector agencies it
oversees. This applies to LAP as a whole and specifically to the pilot
programme for CLSs. At the outset of LAP, a number of observers ex-
pressed reservations about ‘bolting-on’ a sub-component for support for
CLS piloting to the original framework of LAP which concentrated on
reforms to land administration in the formal sector. In fact the way in
which LAP has been implemented in practice demonstrates that de-
spite overall agreement on objectives and the need to cooperate, donors
to LAP do not share a common understanding and diagnosis of pro-
blems and proposed solutions, particularly in relation to customary
land management, having been instead primarily concerned with rea-
lising the specific objectives and priorities of their own projects which
ensure disbursement of allocated funds.
A continuing programme of land administration reform and capacity
building must engage directly with major land policy and institutional
change issues determining the governance of land resources, in which
arrangements for the management of customary land are central. CLS
development needs to become a core part of LAP business, something
which is now being recognised. LAP should also become central to
MLFM business, rather than the present situation in which main-
streaming is interpreted as incorporation of project resources into
MLFM and LSA business as usual, which involves preservation of the
institutional status quo, of political allocation of resources, and of rent-
seeking opportunities for officials.
Arguably, this might be tackled by greater rather than lesser main-
streaming of donor resources for LAP in a subsequent phase – so as to
encourage government to articulate a clear vision for reforming its rela-
tionship with the chiefs in relation to land management and to permit
the joint definition of key targets and milestones by government and
donors. Although full coordination of the different components of LAP
within a common programme framework is required, in order to ob-
tain the necessary flexibility – for instance to commission appropriate
research into tenure dynamics, organise public debates at local and na-
tional levels, and experiment with different models of CLS develop-
ment – the MLFM should be prepared to relinquish direct control over
some components of the LAP budget and the necessary procurement,
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by appointing appropriate managing agents, while building capacity of
a new, reformed LSA to operate in more business-like, efficient ways.
Conclusion
Unresolved tensions in relations amongst state, customary authority,
and citizens are a major cause of Ghana’s land problems. LAP presents
some opportunities to address this, but for this project to be effective
broad political will and clarity of overall vision are required.
The extent of local struggles and disputes over land in Ghana point
to the need to resolve two major issues:
L Clarification of the land rights of smallholder farmers – whether
‘subjects’ of stools and members of landholding families or im-
migrant farmers – vis a` vis the powers of chiefs and family heads
to dispose of land;
L An equitable settlement between the chiefs and the state regard-
ing the control of land revenues involving formal recognition of
traditional authorities’ and land owning families’ land manage-
ment responsibilities in relation to those of the state.
The attempt under the LAP to establish and strengthen CLSs takes
place in this context. However, the requirements for reform of revenue
collection and distribution arrangements and for transforming the role
of the OASL were not properly considered during project design. More-
over the interests of the traditional authorities go beyond formalising
their responsibilities and building capacities for land administration,
and a more far reaching settlement between chiefs and state would
most likely include the widespread return of vested lands, collaborative
programmes to improve relations between traditional authorities and
District Assemblies and to develop a workable division of rights and re-
sponsibilities.
To achieve more equitable and efficient arrangements for the man-
agement of customary land in the longer term a clearer legal, regula-
tory, and policy framework is likely to be required. This in turn is likely
to require amendment of the constitutional framework governing the
roles of traditional authorities and the OASL, in addition to the legisla-
tive and institutional reforms presently contemplated under LAP and
the practical implementation of existing provisions for the registration
of customary freehold land interests. In order to prepare the ground in
practice, and if the pilot CLS experiment under LAP is to prove a suc-
cess, not only will this take a longer period to bear fruit, it will likely re-
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quire a new approach. This includes a critical role for action research
in gathering evidence and assessing the impact of pilots and experi-
mental approaches, as well as in engaging policymakers in debate. The
fostering of public engagement in land debates is also required at a
variety of levels, for land users, land administrators, customary leaders,
government officials, and politicians.
Notes
* Julian Quan has from 2002 provided policy and technical advice on the development
and from 2005 until the present on the implementation of the Land Administration
Programme (LAP) Ghana on behalf of DFID. Janine Ubink has written her PhD-the-
sis on customary land management in Ghana, which included an analysis of the
LAP. Adarkwah Antwi worked from 2005-2007 as the National Facilitator for the
Customary Land Secretariat component of the LAP.
1 In addition the Attorney General’s Department, with support from GTZ, is working
to develop detailed knowledge of customary land management practice and debate
the scope for formalisation and harmonisation of customary land ‘law’ with Regional
and National Houses of Chiefs.
2 Article 267(6), Constitution of the Republic of Ghana, 1992 and sections 3 and 8,
OASL Act, 1994 (Act 481).
3 For a quantitative analysis of rent-seeking behaviour generated by this arrangement,
see Antwi and Adams 2003.
4 The CLS in Kyebi is intended to improve the management of the lands of the Akim
Abuakua Stool, under the Okyenhene, one of the most powerful paramount chiefs in
Ghana. A land secretariat at the Okyenhene’s palace was originally established during
the colonial period but following independence this was closed as the Nkrumah re-
gime sought to take control of land administration and limit the powers accumulated
by chiefs. Under the pro-chieftaincy Kufuor regime, re-establishing the Okyenhene’s
land secretariat was a priority at the beginning of LAP.
5 Interview with World Bank natural resource management specialist, 19 January
2004.
6 Interview with DFID Ghana rural livelihoods adviser, 27 January 2004.
7 Interview with Gbawe Kwatey family elders, 11 August 2005.
8 Interview with Gbawe Kwatey family head Nii Adom Kwatey and elders, 9 June 2006.
9 Interview with Kyebi CLS registrar, Kyebi, 15 August 2005.
10 Interview with staff of the Asantehene’s Land Secretariat, Kumasi, 16 August 2005.
11 Interview with coordinator of Wassa Emenfi CLS, Wassa Akropong, 18 August 2005.
12 See the position paper of Gyan 2005, which was accepted by the Attorney General’s
office.
13 See the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness: Ownership, harmonisation, alignment
results and mutual accountability. OECD Paris 2005 Available at www1.worldbank.
org/harmonisation/Paris/FINALPARISDECLARATION.pdf
14 Although chiefs often express the view that all land revenues should be paid to and
controlled by the stools, government treats the question of CLSs as a potential means
to improve efficiency and equity in land management quite separately from the con-
trol of land revenues. Under the Constitution, stool land revenues are collected and
distributed by the OASL, and a change to this system would involve constitutional
change.
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